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Clean Air Act Mobile-Source Provisions

Pollution has long been with us, and so have legal tools for
pollution control. The past few years, however, have witnessed a
veritable revolution in the law of pollution. Responding to a paroxysm of public pressure, legislative bodies at all levels of the American government have enacted volumes of unprecedentedly vigorous
pollution-control measures whose importance and complexity warrant detailed examination.
The first federal air-pollution statute was two pages long; the
present one, without case annotations, consumes 164 pages in a
pamphlet of the United States Code Annotated. Its bewildering
detail begins to rival that of the Internal Revenue Code. It has been
the subject of a substantial body of judicial decision, and the regulations for its implementation occupied two volumes of the Code of
Federal Regulations even before the 1977 statutory revisions.
The 1977 amendments have generated a renewed flurry of administrative activity. Significant new regulations appear almost
weekly, and a second round of judicial interpretation is in the offing.
My aim in this article is to furnish some assistance to lawyers,
administrators, and courts in the initial process of applying the new
law. In addition, I offer criticisms of the statute itself in the hope
that some of the mistakes Congress has made may be avoided, not
only in future efforts in the same field, but also in devising public
policy with respect to other problems for which government intervention may be thought desirable.
I.

THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

The basic elements of the present Clean Air Act' are derived
from the 1970 amendments, 2 which were the subject of detailed
revision in 1977.3 Provisions of earlier law for federal research, interstate compacts to fight pollution, and federal support of state control programs remain.4 A cumbersome conference procedure, which
allowed the federal agency to convene local, state, and interstate
enforcement bodies, was relegated to a minor role in 19701 and abolished altogether in 1977.6
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. 1 1977) [hereinafter cited to the original sections of the
Act and the current U.S.C.]. An enormous body of secondary literature is developing on the
Clean Air Act. In addition to the various books and articles cited throughout this article, an
entire issue of the Ecology Law Quarterly (volume 4, no. 3) was devoted to the Act in 1975.
2 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676.
3 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685.
§§ 101-106, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7406 (Supp. 1 1977).
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 114(b), 84 Stat. 1688 (repealed 1977): "A conference may not be called. . .with respect to an air pollutant for which
a national . . . ambient air quality standard is in effect . .. ."
£ Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 114, 91 Stat. 710.
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Direct federal regulatory authority was sharply increased in
19707 and strengthened further in 1977. The Environmental Protection Agency may now adopt emission standards not only for new
vehicles s but for all aircraft," for any source of a "hazardous" air
pollutant (defined as one that "may cause an increase in mortality
or an increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible,
illness"),'0 and for all new stationary sources of air pollution "which
may contribute significantly to the endangerment of the public
health or welfare,"" as well as for existing stationary sources of a
type regulated under this last provision. 2 The EPA may regulate
the contents of motor-vehicle fuels 3 and adopt measures to protect
the stratosphere. 4 Moreover, an emergency provision authorizes the
EPA, absent adequate state or local action, to sue to enjoin any
emissions contributing to "an imminent and substantial endangerment to the health of persons.""
Control of most existing stationary sources, however, remains
an awkward cooperative federal-state enterprise. The EPA itself
now promulgates the standards defining the acceptable quality of
the air we breathe, and it does so for the whole country. 6 But plans
to implement these standards are to be adopted in the first instance
by the states, subject to ultimate federal authority to ensure their
consistency with detailed statutory requirements." Complex provisions were added in 1977 to prevent "significant deterioration" of
areas cleaner than required by the air-quality standards,' 8 to protect
visibility in scenic areas,' 9 and to regulate new and existing sources
2
in areas not yet meeting the standards. '
II.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF RESTRICTIONS ON AUTOMOTIVE

POLLUTION

Transportation is the principal source of atmospheric concenSee Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676.
§ 202, 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (Supp. I 1977).
§ 231, 42 U.S.C. § 7571 (Supp. I 1977).
10§ 112, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(1) (Supp. I 1977).
1 § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(A) (Supp. I 1977).
12 § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d) (Supp. I 1977).
13§ 211, 42 U.S.C. § 7545 (Supp. I 1977).
" §§ 150-159, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7450-7459 (Supp. I 1977).
, § 303, 42 U.S.C. § 7603 (Supp. I 1977).
§9 109, 42 U.S.C. § 7609 (Supp. I 1977).
,T§ 110, 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (Supp. I 1977).
§ 127(a), 91 Stat. 731 (adding Clean Air Act §§ 160-169) (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7470-7479 (Supp. 1 1977)).
'1Id., § 128, 91 Stat. 742 (amending Clean Air Act § 169A) (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§ 7491 (Supp. I 1977)).
" Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 129(b), 91 Stat. 745 (adding
Clean Air Act §§ 171-178) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7501-7508 (Supp. I 1977)).
2
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trations of hydrocarbons (HC), carbon monoxide (CO), and lead,
and a principal source of nitrogen oxides (NOx).' Carbon monoxide,
lead, and nitrogen oxides have been identified by the federal government as harmful to public health and welfare at concentrations
frequently encountered in this country, 2 and so have photochemical
oxidants (principally ozone), which result from the action of sunlight on a mixture of hydrocarbons and nitrogen oxides.? Motor
vehicles have consequently been prime targets of regulatory efforts
to reduce and to prevent air pollution.24
A.

California and the 1965 Federal Statute

The injurious environmental impact of automotive emissions
was first discovered in California,2 and it was California that first
acted to regulate motor-vehicle pollution.2 6 In 1959, the legislature
authorized the Director of Public Health "to determine . . . the
maximum allowable standards of emissions of exhaust contaminants from motor vehicles which are compatible with the preservation of the public health including the prevention of irritation of the
senses." 27 The next year it required installation of control devices on
new vehicles, and in some cases on used ones, upon certification
that devices had been developed that were sufficient to meet the
Public Health standards.? Thus, although "public health" was the
basis of the standards, they were not to be enforced until the technology became available. Progressively stricter standards have been
adopted under these provisions and their successors, applicable first
only to crankcase emissions, but later also to exhaust and to evaporative fuel losses. The more recent standards cover nitrogen oxides
2
as well as carbon monoxide and hydrocarbons.
21 See UNITED STATES NATIONAL AIR POLLUTION CONTROL ADMINISTRATION,

AIR QUALITY

CRrERIA FOR CARBON MONOXIDE 4-1, 4-2 (1970); UNITED STATES NATIONAL AIR POLLtION
CONTROL ADMINISTRATION, AIR QUALITY CRITERIA FOR HYDROCARBONS 2-18 (1970);

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, AIR QUALrrY CRITERIA FOR NITROGEN OXIDES 3-1 (1971);
Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (lead).
u See authorities cited note 21 supra.
23 See UNITED STATES NATIONAL AIR POLLUTION CONTROL ADMINISTRATION, AIR QUALITY
CRITERIA FOR PHOTOCHEMICAL OXIDANTS 2-3 to 2-10 & passim (1970).
24 See generally Anestis, Automotive Air Pollution and the Clean Air Amendments of
1970, in ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 243 (L. Jaffe & L. Tribe eds. 1971).
21 See D. CARR, THE BREATH OF LIFE 81-82 (1965).
24The history is briefly recounted in Kennedy & Weekes, Control of Automobile Emissions-California Experience and the Federal Legislation, 33 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 297
(1968).
" 1959 Cal. Stats. ch. 200, § 1 (repealed 1967).
" 1961 Cal. Stats. ch. 23, § 1 (1960 Special Sess.) (current version at CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE §§ 24386, 24390 (1967)).
Z, See, e.g., Cal. Administrative Code, tit. 13, § 1955 (1977).
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Recognition that California was not alone in its difficulties,
combined with the desirability of uniform standards for manufacturers and users of mobile equipment, 0 induced Congress in 1965 to
make emissions from new motor vehicles the first subject of serious
federal regulation of air pollution. Section 202(a) of the Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Act 3' authorized the Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare to prescribe "standards, applicable to the
emission of any kind of substance, from any class or classes of new
motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, which in his judgment
cause or contribute to, or are likely to cause or contribute to, air
'32
pollution which endangers the health or welfare of any persons.
The criteria for setting such standards were very general: the Secretary was to give "appropriate consideration to technological feasibility and economic costs," '3' and the effective date of the regulations
was to be determined "after consideration of the period reasonably
necessary for industry compliance." 3 Acting under this authority,
the federal government tended to adopt nationwide standards that
had been tried before in California. 5
Technology Forcing

B.

Dissatisfied with the slow pace of progress under the 1965 law,
Congress in 1970 added a new section 202(b), requiring that emissions of hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide, and nitrogen oxides from
new "light duty vehicles" be reduced by at least 90% from 1970 and
1971 levels by 1975 or (in the case of nitrogen oxides) by 1976.31
See S. REP. No. 192, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1965).
entire Act was enacted as § 101(8) of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1965, Pub.
L. No. 89-272, 79 Stat. 992 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (Supp. I 1977)).
11

3, The
32 Id.
33Id.

1179 Stat. at 993.
3 See 38 Fed. Reg. 10,317, 10,318 (1973): "In general, Federal standards have followed
California standards by at least 1 full model year."
31 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 6(a), 84 Stat. 1690 (amending Clean Air Act § 202(b)(1)) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(1) (Supp. I 1977)).
Professor Rodgers has argued that these requirements were by no means as precise as they
appeared, since "the Act invites discretion in fixing the baseline and measuring deviations
from it." W. RODGERS, HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 3.14, at 297 (1977). See also
Jorling, The Federal Law of Air Pollution Control, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1058,
1114-15 (E. Dolgin & T. Guilbert eds. 1974). The 1970 hydrocarbon standard was 2.2 grams
per mile; the EPA, changing the test method, prescribed a 1975 standard of 0.41. A judicial
challenge failed because an emission measured at 2.2 grams per mile on the old test was
measured at 4.1 on the new: "All the Administrator did, in effect was translate the 1970
emissions figures from the original test procedure into a more accurate procedure and calculate the 90 percent reduction according to the latter." Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 359 F. Supp. 1028, 1030 (D.D.C. 1973). Thus, Professor Rodgers's conclu-
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These standards were to be "applicable" throughout the "useful
life" of the vehicle, 3 defined as five years or 50,000 miles, whichever
came first.3"
The new standards were dictated not by technological feasibility but by perceived need, in order to achieve projected ambient airquality standards in badly polluted areas. The needed reductions in
emissions were determined by a simple "rollback" model based
upon the proportional relationship between air quality and emissions: since carbon monoxide levels in Chicago were about five times
the expected ambient standard, emissions would have to be cut by
roughly a factor of five.39 It was explicitly recognized that the new
standards could not be met with technology available in 1970:
The Secretary is expected to press for the development and
application of improved technology rather than be limited by
that which exists. In other words, standards should be a function of the degree of control required, not the degree of technology available . . . . [T]he committee concluded that 1975
would be the earliest possible date for application of the proposed standards . . . , based on recognition that technology
may not be available to meet these standards within the next
year and that the regular lead time which, in 1964, the industry
indicated would be two years, should be supplemented by an

sion that the test revision "had the effect of relaxing actual emissions standards," W. RODGEs, supra, § 3.14, at 297, seems to be true only in the nominal sense, for the regulations
required 1975 emissions to be 90% less than those of 1970.
More disturbing is his argument that the Administrator disobeyed the statute by taking
as his baseline actual emissions from 1970 vehicles rather than those allowable under 1970
standards, and that the actual emissions were "considerably higher." W. RODGERS, supra, §
3.14, at 297. The source Rodgers cites for this argument does not clearly establish it. While
the EPA reported it had run "tests on 1970 model year vehicles," it did so in order to compare
the two test procedures; its conclusion on hydrocarbons was that "the 1970 standardsof 2.2
grams per vehicle mile. . . were equivalent to 4.6 grams per vehicle mile. . . using the new
test procedure." 36 Fed. Reg. 3529 (1971) (emphasis added). The discrepancy between the
4.6 and 4.1 figures is explained by the development of still another test between 1972 and
1975. See also Ford Motor Co. v. EPA, 604 F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (holding it proper to
limit nonreactive methane because it had been limited by the 1970 standards that were the
basis of the required percentage reduction).
17Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 6(a), 84 Stat. 1690 (amending Clean Air Act § 202(a)(1)) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (Supp. 11977)).
Id. 84 Stat. 1692 (amending Clean Air Act § 202(d)(1)) (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§ 7521(d)(1) (Supp. I 1977)).
" S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1970). Allowances were made for growth in
the number of automobiles and for the fact that older vehicles not subject to the new standards would remain in use for some years.
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additional period for the development of the control technology
required .... 40
The sanction, as under the original Act, was a prohibition on
sale of vehicles not certified as meeting the standards,4 ' enforced by
injunction upon suit by the United States, 2 or by civil penalties,
now of up to $10,000 per vehicle.43 But the threat of a shutdown of
the vital automotive industry for what might be an honest inability
to come up with the requisite technology was so drastic as to be
essentially incredible; Judge Leventhal spoke of "the reality that
this authority would undoubtedly never be exercised"44 and noted
that Senator Muskie, the bill's principal sponsor, had "stated quite
clearly in the debate. . . that he envisioned the Congress acting if
an auto industry shutdown were in sight."4 5
C.

Postponements

In fact Congress did provide an escape hatch, though of limited
duration: upon proof that demanding conditions were satisfied, the
EPA was authorized to suspend the statutorily required 1975 and
1976 standards "for one year," apparently with no right of renewal
since "[n]othing in this provision shall extend the effective date of
any emission standard . . .for more than one year."4
Affected manufacturers lost no time in applying for suspension
of the 1975 hydrocarbon and carbon monoxide standards. After extensive litigation, 7 the Administrator granted the suspension, setting two interim standards designed to require the use of catalytic
converters only in California in order to "minimize initial production problems . . .while requiring each manufacturer to 'gain production experience preliminary to use of catalysts on all conventional engines during the 1976 model year. 48 Further technological
problems resulted in additional administrative suspensions in 1973

40Id. at 24, 27.

"1Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 6(a), 84 Stat. 1693 (amending Clean Air Act § 203(a)(1)) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7522(a)(1) (Supp. 1 1977)).
42 Id. § 7(b), 84 Stat. 1694 (amending Clean Air Act § 204) (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§ 7523 (Supp. I 1977)).
43Id. § 7(c), 84 Stat. 1694 (amending Clean Air Act § 205) (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§ 7524 (Supp. I 1977)).
International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 636 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
Id. (citing 116 CONG. REc. 32,905 (1970)).
46Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 6, 84 Star. 1691 (amending Clean Air Act § 202(b)(5)) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(5) (Supp. 1 1977)).
41 For a discussion of this litigation, see text and notes at notes 129-227 infra.
38 Fed. Reg. 10,317, 10,319 (1973).
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and 197511 and in a statutory extension in 1974.11 Further extensions
were part of an extensive revision of the vehicle provisions in 1977.

III.
A.

LIGHT-DUTY VEmCLES

The Basic Emission Standards

1. The Statutory Provisions. One of the principal motive forces
behind the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act was the auto
industry's urgent cry that further postponement of the light-dutyvehicle-emission standards was necessary to avoid a disastrous
shutdown. 5 Predictably, Congress extended the deadlines once
again. Under section 202(b)(1)(A) the 90% reduction of hydrocarbons, originally scheduled for 1975, was set for 1980, and the like
reduction of carbon monoxide was scheduled for 1981.52 The ultimate nitrogen oxide reduction was not only postponed but also substantively relaxed: while the 1970 statute would have set NOx emissions at 0.4 grams per mile by 1976, the amended requirement is 1.0
by 1981.53 The new requirements are set out as follows in the Conference Report, subject to certain possibilities of waiver:
EMISSIONS
[Grams per mile]
Model year

HC

CO

NOx

1977-79
1980
1981 and thereafter

1.5
.41
.41

15.0
7.0
3.4

2
2
1

SOURCE:

H.R. RsP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 166 (1977).

2. The Explanation. One searches the House Report in vain
for a satisfactory explanation for these relaxations. The discussion
is devoted almost entirely to a defense of the pre-existing standards:
the technology was already available, the cost reasonable, the fuel
penalty virtually nonexistent, the much-touted fear of increased
' In re Applications for Suspension of 1977 Motor Vehicle Exhaust Emission Standards,
7 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1593 (EPA 1975); 4 ENmR. REP. (BNA) 577 (1973) (statement of EPA
Acting Administrator on requested suspension of 1976 NO x emission standards).
" Energy Supply & Environmental Coordination Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-319, § 5(b),
88 Stat. 258 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b) (Supp. I 1977)).
"1 See 8 ENviR. REP (BNA) 462-63, 509 (1977).
5242 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(1)(A) (Supp. I 1977).
51Id. For a translation of the 90% NO x requirement into grams per mile, see H.R. REP.
No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 233 (1977), reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
1077, 1312.
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sulfuric acid emissions greatly exaggerated, the need great. 4 The
Report concedes that despite dramatic percentage reductions by
1977 in new-car emissions of hydrocarbons and carbon monoxide per
mile, we had made little progress; because of increases in miles
driven, EPA figures showed that "since 1970, the total hydrocarbon
and carbon monoxide emissions from all automobiles on the road
has decreased by a mere 14 percent and 16 percent, respectively. In
the same period total automobile nitrogen oxide emissions have
increased by 16 percent." 5
With respect to nitrogen oxides, the Report was particularly
pessimistic: the EPA had found that "at all NO x standardsgreater
than .4 gram/mile, the nitrogen dioxides levels will worsen by the
year 2000, "51 that seven regions will exceed ambient NOx standards
in 2000 if emissions are allowed to remain at 1.0 gram/mile, and that
"[a] reduction from 1.0 gram/mile to 0.4 gram/mile will result in
approximately a 30 percent reduction" in "days of restricted activity due to lower respiratory disease in children."-" Further, the National Academy of Sciences had found that "relaxation of the 0.4
NOx standard could preclude some large cities, and locations downwind from cities, from meeting the ambient oxidant [ozone] standards.""8
Yet the House Committee recommended extending the dates
and relaxing the NOx standard to 1.0, leaving it to the EPA to
tighten the latter if necessary, and even the reference to tighter
administrative standards was omitted in conference.59 Ninetypercent NOx reduction-the pre-1977 standard-remains only a
"research objective," with significant manufacturers required to
build "demonstration vehicles" satisfying the objective by model
year 1979.60
The Senate Report attempted to give reasons for the relaxing
amendments. First, hydrocarbon and carbon monoxide extensions
were based on "the time needed to integrate new emission control
systems with fuel economy improvements, and to conclusively pre-

", H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 231-71 (1977), reprintedin [1977] U.S.

CODE

& An. NEWS at 1310-50.
Id. at 253, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws at 1332.
5 Id. at 258 (emphasis in original), reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 1337.
57Id. at 259, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws at 1338.
58Id. at 261, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws at 1340.
59 H.R. REP. No. 564, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 165-66 (1977), reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
CONG.

CONG. & AD. NEws 1502, 1545-47.
60

§ 202(b)(7), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(7) (Supp. I 1977).
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elude, through testing, the creation of other unregulated emissions."'" The Senate's proposed date was 1979; in conference it was
revised to 1980 and 1981 without explanation.2 As for nitrogen oxides, the Committee noted that "the exact level of . . . control
required for public health protection has been a matter of some
debate '6 3 and that implementation of a 1.0 gram/mile standard
would reduce the fraction of NOx emissions attributable to lightduty vehicles from 32% to 16% by 1985.11 The Committee therefore
concluded that "it is appropriate to place further emphasis on stationary sources . . . while adopting a somewhat more moderate
standard for autos."65 Finally, "a major factor in the decision to
alter the statutory NOx standard was the recognition that this
would expand the technological options open to the auto industry.""6 The 1980 NOx date (also extended by a year in conference)
was set "taking into account the necessary lead time. . . . In some
cases the available technology . . . may require further develop6' 7
ment for efficient integration into the vehicle.
Whether the Senate Committee's cryptic conclusions and the
additional unexplained conference extensions were correct I cannot
say. If one agrees, as I do, that the problem of automotive pollution
does not seem serious enough to call for shutting down the industry
at once, only exhaustive review of the technical data can reveal
whether the new delays were justified. The highly technical nature
of the decision creates a significant risk of misunderstanding that
is compounded when Congressmen with no special expertise and
myriad responsibilities insist on resolving the question themselves.
If we are to have administrative agencies at all, this seems the sort
of decision they should be empowered to make.
B.

Additional Light-Duty Standards Under Section 202(a)

1. Other Pollutants. The specific requirements for light-duty
vehicles under section 202(b) apply only to emissions of hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide, and nitrogen oxides. Emissions of other
pollutants remain subject to the rulemaking power of section 202(a),
41S. REP. No. 127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 70 (1977).
,2 H.R. RzEP. No. 564, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 165-66 (1977), reprinted in [19771 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 1502, 1545-47.
S. RsP. No. 127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 70 (1977).
" Id.
45Id.
"1Id.
67 Id.
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essentially the original 1965 provision,68 under which the Administrator "shall" prescribe emission standards for "any air pollutant"
from "new motor vehicles . . .which in his judgment cause[sJ, or
contribute[s] to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare."69 Sufficient time is to
be allowed "to permit the development and application of the requisite technology, giving appropriate consideration to the cost of compliance within such period."70
The Senate Committee in 1970 expressed the expectation that
section 202(a) would be used "for regulation of particulate emissions," and particulates are, in fact, the only contaminants other
than those listed in section 202(b) for which vehicle-emission
standards have even been proposed.7 2 Particulate standards
existed only for heavy-duty diesels73 until 1979, when the Agency
74
proposed particulate standards for light-duty diesels as well.
13 Compare Clean Air Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-272, § 101(8), 79 Stat.
992 (amending Clean Air Act § 202(a)) with Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No.
95-95, §§ 214(a), 215, 216, 224(a), 401(d), 91 Stat. 751 (amending Clean Air Act § 202(a))
(current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (Supp. I 1977)).
"142 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (Supp. 1 1977). For the genesis and interpretation of this terminology, see text and notes at notes 487-530 infra.
7042 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(2) (Supp. 11977). Sections 202(a) and (b) are silent as to rulemaking procedure. The 1977 amendments, however, added a new and detailed provision for
rulemaking procedure in section 307(d), which applies explicitly to "promulgation or revision
of regulations under section [202]," 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(1)(J) (Supp. I 1977), and to many
other rulemaking activities. Its requirements will be discussed in detail in a subsequent
article.
11S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1970).
72 Emission standards for lead were considered and rejected in favor of limiting the lead
content of gasoline, since section 202(a) authorizes standards only for new vehicles. See note
506 infra.
7-40 C.F.R. §§ 86.077-11 (1978).
1,44 Fed. Reg. 6650 (1979). In proposing the light-duty diesel standards, the EPA quite
unnecessarily invoked the authority of section 203(a)(3)(A)(iii), added in 1977, which requires
the Administrator to prescribe particulate emissions based on best practicable technology for
"classes and categories of vehicles manufactured during and after model year 1981," 42
U.S.C. § 7521(a)(3)(A)(iii) (Supp. 1 1977). Despite the apparently all-embracing reference in
this provision to "vehicles," the structure of the statute and its history suggest that the EPA's
reliance may have been misplaced. All the other paragraphs of section 202(a)(3), in which
the particulate provision appears, expressly apply only to heavy-duty vehicles. See text and
notes at notes 266-270 infra. The House bill had no particulate provision, and its section
202(a) (3) dealt solely with heavy-duty vehicles and with motorcycles. See H.R. REP. No. 294,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 407-09 (1977). The Senate bill, on the other hand, contained a single
provision, applicable only to heavy-duty vehicles and to motorcycles, that treated particulates precisely as it did hydrocarbons, nitrogen oxides, and carbon monoxide. See S. REP. No.
127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 193-94 (1977). In engrafting the Senate's particulate requirement
onto the basic framework of the House bill, the Conference Committee made it a separate
provision, reformulated the criteria for setting particulate standards, and left out the explicit
limitation to heavy-duty vehicles and motorcycles. The Conference Report, in a discussion
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The proposed standards are based on available technology as
applied to the worst emitters among current vehicles; they are expected to add $285 to the price of affected vehicles by 1983, offset
in part by increased fuel economy.7 5 Gasoline-powered vehicles are
excluded from both sets of particulate regulations since the EPA
viewed particulate emissions from gasoline engines as trivial.7 6
2. Nonexhaust Emissions. The section 202(b) standards,
though phrased as limits on "emissions," are understood to refer to
exhaust emissions." But acting under section 202(a), the Administrator has also forbidden all light-duty "crankcase emissions" and
has limited evaporative emissions of hydrocarbons from such vehicles to "6.0 grams per test,"7 8 which must be reduced to 2.0 grams
by 1981.11
3. Tightening the Statutory Standards. Even for emissions
covered by the numerical requirements of section 202(b), the Senate
Committee was explicit that the Administrator retained authority
"to set standards more stringent than those established in the statute."80 With respect to hydrocarbons and carbon monoxide, it is
clear from section 202(b) itself that after 1979 and 1980 the EPA can
promulgate more stringent standards, for the standards "under
subsection (a)" are to require a reduction of "at least 90 percent."'

entitled "Heavy Duty Vehicles and Other Vehicles," H.R. REP. No. 564, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
162 (1977), reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1502, 1542-43, (followed by a
separate discussion on "Light Duty Motor Vehicle Emissions," id. at 163, reprinted in [1977]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEws at 1543-44) says only that the statute "requires the Administrator to promulgate particulate standards based on criteria set forth in the House interim
standards provision." Id. at 162, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS at 154243.
Given the rule that the conference committee is authorized only to reconcile differences
between the Houses, Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 262-63 (1976), this history seems
to establish that the statute should not be construed to include a requirement of light-duty
particulate standards that was found in neither bill. The "vehicles" for which there must be
such standards are those with which section 202(a)(3) is concerned, namely heavy-duty
vehicles. The regulation of particulates from light-duty vehicles, however, is sustainable
under the general authority of section 202(a)(1).
7144 Fed. Reg. 6650, 6652 (1979).
7'"[D]iesel-fueled engines emit approximately 40 times the amount of particulate that
is emitted by gasoline-fueled engines equipped with catalytic converters." Id. at 6650.
1,See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 86.078-8(a) (1978).
Id. § 86.078-8(b)(1)(i).
7,43 Fed. Reg. 37,970 (1978) (adding 40 C.F.R. § 86.081-8). See § 202(b)(1)(c), 42 U.S.C.
§ 7521(b)(1)(C) (Supp. 11977) (prescribing that for 1978 and later light-duty vehicles evaporative emissions "be measured from the vehicle or engine as a whole"); § 202(a)(6), 42 U.S.C.
'§ 7521(a)(6) (Supp. I 1977) (requiring the EPA to prescribe "onboard hydrocarbon control
technology" if it proves preferable to gasoline vapor recovery by the gas-station operator as a
means of reducing evaporative emission during filling). Both were added in 1977.
S. REP. No. 127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 75 (1977).
" 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(1)(A) (Supp. I 1977) (emphasis added).
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For earlier years and for nitrogen oxides the statute is ambiguous:
regulations under subsection (a) "shall contain standards which
provide that such emissions. . . may not exceed" a given number
of grams per mile.12 Since the nitrogen oxide provision of the
bill on which the Senate Committee was commenting contained
language identical to that in section 202(b) 83 the Committee's interpretation should be persuasive that section 202(b) as ultimately
adopted merely sets a ceiling and does not require that the standard
be set at the specified figure.
4. The Relevance of Technology and Cost. In explaining the
omission of the pre-1970 requirement that the Administrator give
"appropriate consideration to technological feasibility and economic costs" in setting standards under section 202(a), the Senate
Report observed that standards "should be a function of the degree
of control required, not the degree of technology available today."'"
This passage may suggest more than it actually says, for the statute
still requires that in setting the implementation date for standards,
the Administrator allow sufficient time "to permit the development
and application of the requisite technology, giving appropriate consideration to the cost of compliance within such period. ' 85 The Senate Committee was arguing for technology-forcing standards, not
contradicting the statutory command that technology and cost be
considered in determining the date of compliance. As Professor
Rodgers said, "the technical and economic factors banished in developing the standards are imported into the equation in determining time for compliance."8 7 Consequently, the EPA has continued
to take technology and cost into account in setting each year's standards under section 202(a).88
C.

The Definition of Light-Duty Vehicles

The statute unhelpfully defines "light duty vehicles and engines" to mean "new light duty motor vehicles and new light duty
motor vehicle engines, as determined under regulations of the AdId. § 7521(b)(1)(A)-(B) (emphasis added).
S. REP. No. 127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 194-95 (1977).
' S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1970).
42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(2) (Supp. I 1977).
" "The Secretary is expected to press for the development and application of improved
technology rather than be limited by that which exists." 8. REP. No. 127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
75 (1977).
" W. RODGERS, supra note 36, § 3.14, at 296.
See, e.g., 43 Fed. Reg. 37;970 (1978) (evaporative emissions from light-duty trucks).
.2
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ministrator."8 The Administrator, in substantial accord with regulations antedating the use of the term in the statute, 0 defined a
light-duty vehicle as one "either designed primarily for transportation of property and rated at 6,000 pounds [gross vehicle weightJ
or less or designed primarily for transportation of persons and having a capacity of 12 persons or less." 9 '
Pursuant to this definition, small trucks and recreational
vehicles were subjected to the stringent section 202(b) standards
for "light duty vehicles." In International Harvester Co. v.
Ruckelshaus,9 2 the District of Columbia Circuit pointed out that
requiring small trucks to meet automotive standards would make it
impossible for such vehicles to haul large loads.13 It therefore held
the definition too broad. Despite the clear delegation of authority
to define "light duty vehicles," the court concluded that the
"legislative history reveals this term to mean 'passenger cars." "
The Senate Committee, for example, had spoken of "standards for
light duty motor vehicles (passenger cars).' 5 Accordingly, the court
held that light trucks were not "light duty vehicles" within section
202(b) and directed the Agency to reconsider the status of "multipurpose passenger vehicles," such as jeeps and campers, which also
carry heavy loads but which "largely overlap in their usage with
passenger cars." 9 On remand the EPA exempted these too.97 With
small trucks, they are now subject to separate standards adopted
under section 202(a).8
High-Altitude Provisions

D.

High altitude, it appears, commonly has an adverse effect upon
automotive emission control. Consequently, the EPA adopted a regulation requiring that cars and light trucks to be sold above 4,000
feet be shown to meet the emission standards at that altitude. As
a result, in 1977 "only 50 percent of all car models were available

"

§ 202(b)(3)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(3)(B) (Supp. I 1977).
See International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 639 n.87 (D.C. Cir.

1973).
:1 36 Fed. Reg. 22,448, 22,449 (1971).
32 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
'" Id. at 639.
"

Id.

, Id. (citing S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1970)).
478 F.2d at 640.
38 Fed. Reg. 10,317, 10,328 (1973).
' See text and notes at notes 271-284 infra.
40 C.F.R. § 86.077-30(a)(4) (1978).
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in the high-altitude areas covered by the regulations."' '
Congress therefore gave dealers and customers of cars sold
above 4,000 feet a break in the 1977 amendments. While by 1984
"[a]ll light duty vehicles and engines . . .shall comply with the
requirements of section [202] . . . regardless of the altitude at
which they are sold,"'' the EPA's 1977 high-altitude regulation' 2
-which makes applicable gram-per-mile standards for CO, HC,
and NOx-is explicitly made inapplicable to 1978 and later vehicles; the Agency is forbidden to make "[a]ny future regulation
affecting the sale or distribution of motor vehicles or engines...
in high altitude areas" applicable before the 1981 model year;' 3
and no such regulation for 1981-1983 may require "a percentage of
reduction . . .which is greater than the required percentage...
in subsection (b)" or establish "a numerical standard which is
4
more stringent" than that applicable at low altitudes.1
By imposing nationally uniform emission limitations in grams
per mile, the EPA had created hardship in high-altitude areas. But
by forbidding the Agency to make any special high-altitude provision for three model years, Congress leaves breathers in those areas
with no assurance that they will benefit from the tighter standards
otherwise mandated by section 202(b). As the Senate Committee
conceded, until the high-altitude regulations were adopted "urban
high altitude areas requiring transportation controls in order to
reach the public health standards were not even getting the benefit
of cleaner cars. The severe problem of cities such as Denver has been
exacerbated, despite the installation of emission control technol5
ogy."

0

Whether Congress's decision for 1978-1980 is a sound one
cannot be answered ivithout more information about the effect of
high altitude on auto emissions. One hopes the -impact is slight;
otherwise Congress in the short run -has sacrificed the comfort of
all people in smoggy high areas to which Judge Leventhal in Inter,0 S. REP. No. 127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 87 (1977).
101§ 206(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7525(f)(1) (Supp. 1 1977).

40 C.F.R. § 86.077-310(9)(4) (1978).
§ 202 (f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(f)(1) (Supp. I 1977).
'4 § 202(f)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(f)(2) (Supp. I 1977). Subparagraph (3) of this section
makes applicable to the adoption of such regulations the rulemaking procedure of section
307(d) and specifies factors to be taken into account in setting such a regulation. "High
altitude" is not defined; the Senate Committee, without appearing to attempt to prescribe,
said the statute would require a test at "a high altitude specified by regulation (presumably
4,000 feet)," the level specified in the 1977 regulation. S. REP. No. 127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
87 (1977).
"I S. REP. No. 127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 88 (1977).

1979]

Clean Air Act Mobile-Source Provisions

nationalHarvester pungently
characterized as "the driving prefer10 6
ences of hot rodders."'
For the 1981-1983 period the EPA may do something about
high-altitude emissions, but within limits. It was the evident inability to achieve the same gram-per-mile emission levels at high
as at low altitudes that caused the shortage of models at high
altitudes; thus it makes sense that in absolute terms high-altitude
limits maynot be more stringent. Equity seemingly accounts for the
additional requirement that no greater percentage reductions be
required at high than at low altitudes, as would the fact, if established, that technology does not permit greater percentage reductions at high altitudes. 107
The statute's requirement that by 1984 all cars meet "the requirements of section [202]' 0 regardless of altitude is ambiguous,
since for two pollutants (CO and HC) that section prescribes percentage reductions,0 9 while for the third (NOx), as the 1977 EPA
regulations do for all three, it imposes a standard in grams per
mile." 0 On the face of the statute, the 1984 provision arguably could
be satisfied for carbon monoxide and hydrocarbons if the regulations required equal percentage reductions at all altitudes. But such
a construction would arguably depart from the Senate Committee's
purpose to afford all areas "the same cleanup benefit" and from its
paraphrase of the provision as requiring that all models comply
"with applicable emission standards.""' These passages may seem
to suggest that Congress intended, as under the 1977 EPA regulation, to require compliance with uniform performance standards at
all altitudes in grams per mile.

104

478 F.2d at 640.

I suspect the effect of the limitation will be to forbid greater percentage reductions at
high than at low altitudes, though the actual basis of comparison is the percentage reduction
"as set forth in subsection (b)," not that actually applicable at low altitudes. § 202(f)(2), 42
U.S.C. § 7521(f)(2) (Supp. I 1977). In theory these might differ: while the percentages "set
forth in subsection (b)" for 1981-1983 are 90% for carbon monoxide and hydrocarbons, the
regulations are to require "at least" that degree of reduction. Apparently 90% is to be the
limit of HC and CO reduction required at high altitude even if a greater reduction is required
elsewhere. Although a requirement exceeding 90% in those years may be unlikely, I do not
see why, without a showing that altitude affects the percentage reduction achievable, Congress should have made such a distinction.
IS § 206(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7525(0(1) (Supp. 1 1977).
"
§ 202(b)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(1)(A) (Supp. I 1977).
", § 202(b)(1)(B),
42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(1)(B) (Supp. I 1977).
'
S. REP. No. 127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 87 (1977). While the dates in the Senate bill
were different from those ultimately adopted, the same reference was made to "the requirements of section 202," which in that bill also combined percentage and performance requirements, at the time phrased in grams per mile. Id. at 194-95, 203.
"
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This interpretation sounds attractive as a means of assuring the
necessary degree of control at high altitudes. Yet it may prove undesirably rigid. Although the statutory levels were chosen because of
their relation to public health, the calculations were not made with
high-altitude conditions in mind and were derived from a rollback
model that seemed to focus on percentage reductions.112 These calculations do not by themselves prove that identical performance
standards are needed to achieve the same beneficial effects at high
altitudes. Conversely, the requirement of uniformity fails to allow
for the possibility that continuing technological disparities may
make it impossible to achieve identical high- and low-altitude standards. In other words, the uniformity requirement may in effect
mean that the EPA cannot require stricter controls at sea level,
however feasible and necessary, unless they are also feasible in other
places where they may not be needed.
It should be noted that the 1977 regulation applied only to
3
light-duty vehicles and to light trucks, not to heavy-duty vehicles;"
that the prohibition on special high-altitude requirements before
1981 and the limits on later regulations apply to all vehicles;" 4 and
that the 1984 equality provision reaches only "light duty vehicles." 11 5 High-altitude regulations for other vehicles in 1984 and
later years will be determined by the Administrator subject to the
limitations applicable to all vehicles in 1981-1983. This may mean
that what the statute requires as to cars it forbids as to trucks, for
in the case of the latter no greater percentage reduction may be
required at high than at low altitude. I see no justification for such
an inconsistency.
E.

Waiver Provisions

1. Nitrogen Oxides. Three safety valves are provided in the
1977 amendments for further administrative relaxation of the
nitrogen oxides standard of section 202(b). The first, in section
202(b) (1) (B), allows the relatively small manufacturer (fewer than
300,000 vehicles worldwide in 1976) up to 2 grams per mile until
1983 on a showing that he is "dependent upon technology developed
by other manufacturers" and "lacks the financial resources and
technological ability to develop such technology.""' The other two,
,,2 See S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 25-27 (1970).
,,3 40 C.F.R. § 86.077-30(a)(4) (1978).
"I § 202(f)(1)-(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(f)(i)-(2) (Supp. 1 1977).
", § 206(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7525(f)(1) (Supp. 1 1977).
"' 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(1)(B) (Supp. 1 1977). American Motors Corporation was granted
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in sections 202(b)(6)(A) and (B)," 7 allow any manufacturer up to 1.5
grams per mile for as many as four years if he can demonstrate that
the exemption will encourage, respectively, the development of an
"innovative power train technology, or innovative emission control
device or system" or "the use of diesel engine technology," the latter
of which was viewed as "a very useful means of meeting fuel econ8
omy requirements."111
In either of these latter two cases the Administrator must find
that a waiver will "not endanger public health" and that the technology involved "has a potential for longterm air quality benefit and
has the potential to meet or exceed" applicable fuel-economy standards at the end of the waiver."' In addition, a diesel waiver may
be granted only if there promise to be "significant fuel savings at
2
least equal to the fuel economy standard applicable in each year,"' '
and other innovative waivers only if "there is a substantial likelihood that the vehicles will be able to comply with the applicable
[NOx] standard. . . at the expiration of the waiver."' ' 2' The latter
may be granted for no more than "5 percent of such manufacturer's
production or more than fifty thousand vehicles or engines, whichever is greater.' 22 "Opportunity for public hearing" is required for
innovative and diesel waivers;'2 3 nothing is said of procedure respecting the small-manufacturer extension of section 202(b)(1)(B).
These waiver provisions appear to allow for sensible minor adjustments to the overall statutory plan, and they rightly leave it to
the Agency to determine whether the statutory policies are in fact
satisfied. Somewhat uncertain in its impact is the understandable
insistence that there be no danger to public health. Since ambient
levels of both nitrogen oxides and oxidants exceeded health-related
levels in many areas when the amendments were adopted,' 24 a strict
interpretation of the health requirement might render the waiver
provisions entirely nugatory. It would seem more consistent with
congressional expectations to read the proviso as requiring that the

a waiver in August, 1979. 44 Fed. Reg. 47,780, 47,884 (1979) (amending 40 C.F.R. § 86.081-

8(iii)).
"7 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(6)(A)-(B)

(Supp. I 1977).

"I H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 249 (1977), reprinted in [19771 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 1077, 1328.

"I § 202(b)(6)(A)-(B), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(6)(A)-(B) (Supp. I 1977).
120§ 202(b)(6)(B)(ii), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(6)(B)(ii) (Supp. I 1977).
"I § 202(b)(6)(A)(ii), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(6)(A)(ii) (Supp. I 1977).
" § 202(b)(6)(A)(iii), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(6)(A)(iii) (Supp. I 1977).
21 § 202(b)(6)(A)-(B), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(6)(A)-(B) (Supp. I 1977).
"I See HR. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 207-08 (1977), reprinted in [19771 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1077, 1286-87.
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waiver itself not significantly exacerbate the existing health dan-

gers; the EPA does so interpret

it.125

2. Carbon Monoxide. More complicated provisions in section
202(b)(5), derived from earlier sections under which previous extensions were granted, authorize the Administrator "after public hearing" to allow up to 7.0 grams per mile of carbon monoxide-twice
the statutory standard-during model years 1981 and 1982.26 The
criteria for this waiver are quite demanding:
The Administrator may grant such waiver if he finds that protection of the public health does not require attainment of such
90 percent reduction for carbon monoxide for the model years
to which such waiver applies in the case of such vehicles and
engines and if he determines that(i) such waiver is essential to the public interest or
the public health and welfare of the United States;
(ii) all good faith efforts have been made to meet the
standards established by this subsection;
(iii) the applicant has established that effective
control technology, processes, operating methods, or othef
alternatives are not available or have not been available
with respect to the model in question for a sufficient period of time to achieve compliance prior to the effective
date of such standards, taking into consideration costs,
driveability, and fuel economy; and
(iv) studies and investigations of the National
Academy of Sciences conducted pursuant to subsection
(c) of this section ana other information available to him
has not indicated that technology, processes, or other alternatives are available (within the meaning of clause
12
(iii)) to meet such standards. 1
No similar provision was made for hydrocarbons or nitrogen
oxides. Presumably, though the reports do not say so, Congress
thought there was less doubt that the requisite technology for those
pollutants would be available in time.
In September 1979, the Administrator granted waivers of the
1981-1982 CO standards for certain vehicle models and denied waivers for others.'2
'2 See 43 Fed. Reg. 30, 31 (1978).
1'2

42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(5)(A)-(B) (Supp. I 1977).

'- Id. § 7521(b)(5)(C).
"2

44 Fed. Reg. 53,376 (1979).
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With two exceptions discussed below, the criteria for a carbon
monoxide waiver under section 202(b)(5) are identical to those in
force when the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
passed upon the Administrator's initial denial of a suspension of
1975 requirements in InternationalHarvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus.'"
That opinion therefore sheds considerable light on the meaning of
the current provisions.
a. Unavailable Technology. The central focus of the
InternationalHarvester litigation was on the requirement, now in
paragraph (iii), that the necessary technology not be available in
time to permit compliance. In requesting a waiver, the manufacturers pointed out that only one of the 500 test vehicles had met the
standards, and that none had actually been driven the requisite
50,000 miles. But the EPA denied the suspension, predicting that
catalytic converters would make compliance possible in time for
1975 production. Taking a close look at the record, the court remanded for further proceedings on the ground that the Agency had
relied on several inadequately established assumptions. In the
course of the opinion, however, the court settled several propositions
of general significance.
i. Forecasting, Model Diversity, and Catalyst Replacement.
First, the court held, the EPA was right that denial of a suspension
was permissible although the technology was not fully developed at
the time of the application; since manufacturers had "admitted
that technological improvements can continue during the two years
prior to production," it was permissible to predict improvements,
"subject to the restraints of reasonableness" and "limited by relevant considerations of lead time needed for production.' ' 10 There is
some difficulty in squaring this result with the statutory reference

to technologies that "are" or "have . . . been"' 31 available, which

seems to speak to the time of the waiver decision; but the court
surely was faithful to the congressional purpose as reflected in the
further words "a sufficient period of time to achieve
compliance
32
prior to the effective date of such standards.'

The court also held in InternationalHarvester:
We are inclined to agree with the Administrator that as long
as feasible technology permits the demand for new passenger
478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
Id. at 629.
222 § 202(b)(5)(c)(iii), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(5)(C)(iii) (Supp. 11977).
"

13

Id.
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automobiles to be generally met, the basic requirements of the
Act would be satisfied, even though this might occasion fewer
models and a more limited choice of engine types. The driving
preferences of hot rodders are not to outweigh the goal of a
133
clean environment.
As the statute stood at the time, this seemed a reasonable interpretation, for the statute required a showing that the requisite technology was not "available" without specifying for which models. 34 The
1977 amendments, however, revised the language to permit waiver
on proof that the technology was unavailable "with respect to the
model in question."' 135 The Agency accordingly appeared to depart
from the InternationalHarvester interpretation in granting 19811982 waivers under the revised provision, despite the availability of
technology for other models, in order to preserve competition and
1
avoid unemployment. 3
In this last decision the Administrator also resolved an additional question of significance with respect to the availability of
technology. Certain models, he found, could be made to meet the
standards by replacement of the catalyst once during the statutory
period of "useful life." Nevertheless he granted the waiver as to
these models, plausibly reasoning that the likelihood that the consumer would neglect to make the replacement rendered the technol37
ogy not "effective," as required by the statute.
ii. Cost. As enacted in 1970, the suspension provision made no
mention of excessive cost, of impaired performance, or of harmful
emission of other pollutants;" 3 arguably the statute forbade an extension, so long as technology was "available" to achieve the standard, even if its use would cause a 50% drop in fuel economy, double
the price of automobiles, and poison passers-by with horrible metals.
Predictably, when it was feared that catalytic converters created a risk of harmful sulfuric acid emissions, the Administrator
found a way to grant another extension. The statute required that
"effective" technology be available, and "Congress could not have
478 F.2d at 640.
"I Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 6(a), 84 Stat. 1691 (amending Clean Air Act § 202(b)(5)(C)) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(5)(C)(iii) (Supp. I
1977)).
133§ 202(b)(5)(C)(iii), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(5)(C)(iii) (Supp. 1 1977).
'3 44 Fed. Reg. 53,376, 53,378, 53,382-83 (1979).
Id. at 53,376, 53,377, 53,380-81.
"'

3 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 6(a), 84 Stat. 1691 (amending Clean Air Act § 202(b)(5)) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(5) (Supp. I 1977)).
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intended that 'effective' would describe a technology that did more
' 3
harm to public health in one aspect than it prevented in another.' 1
Thus did administrative common sense compensate for inept drafting; the EPA might easily have concluded, and perhaps ought to
have concluded, that Congress, as is its prerogative, had meant to
do something quite foolish.
Fortunately, the 1977 amendments confirm the Agency's interpretation by adding that the determination of availability under
paragraph (iii) is to be made "taking into consideration costs
[which should be read broadly to include environmental ones'40 ],
driveability, and fuel economy."'' Unfortunately, the EPA has chosen to give costs a rather minimal consideration that may be inconsistent with the statute. In denying waivers of certain 1981-1982
models, the Administrator stated that cost renders technology unavailable only if it is so great as "to make the engine family unable
to remain reasonably competitive in the marketplace.' 4 2 I should
have thought "taking [costs] into consideration" meant determining whether the costs were unreasonable when compared with the
benefits.
As redefined to incorporate costs, the unavailability of technology remains a necessary but not sufficient ground for suspension.
b. NAS Study. A second and somewhat vague requirement for
suspension, in paragraph (iv), is that a study by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) and "other information available" to EPA
"has not indicated" that the technology is available.' Perhaps this
means only that the EPA is to consider the NAS report in determining whether technology is available, but that it is stated as an independent requirement lends strength to the startling conclusion that
Congress has given a quasi-public association an unreviewable veto
power."' If an extension is in the public interest, the statute should
'' In re Applications for Suspension of 1977 Motor Vehicle Exhaust Emission Standards,
7 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1593, 1597 (EPA 1975). Cf. Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486
F.2d 375, 385 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding that references to "the best. . . system of emission
. . . reduction" and to "the cost of achieving such reduction" in section 111 of the Act
(current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (Supp. 11977)), "require the Administrator to take
into account counter-productive environmental effects of a proposed standard").
-40See Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 385 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
M § 202(b)(5)(C)(iii), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(5)(C)(iii) (Supp. I 1977).
14244. Fed. Reg. 53,376, 53,381, 53,385 (1979).
"1 § 202(b)(5)(C)(iv), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(5)(C)(iv) (Supp. I 1977).
M The court of appeals seems to have agreed in dictum with the latter interpretation:
"The statute makes the NAS conclusion a necessary but not sufficient condition of suspension." 478 F.2d at 649. In granting the 1975 extension after remand in InternationalHarvester,
the Administrator ducked the veto issue. AltHough NAS had flatly reported that "vehicles
incorporating certified systems 'can be mass-produced in great enough volume to satisfy, in
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require it to be granted, whether or not the NAS agrees.
c. Public Interest. Paragraph (i) imposes the additional requirement that the waiver be "essential to the public interest or the
public health and welfare."' 4 5 Since the theoretical consequence of
inability to meet the standards may be a catastrophic limitation of
auto production, a public-interest finding may be virtually inevitable if the technology is not available; yet making the requirement
clear in the statute properly focuses attention on the benefits as well
as on the costs of compliance.'
d. Good Faith. The final criterion of the 1970 statute,'4 7 preserved in paragraph (ii) of the 1977 amendments, was that "all good
faith efforts have been made to meet the standards. 1 8 In principle,
this limitation is attractive. In practice, the severity of possible
consequences of denying a waiver promises to make it essentially
4 9
unenforceable.
On remand from the InternationalHarvester decision, for example, the Administrator expressed doubts as to Chrysler's good
faith: Chrysler expenditures for emission-control research, per dollar of sales volume, had been about a third of those of Ford or of
General Motors;!59 Chrysler had changed plans when rather well
along, making "certain sacrifices in the progress of its technology
. . . to achieve cost savings";' 5 ' and a catalyst manufacturer had
testified that Chrysler had refused to buy its product "for reasons
materially influenced by the aggressive testimony of [the supplier]
• . . at the EPA hearings last year."' 5 2 Yet because of the serious
consequences of a suspension denial on large numbers of innocent
aggregate, the expected demand for vehicles in model year 1975,'" the Administrator affected
to find NAS in agreement with his own conclusion: "The NAS itself admitted that there is a
chance that a significant number of engine families would not certify and did not deny that
production problems were a significant possibility. . . ." 38 Fed. Reg. 10,317, 10,325 (1973).
Once again the Agency appears to have given short shrift to a statutory requirement that
could interfere with rational administration if taken seriously.
,, § 202(b)(5)(C)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(5)(C)(i) (Supp. I 1977).
'" On remand from InternationalHarvester,the Administrator found the risk of failure
in mass production decisive in light of its adverse effects on the automobile industry. 38 Fed.
Reg. 10,318 (1973).
"I Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 6(a), 84 Stat. 1692 (amending Clean Air Act § 202(b)(5)(D)(ii) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(5)(C)(ii) (Supp.
I 1977)).
§ 202(b)(5)(C)(ii), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(5)(C)(ii) (Supp. 1 1977).
"' See W. RODGERS, supra note 36, § 3.14, at 299: "The devastating impact of a finding
of bad faith for all practical purposes assures the extinction of the provision."
38 Fed. Reg. 10,317, 10,327 (1973).
' Id.
at 10,328.
152Id.

at 10,327.
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people, the Administrator nevertheless concluded "with serious reservations" that Chrysler had acted in good faith. 5 '
e. Public Health. The 1977 amendments, without committee
explanation, add still another requirement: the Administrator must
find "that protection of the public health does not require attainment of such 90 percent reduction for carbon monoxide for the
model years to which such waiver applies."'54 Since the statute already required that the waiver be "essential to the public interest
or the public health,"'55 one might think the additional health requirement superfluous. In any case, the presence of the publicinterest requirement seems to suggest that the health provision
means something other than a mere balancing of health concerns
against risk of shutdown, since this much was implicit in "public
interest." The resulting inference is that Congress meant to forbid
an extension absolutely, without regard to this balance, if failure to
meet the standard would be harmful to public health.
I have elsewhere criticized the tendency to require absolute
health protection without regard to cost, 5 ' and the evident decision
to do so in the waiver provision seems inconsistent with the decision,
in the same amendments, to extend the deadline for meeting basic
emission standards despite predictions that health hazards will continue. 57 The EPA's interpretation of the health requirement, which
tracks its reading of the innovative NOx waivers, 15 somewhat reduces the problem: the question is not whether ambient levels after
the waiver will be harmful, but whether they will be significantly
more harmful than if the statutory standard were complied with.'
Even so construed, the health requirement makes less sense here
than in the NOx waiver section, for the consequence of denying the
153Id. at 10,328. Similarly, in granting 1981-1982 waivers, the EPA found "marginal"

proof of good faith with respect to some manufacturers but, questionably relying on language
in InternationalHarvester about the shifting of the burden of proof, found no proof that the
manufacturers were in bad faith. 44 Fed. Reg. 53,376, 53,383 (1979).
," Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 201(c), 91 Stat. 752
(amending Clean Air Act § 202(b)(5)(C)) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(5)(C) (Supp.
I 1977)).
I' Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 6(a), 84 Stat. 1691 (amending Clean Air Act § 202(b)(5)(C)) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(5)(C) (Supp. I
1977)).

I" Currie, FederalAir-Quality Standardsand Their Implementation, 1976 Am. B. FOUNJ. 365, 368, 380, 389-90, 408.

DATION RESEARCH

," See text and notes at notes 51-67 supra.
"' See text and notes at notes 124-125 supra.

,' See 43 Fed. Reg. 47,272, 47,274 (1978); 44 Fed. Reg. 53,376, 53,377 (1979). In the latter
proceeding, the EPA found that the health consequences of waiving the standards as to
certain models would be "insignificant." Id.
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waiver on health grounds in the latter case is only to hamper research, while in the former it may shut down the auto industry.
Of course this threat, like that in the standards themselves, is
largely mythical; Congress can be expected to intervene if necessary. But the whole purpose of provision for administrative variances is to avoid the need for awkward and possibly uninformed
congressional intervention. If there are to be waiver provisions, one
would think they should be flexible enough to allow for waiver in
all cases of unreasonable hardship.
f. Effect of Denial. One thread running throughout the preceding discussion is the assumption that if a carbon monoxide
waiver is denied, the manufacturer who cannot meet the standard
must shut down. This is a common assumption in assessing claims
of hardship in variance cases. But a shutdown is not the inevitable
result of a variance denial; the remedy in a subsequent enforcement
proceeding may, as the practice of at least one state agency illustrates, be limited to money penalties if the statute provides for
0 as section
them,""
205 does. 6' By this procedure the enforcement
agency can avoid either inflicting unreasonable hardship or rewarding bad faith.
Further, even when the manufacturer has done his best to comply, monetary liability may spur, as an outright waiver may retard,
technological development. A 1977 amendment relating only to certain truck standards, considered below,"6 2 embodies an idea that
might profitably be extended to technology-forcing standards generally: in case of inability to comply, the manufacturer may continue
production, but must pay a fee for the privilege. 1 3 In theory, the
same result might be achieved under present law with respect to
automobiles by holding that the "public interest" does not require
a waiver, but rather can best be served by imposing money penalties. I doubt, however, that this is in accord with the spirit of the
public-interest provision; the House Committee said that a
nonconformance-penalty provision "would change existing law
which does not permit the introduction of nonconforming automo1 64
biles into the market. 1
"I See Currie, Enforcement Under the Illinois PollutionLaw, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 399, 42023 (1975).
III 42 U.S.C. § 7524 (Supp. I 1977).
162 See text and notes at notes 384-403 infra.
'e § 206(g), 42 U.S.C. § 7525(g) (Supp. 1 1977).
'' H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1977), reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1077, 1096.
The court in InternationalHarvester isolated the potential inequity of relaxing standards
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3. Hearings.Section 202(b)(5)(C) requires a "public hearing"
before action on an application to waive the carbon monoxide standard, without specifying hearing procedure.' 5 The interpretation of
this requirement in InternationalHarvesterstands as an important
starting point for construction of the many similarly phrased requirements scattered throughout the federal pollution laws.
a. The International Harvester Decision. First, the court held,
a "trial type hearing" was not required:
[T]his provision for a "public hearing" contrasts significantly
with other provisions that specifically require an adjudicatory
hearing [citing the since-repealed section 110(f)(2) on postponement of implementation-plan requirements and section
206(b) (2)(B) on suspension of vehicle certification for violations, both requiring decisions "on the record"]. More importantly, the nonadjudicatory nature of the "public hearing" contemplated is underscored by the 60 day limit for a decision to
be made.'66
The absence of a record requirement was emphasized, the court
added, by the statutory reference to "other information available"
to the Administrator.'6 7 Thus, the court concluded:
In context, the "public hearing" provision amounts to an assurance by Congress that the issues would not be disposed of
merely on written comments, the minimum protection assured
by the Administrative Procedure Act for rule-making, but
would also comprehend oral submissions of a legislative nature. . . . Even assuming oral submission, in a situation where
"general policy" is the focal question, a legislative-type hearing
is appropriate.6s
at the last minute to avoid the risk of shutdown:
The case is haunted by the irony that what seems to be Ford's technological lead may
operate to its grievous detriment. . . . If in 1974, when certification of production vehicles begins, any one of the three major companies cannot meet the 1975 standards, it is
a likelihood that standards will be set to permit the higher level of emission control
achievable by the laggard. . . . [T]he Government's action, in first imposing a standard not generally achievable and then relaxing it, is likely to be detrimental to the
leader who has tooled up to meet a higher standard than will ultimately be required.
high achievement in emission control results, under systems presently
. . [T]he
[
available, in lessened car performance . ...
478 F.2d at 637-38 (citations omitted). This problem too could be solved by imposing money
penalties rather than shutdown as the standard remedy for noncompliance.
42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(5)(C) (Supp. I 1977).
',
"
EU

478 F.2d at 629.

Id. at 630 n.48 (citing what is now 42 U.S.C. §"7521(b)(5)(C)(iv) (Supp. I 1977)).
478 F.2d at 630 (citations omitted).
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On the other hand, more than the ordinary legislative hearing
was required. In InternationalHarvester itself "the general policy
questions became interfused, with relatively specific technical issues."'" 9 Therefore, the court decided that while the EPA's practice
of allowing submission of written questions to be put to witnesses
orally by the Hearing Panel satisfied "basic fairness" under the
circumstances, "a right of cross-examination, consistent with time
limitations, might well extend to particular cases of need, on critical
points where the general procedure proved inadequate to probe 'soft'
and sensitive subjects and witnesses."'7 0 It was "contemplated," the
court concluded, that "the remand proceeding will involve some
opportunity for cross-examination," specifically "on a proffer that
critical questions could not be satisfactorily pursued-by procedures
previously in effect."'"' Finally, "the parties should have opportunity on remand to address themselves to matters not previously put
before them by EPA for comment, ,including material contained in
the Technical Appendix filed by EPA in 1972 subsequent to its
' 2
Decision.'
While this decision seems straightforward enough to permit
reasonably simple administration, some particularly vexing questions remain: whether it was correct, whether it would be followed
today, and whether it can be applied to other "public hearing"
provisions.
b. Oral Participation.In determining what sort of proceeding
was required by the statute in InternationalHarvester,the place to
begin is the Supreme Court's fundamental and unimpeachable, if
less than comforting, declaration in United States v. FloridaEast
Coast Railway, 7 3 that the meaning of the term "hearing" "will vary,
depending on whether it is used in the context of a rulemaking-type
proceeding or in the context of a proceeding devoted to the adjudication of particular disputed facts. 1 7 4 In the absence of indications to
the contrary, it seems reasonable to assume that Congress used the
term to refer to the type of hearing commonly held in resolving
similar matters. Thus, when the "hearing" is to determine whether
sanctions should be imposed upon an individual for offending the
law, as in the provision for revoking vehicle certifications distin169

Id.

11 Id. at 631.
" Id. at 649.
172Id.
410 U.S. 224 (1973).
1?,Id. at 239.
"
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guished in International Harvester, 5 it is normal to interpret an
unelaborated "hearing" requirement as something resembling a
judicial trial; "6 when it is to set nationwide standards on a subject
such as automotive safety, it is normal to find the same words
satisfied by the kind of speech-making proceeding familiarly conducted by legislative committees.' 77
The issue is complicated by the Supreme Court's further and
quite surprising holding in Florida East Coast that a "hearing"
requirement respecting charges for the use of freight cars need fit
neither the legislative nor the adjudicative model, but was satisfied
by notice and written comments with no opportunity for oral presentation whatever. " ' Although written procedure for general rulemaking is the norm under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA)'79 when other statutes are silent, Professor Davis seems on
sound ground in suggesting that it was not generally thought of
before Florida East Coast as constituting a "hearing": "The new
term 'oral hearing' is now necessary to express the meaning that
'hearing' once had. The word 'oral' in the phrase used to be redundant."80

"'
That provision is now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7525(6)(2)(B) (Supp. 1 1977). See text
at note 166 supra.
'' Cf. ICC v. Louisville & N.R.R., 227 U.S. 88, 91-94 (1913) (individual railroad rates).
I? See Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294 (1933):
What is done by the Tariff Commission and the President in changing the tariff rates
to conform to new conditions is in substance a delegation . . of the legislative process. . . . The inference is, therefore, a strong one that the kind of hearing assured by
the statute to those affected by the change is a hearing of the same order as had been
given by congressional committees when the legislative process was in the hands of
Congress and no one else.
Id. at 305 (citations omitted). As to the nature of the typical congressional hearing:
[T]he hearing. . . is not similar to trial as conducted in a court. The proponents of a
bill and the contestants make their statements for and against, bringing forward such
confirmatory documents . . . as they believe to be important... . In none of these
congressional hearings has the practice ever prevailed of permitting the advocates of a
measure to cross-examine the opponents, or the opponents the advocates, or of compelling the committee itself to submit to an inquisition ....
Id. at 304. While the Court attempted to define the power of the Tariff Commission as simply
advisory, id. at 317-19, the same reasoning applies to any case of general rulemaking, and
the Court acknowledged that the President, in acting on the Commission's advice, had the
power to make law, id. at 303.
"1 410 U.S. at 240-42.
1715 U.S.C. § 553 (1976).
'0 1 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.22, at 556-57 (2d ed. 1978). That the
APA twice uses the term "hearing" in ways suggesting that it embraces purely written
procedure, as the Court in FloridaEast Coast emphasized, 410 U.S. at 240-41, proves only
that the word is susceptible of such an interpretation, not that it is what Congress had in
mind in the freight-car statute.
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The issue in International Harvester was whether the statute
required more than a legislative hearing, not whether it allowed less,
and the dictum that written procedure would not have sufficed is
arguably contrary to FloridaEast Coast. The court gave no basis for
distinguishing that decision, nor any reasons to support its statement that the "public hearing" requirement assured "oral submissions of a legislative nature."''
One possible basis for the distinction is the nature of the proceeding.' 8 2 More fundamentally, however, the International
Harvester dictum is representative of a tendency in the courts of
appeals not to follow the lead of FloridaEast Coast in validating
purely written proceedings when the statute requires not simply a
"hearing" but a "public hearing." Similar to -International
Harvester, but in an unquestionable context of general rulemaking,
was the post-FloridaEast Coast statement of the First Circuit'" in
construing the "public hearing" requirement of section 110(c)' 4 respecting plans for implementing air-quality standards: "'Public
hearing' encompasses oral presentation and, thus, expands the minimum requirements for informal rule-making" beyond notice and
5
comment.'
Absent Florida East Coast, I should have thought this position
eminently correct. I should, however, have read that opinion as
establishing the general principle that "hearing" without more in a
general rulemaking context means notice and written comment.
Perhaps the Supreme Court would regard the addition of the word
"public" as a term of art indicating oral procedure, though on its
face "public" participation may be written as well as oral. Since the
EPA has to date allowed oral participation in proceedings concerning automotive-control suspensions,'88 the question whether less is
permissible may never arise. But given Florida East Coast, that
cannot be taken for granted.
c. Decision on the Record. Probably of more practical significance is the question whether procedures going beyond the typical
legislative hearing will be necessary in a waiver hearing. This question has two parts. First is whether a trial-type proceeding on the
record is required, which would trigger the specific procedures of
Is' 478 F.2d

at 630.
See text and notes at notes 189-205 infra.
"1 South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1974).
'u Now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c) (Supp. I 1977).
18 504 F.2d at 660 n.15.
1s,
See, for example, International Harvester, 478 F.2d at 624; 44 Fed. Reg. 53,376-77
(1979).
19
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sections 556 and 557 of the APA. 87 The second, considered below, '8
is whether additional specific procedures are required in a waiver
proceeding if a trial-type proceeding on the record is not.
i. The Context. The court in InternationalHarvester seemed
to rely in part on the nature of the proceeding in holding that a
decision on the record was not required, apparently classifying the
matter before it as "rule-making. ' 189 In general rulemaking, as we
have seen, the ordinary interpretation of "hearing" is a legislative
one. Whether the InternationalHarvesterdecision should have been
considered general rulemaking, however, is open to question.
It is true that the Administrator at the end of the International
Harvesterwaiver proceeding said he was prescribing new standards
for all cars ("all 1975 light duty vehicles . . .[except in California,
for which different standards were set] shall be subject to the following federal interim standards"); 10 that his decision has been
generally so interpreted; 9 ' and that the setting of generally applicable auto-emission standards is the sort of thing that is commonly
done after either legislative hearings or written procedure. The statutory waiver provision, however, provided for no such result, but
rather said that "any manufacturer may file . . . an application
requesting the suspension . . . of the effective date of any emission
standard. . . with respect to such manufacturer.""'9 If the Administrator decided to grant "such suspension," he was authorized to
set interim standards for "such vehicles and engines,'" 3-those of
the applying manufacturer. In fact, the Administrator reflected this
distinction between general and individual applicability elsewhere
in his opinion when he recited that a suspension had been granted
"to the five applicants" (GM, Ford, Chrysler, AMC, and Harvester). ' " To the extent that other passages in the order purported
to suspend the standards as to other manufacturers, so far as I can
see they did so completely without authority. In short, section
202(b)(5) was a garden-variety provision for granting individual
1- 5 U.S.C. §§ 556, 557 (1976).
U See text and notes at notes 219-227 infra.
"' 478 F.2d at 630. See text at notes 168-172 supra.
38 Fed. Reg. 10,317, 10,319 (1975).
See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 232 (1977), reprinted in [19771
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1077, 1311: "[Tihe 1975 requirements for hydrocarbons
(HC) and carbon monoxide (CO)were pushed back [to] 1976."
"I Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 6(a), 84 Stat. 1691 (amending Clean Air Act § 202(b)(5)(A) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(5)(A) (Supp. I
1977)).
23 Id.
'"
"

23

38 Fed. Reg. 10,317, 10,317 (1975).
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manufacturers variances from otherwise applicable general requirements.
The APA defines a "rule" broadly: "an agency statement of
general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy."'' Standing alone,
this definition literally embraces variances, as it does obviously adjudicative ' cease-and-desist orders. But Florida East Coast
strongly suggests that administrative action within the APA definition of rulemaking may nevertheless be of such a nature as to require that a statutory "hearing" be read as a trial. Thus, although
the Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure
Act tells us, as the definition suggests, that "the prescription of
future rates for a single named utility by the Federal Power Commission, and similar agency actions, although applicable only to
named persons, constitute rule making,"'' 7 the Supreme Court long
ago construed the term "full hearing" to require judicial-type trials
for determining the future rates chargeable by individual railroads'"5
or at individual stockyards.'99 In Florida East Coast, which concerned freight-car use charges applicable to all railroads, the individual-rate cases were distinguished as "quasi-judicial." 200 Thus, if
the InternationalHarvester proceedings were "rulemaking" at all,
they were of a type-"quasi-judicial"-in which the context indicated the "hearing" prescribed should be more than legislative.
Moreover, it seems clear that, despite its terms, the broad APA
rulemaking definition cannot be applied to variances at all. Variance proceedings, like those leading to cease-and-desist orders, are
typically regarded as adjudicative, and trial-type procedures are
usually provided for them. 0 ' Indeed, a request for suspension of the
statutory vehicle standards seems to be one for a "statutory exemption," which under the APA is "licensing, ' 2° and licensing in turn
is deemed even by that statute to be adjudication-despite the
broad rulemaking definition.2 3 In the analogous context of a permit
, 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1976).
"' See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE AcT 15 (1947) [hereinafter cited as ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL].
' Id. at 13.

,,ICC v. Louisville & N.R.R., 227 U.S. 88, 91-94 (1913).
"' Morgan v. United States (I), 298 U.S. 468, 479-81 (1936).
200 410 U.S. at 242. The Morgan opinion referred to by Florida East Coast was a later
episode in the same proceeding, 304 U.S. 1 (1938), and the Court distinguished it on the
further ground (not applicable to Morgan /)of inadequate notice.
M'E.g., ILL-. REV. STAT. ch. 11112, §§ 1037, 1032-33 (1977).
"1 5 U.S.C. § 551(8)-(9) (1976).
203 Id. § 551(6)-(7). See Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the
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to discharge heated water without meeting ordinarily applicable
standards, the First Circuit quoted from the Attorney General's
Manual to hold that a "public hearing" requirement implied a trial
on the record subject to the formal-hearing rules of the APA: "'It
is believed that with respect to adjudication the specific statutory
requirement of a hearing, without anything more, carries with it the
further requirement of decision on the basis of the evidence adduced
at the hearing.' ",204 Similarly, the nature of the proceeding to suspend the vehicle standards argues that the "public hearing" re25
quired by the statute is a full-scale APA trial. 1
ii. The Statute. The InternationalHarvestercourt's principal
reliance, however, was placed not on what it thought to be a
"rulemaking" context but on independent evidence drawn from the
statute: the contrast with provisions explicitly requiring "record"
(trial-type) proceedings for other determinations, the demanding
requirement of a decision in sixty days, which indicates "concern
with 'avoidance of. . . time-consuming procedures,'" and the reference to "other information available," which sounds as if it may
be outside the record.0 ' That these considerations carry some

Supreme Court, 1978 Sup. CT. REV. 345,'351 & n.33. In United States Steel Corp. v. Train,
556 F.2d 822, 833-34 (7th Cir. 1977), the court held APA formal-trial procedures applicable
to the grant of a permit to discharge water pollutants under 42 U.S.C. section 1342 although
the statute required only a "public hearing." 556 F.2d at 833-34. Indeed, the court carried
the licensing argument a step further, concluding that because under the statute a permit
was "an application. . . for a license required by law," the licensing provision of the APA, 5
U.S.C. § 558(c) (1976), required the EPA to conduct proceedings "in accordance with sections
556 and 557" of that statute, which prescribe a quasi-judicial proceeding. 556 F.2d at 83334. On this the court went too far, for section 558 appears directed toward expedition rather
than the nature of the proceeding: "[Tihe agency, with due regard for the rights and privileges of all the interested parties or adversely affected persons and within a reasonable time,
shall set and complete proceedings required to be conducted in accordance with sections
556 and 557 of this title or otherproceedings required by law and shall make its decision."
5 U.S.C. § 558(c) (1976) (emphasis added).
" Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872, 877 (1st Cir. 1978) (quoting
ATroRN.Y GENERAL'S MANUAL, supranote 196, at 42-43). Accord, Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA,
564 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1977); United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1977).
'" This remains true under the 1977 amendments; though the conclusive words "with
respect to such manufacturer," Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, §
6(a), 84 Stat. 1691 (amending Clean Air Act § 202(b)(5)) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §
7521(b)(5) (Supp. 11977)), are replaced by references to "any model" and "such model," 42
U.S.C. § 7521(b)(5)(A) (Supp. 1 1977), the implication is that each manufacturer is to seek
relief for his own models, and Senator Muskie so explained it. See 123 CONG. REc. 13,703
(daily ed. Aug. 4, 1977) ("not a general waiver for all manufacturers, nor. . . for all models
. . . produced by a single manufacturer"). The EPA, quoting this passage in its guidelines
for CO waivers, agrees. 43 Fed. Reg. 47,272, 47,273 (1978). Indeed, in passing on applications
under the 1977 provisions it explicitly granted suspensions for some models and denied them
for others. 44 Fed. Reg. 53,376, 53,408 (1979) (amending 40 C.F.R. § 86.081-8(ii)).
, 478 F.2d at 629-30.
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weight is undeniable, though the assumption of consistent usage in
a statute of this complexity seems strained; I would be unhappy if
every reference to a "public hearing" in the Clean Air Act were
held to mean a legislative one regardless of context simply because
other sections use the magic word "record." In the absence of
constitutional overtones, I would, despite the quasi-adjudicatory
context, accept the court's conclusion that in this instance no trial
was intended.
iii. Due Process. But there are constitutional overtones. The
statute appears to give the manufacturer a right to a suspension or
waiver whenever the prescribed criteria are met."'7 Thus, like the
applicant for bar admission"'8 and the welfare recipient,2 9 the
manufacturer claims an "entitlement" that seems to constitute
"property" or "liberty" within the protection of the due process
clause. It follows that, like them, he may be entitled by due process
to a full adjudicative hearing on disputed matters of fact particular
210
to his case.
The requirements of due process vary according to a balance of
competing interests, and for some interests within the due process
clause little or no procedure is required.1 1 I think, however, that the
stakes in a typical variance case, and in an auto-emission case in
particular, are great enough that-as in bar admission, welfare termination, and rate-setting for individual firms-disputed adjudicative facts must be resolved by something approaching judicial pro-

2" Although at the time of InternationalHarvesterit said the Administrator "shall grant
such suspension only if" the conditions are met, Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub.
L. No. 91-604, § 6(a), 84 Stat. 1692 (amending Clean Air Act § 202(b)(5)(D)), and now it says
he "may" grant it, § 202(b)(5)(c), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(5)(C) (Supp. I 1977), all parties in
InternationalHarvesterseem to have assumed, and I think rightly, that Congress meant for
a suspension to be granted if the prescribed showing was made. See S. REP. No. 1196, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1970):
The Court in reviewing the Secretary's decision can affirm or reverse only after independently finding that a suspension is essential to the public interest and general welfare
; that all good faith efforts have been made. . . ; and that. . . technology...
[has] not been available. . . . The industry could challenge [the Secretary's] . . .
decision not to extend . . . the deadline ....
The Senate bill provided that "[t]he Secretary shall grant such suspension only if" he found
the conditions satisfied. The Conference Report did not suggest that the final choice of words
was intended to make any substantial change. See H.R. REP. No. 1783, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1970), reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5374.
- Willner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963).
- Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).

21*Id.

at 266-70.

E.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (corporal punishment of students); Goss
v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (school suspension).
211
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cedure, including a decision on the record. 1 2 If this is true, then
under the principles of Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath213 the formalhearing requirements of sections 556 and 557 of the APA probably
should be held to apply.
Although the InternationalHarvester procedure was objected
to on due process grounds, 2 4 the court did not discuss the question

of a quasi-judicial trial as a due process matter, presumably because
of the court's view that it was dealing with general rulemaking, for
which the Constitution does not require a full trial. 2'5 Moreover, the

Administrator had denied the suspension for failure to establish
that "effective control technology" was "not available," a
"legislative" fact question if there ever was one, which undoubtedly
could have been established without trial procedures even in a judicial proceeding. 26 The same may be said of the 1977 requirement
that the suspension not be precluded by considerations of "public
health," and of many components of the "public interest" requirement, while the "study and investigations" of the National Academy of Sciences can probably be~t be established by submission of
official reports. The "good faith" criterion, however, is quite another
matter. While its phrasing is ambiguous, the Administrator seems
correct in having viewed it as referring to the good faith of the
individual applicant, which he determined with respect to Chrysler
on the basis of facts specific to Chrysler alone. 2 7 1 do not see how
one can fairly escape the conclusion that when the good faith of an
individual applicant is disputed in a suspension proceeding, a trial
21 8
on that issue is required by due process.

d. Cross-examination and Comment. The next question is
whether, assuming, as InternationalHarvesterheld, that a full trial
is not required, specific additional procedures such as crossexamination or the opportunity for comment on EPA documents are
necessary. So far as the statute itself is concerned, I see no basis to
answer this question differently from the question whether a full
22 Cf. Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292 (1937) (record hearing

required before utility must surrender excess earnings); West Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Utils.
Comm'n, 294 U.S. 63 (1935) (same for rate-fixing by a utility).
213 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
211478 F.2d at 629.
212 Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
2,,

See K.

DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT,

§ 7.03, at 160 (3d ed. 1972); Karst,

Legislative Facts in ConstitutionalLitigation, 1960 Sup. CT. REv. 75.
27 See text at notes 150-153 supra.
21 The EPA's guidelines for CO waivers under the 1977 amendments indicate that the
Agency will base its decision on the "public record" but do not guarantee a quasi-judicial
trial. 43 Fed. Reg. 47,272, 47,273 (1978).
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trial is required: in general rulemaking, which the court thought this
was, a "hearing" did not at the time typically include either of these
rights; in the adjudicatory-variance proceeding actually prescribed,
it did; the short time period, the contrast with "record" provisions,
and the allowance of "other information" argue that Congress
meant a purely legislative hearing. Indeed, the court did not seriously attempt to derive support for its cross-examination and comment requirements from the statute, though it did once quote in this
discussion the statutory term "hearing"; it spoke instead essentially
' 21 9
of "basic fairness.
Since due process was argued,220 perhaps "basic fairness" was
intended as a paraphrase of due process. If so, the conclusion is
surprising in light of the court's perception that it was dealing with
general rulemaking, for the general view has been that in such a
22
proceeding due process imposes no procedural constraints at all, '
and the FloridaEast Coast holding that notice-and-comment procedure suffices in such cases 222 bodes poorly for any constitutional
argument for cross-examination or comment there. On my assumption that the matter was essentially an adjudicatory variance proceeding, however, the due process case is a better one. That the issue
of technological availability was itself a "legislative" one does not
necessarily mean, in this context, that due process imposes no constraints on how it is resolved. Although it need not be made the
subject of an evidentiary trial, there is Supreme Court authority
suggesting that due process requires the -opportunity to rebut the
taking of official notice of a similarly legislative fact. 22 3 Crossexamination on specific issues of legislative fact that otherwise
"could not be adequately ventilated," as InternationalHarvester
required, 24 would be a bold but not a shocking step beyond in the
changing climate of due process.
An alternative reading of the court's reliance on "basic fairness" is that, understandably unwilling to base its decision on the
" 478 F.2d at 631. See also id. at 630 (" 'basic considerations of fairness' "); id. at 649
("the interest of justice"). Also mentioned, id., was 28 U.S.C. section 2106, which irrelevantly
spells out broad powers of an appellate court respecting review of an order of "a court," not
of an administrative agency.
21 See 478 F.2d at 629.
"I' Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915). See Williams,
"Hybrid Rulemaking" Under the Administrative Procedure Act: A Legal and Empirical
Analysis, 42 U. CI. L. REv. 401 (1975).
222See text at note 178 supra.
223Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292 (1937) (agency took notice
of trends in market value of property).
12 478 F.2d at 631.
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Constitution in light of the precedents applicable to general rulemaking, the court chose to enunciate common-law requirements of
cross-examination and reply. Procedural requirements of similarly
ambiguous origin have proliferated in recent opinions of the District
of Columbia Circuit. 2 5 Insofar as such requirements are based upon
a theory that the courts may impose upon agencies procedures required by neither Constitution nor statute, the Supreme Court attempted in no uncertain terms to put an end to them in its opinion
last year in Vermont Yankee Power Corp. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.: 2 "[N]othing . . . permitted the court to
review and overturn the rulemaking proceeding on the basis of the
procedural devices employed (or not employed) by the Commission
as long as the Commission employed at least the statutory minima
It thus seems quite unlikely that, if the InternationalHarvester
court's perception of section 202(b)(5) waiver proceedings as
general rulemaking prevails, its requirement of cross-examination
will be adhered to. In any event, as Professor Williams has reported,
this fiercely sought right was not exercised on remand in InternationalHarvester itself.
e. NOx Waivers. The remaining question is the extent to
which the InternationalHarvester conclusions, or what is left of
them, will be applicable to the various new provisions for waiver of
nitrogen oxide standards. 221 The diesel- and innovation-waiver
paragraphs explicitly require "public hearing," and the context is
the same as that in InternationalHarvester: "[a]ny manufacturer"
may petition for a waiver "for any class . . . of. . . vehicles...
manufactured by such manufacturer. '2 9 Missing, though, are two
of the three textual props relied on for rejecting a full trial in
211E.g., Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Mobil Oil Corp. v.

FPC, 483 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846 (D.C.
Cir. 1972). See generally Scalia, supra note 203.
-1 435 U.S. 519, 548 (1978).
2" Williams, supra note 221, at 434. The Administrator's opinion in support of his partial
suspension of the 1981-1982 CO standards indicates only that a "public hearing" was held
and "testimony" received; it does not say whether additional procedural rights such as crossexamination were afforded. 44 Fed. Reg. 53,376 (1979).
The requirement of opportunity to comment on materials on which the EPA relied, on
the other hand, has been further developed in a subsequent opinion of the District of Columbia Circuit that may survive Vermont Yankee. Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486
F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973). This requirement will be discussed in a subsequent article.
22 § 202(b)(1)(B), (6)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(1)(B), (6)(A) (Supp. I 1977). See text
and notes at notes 116-125 supra.
2'1 § 202(b)(6)(A)-(B), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(6)(A)-(B) (Supp. 11977).

The University of Chicago Law Review

[46:811

InternationalHarvester: the 60-day time for decision and the reference to "other information." Yet the waiver provisions are so similar
in other respects that it seems quite unlikely Congress had any
different procedure in mind, and the legislative nature of most of
the facts relevant to these NOx waivers reinforces the conclusion
that International Harvester, as arguably modified by Vermont
Yankee, will be held to govern their procedure.
The NOx waiver for small manufacturers is another story.2 30
Confusingly, it appears not with the other waiver provisions but in
the body of the paragraph prescribing standards; it speaks not of
"waiver" but directs the Administrator to "prescribe standards in
lieu of those" in the statute; it makes no mention of a "hearing" or
other procedure. These features alone would suggest an exercise in
general rulemaking governed by the notice-and-comment procedures of the APA. Like the other waivers, however, these standards
are to apply to "any manufacturer" as to whom the Administrator
"determines" certain facts. Moreover, those facts are peculiar to the
individual manufacturer: his dependency upon the developmental
abilities of others and (what may be the same thing) his lack of
resources to develop technology on his own. 231 Thus, despite the
language of "standards," the essence of this provision seems to be
to give individual manufacturers an erititlement to relief upon a
showing of adjudicative facts. In such circumstances, as I have
2 32
argued above, due process requires opportunity for a trial.
IV.

OTHER VEHICLES

Congress in 1977 was dissatisfied with the emission standards
for trucks and buses set by the EPA under the general authority of
section 202(a). The House Report noted:
[P]rogress in regulating new motor vehicle emissions from
vehicles other than the passenger car has lagged. . . . 1977
Federal standards require heavy-duty gasoline-powered engines to achieve only a 15 per cent reduction in HC plus NOx
emissions, and only a 57 per cent reduction in CO emissions,
from uncontrolled levels. . . and no reduction of HC, NOx, or
2 33
CO from uncontrolled diesel-powered engines.
§ 202(b)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(1)(B) (Supp. 1 1977).

Id.
212The Administrator, in passing on American Motors's request under this provision,
231

invited written public comment. None was received, and the application was granted on the
basis of AMC's submissions. See 44 Fed. Reg. 47,880 (1979).
H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 271-72 (1977), reprinted in [19771 U.S. CODE
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And the Report, quoting from a Library of Congress study, observed
that under these standards
a heavy duty truck will emit as much nitrogen oxides as nine
automobiles, as much HC as 18 automobiles, and as much CO
as 45 automobiles. . . . At some time between 1980 and 1989,
the emissions from heavy-duty vehicles will be more than half
of all transportation emissions, unless control regulations are
revised.z3
The consequence of this concern was a new paragraph (3) of
section 202(a),2 5 the central thrust of which is to prescribe the future content of HC, CO, and NO x regulations for new heavy-duty
vehicles.
A.

Ultimate and Interim Heavy-Duty Standards

The basic requirement, in section 202(a)(3)(A)(ii), is that
carbon monoxide and hydrocarbon emissions be reduced by "at
least 90 per cent" from unregulated levels by the 1983 model year
and those of nitrogen oxides by "at least 75 per cent" by 1985.2:1
These are the same percentage reductions as those ultimately required for automobiles under section 202(b),2 37 thus satisfying an
immediate sense of equity. The House and Senate Reports make no
attempt, as they did with automobile standards in 1970,238 to correlate these percentages with ambient air quality; nor, the House
Report emphasizes, did the Committee "conclude that they were
certainly technologically feasible."' 1 They were justified as "reasonable target levels" toward which "manufacturers [could] aim

CONG. & AD. NEws 1077, 1350-51. The 1977 federal standards are set out in 40 C.F.R. § 86.07710, -11 (1978).
21 H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 272 (1977) (quoting LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
AIR POLLUTION: UNCONTROLLED MOBILE SOURCES 2 (Issue Brief No. IB 74033 1975)), reprinted
in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 1351.
in 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(3) (Supp. 1 1977).
2, Id. § 7521(a)(3)(A)(ii)(I)-(II). The "baseline model year" against which the reductions
are to be judged is that "immediately preceding the model year in which Federal standards
applicable to such vehicle or engine . . . first applied with respect to such pollutant." Id. §
7521(a) (3)(A)(v). Regulations to implement the 1983 heavy-duty HC and CO standards were
proposed at 44 Fed. Reg. 9464 (1979).
"I Except that the starting points for automotive reductions were 1970 levels of HC and
CO, which already represented some degree of control. See text and notes at notes 36, 51-53
supra.
2m See text and notes at notes 39-40 supra.
9 H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 274 (1977), reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1077, 1353.
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research and development efforts," 40 on the basis of laboratory results that were viewed as promising.!'
In the interim, section 202(a) (3) (A) (i) directs the Administrator to set standards for "model years 1979 through 1982" that
"reflect the greatest degree of emission reduction achievable
through the application of technology which the Administrator determines will be available.

. .

, giving appropriate consideration to

the cost of applying such technology within the period of time available to manufacturers and to noise, energy, and safety factors."'2
With minor variations, this is the same formula previously applied
to performance standards for new stationary sources under section
111,243 which I shall discuss in detail in another article. Suffice it to
say that the language clearly confirms the House Committee's intention, in accord with the InternationalHarvester decision, to
allow "reasonable projections about the future availability of technology"; 244 that, while the heavy-duty vehicle provision refers ex-

plicitly to "noise, energy, and safety" and section 111 to "health and
environmental impact and energy requirements," the general injunction to consider "cost" in both instances is broad enough to
include them all and should lead to interpreting the enumerated
considerations as exemplary, not exclusive;2"5 and that there seems
no reason to distinguish between the "degree of emission reduction"
from "the best system" in section 111 and the "greatest degree of
emission reduction . . . available" in section 202(a)(3)(A).

It might be thought that the best-technology standard for interim truck emissions adds little, since the Administrator already
had, and had exercised, discretionary authority under sections
202(a)(1) and (2) to set truck standards to protect health and welfare, "giving appropriate consideration to the cost of compliance"
in the prescribed time. But it seems fair to say, as Justice Frankfurter once wrote in another setting, that in the new legislation
"Congress expressed a mood"246 that ought not to be lost upon ad240

241

Id.
Id. at 274 n.14, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 1353 n.14.
U.S.C. § 7521(a)(3)(A)(i) (Supp. I 1977).

242 42

2-

Id. § 7411.

241 H.R.

REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 273 (1977), reprinted in [19771 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1077, 1352. See also id. at 273 n.12, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS at 1352 n.12.
24' Cf. Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 385 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (references to "the cost of achieving reduction" require the Administrator to "take into account

environmental effects of a proposed standard").
241 Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1951).
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ministrators and reviewing courts. While the identical words
"appropriate consideration to the cost" appear in both the original
provision (section 202(a)(2)) and the new one (section
202(a) (3)(A)(i)), the context is no longer blandly neutral as to how
the balance shall be struck. Congress was plainly convinced that
standards set under the prior authority should be tightened, and the
language it chose to express that conviction, modified by the new
and compelling phrase "greatest. . .reduction achievable," had a
that costs must be wellhistory of judicial construction 2 indicating
47
nigh prohibitive to be decisive.
A minor matter that must be of some embarrassment to those
who drafted the final statutory language is the evidently accidental
omission of any provision concerning the content of nitrogen oxide
standards for 1983-1984. The House bill had provided for besttechnology standards for all pollutants, including NOX, through
1984, with prescribed percentage reductions in 1985.248 In accelerating the date for 90% HC and CO reduction to 1983, the Conference
Committee reset the technology-standard date accordingly for all
three pollutants at 1982249 without noticing that it had left the 75%
NOx date at 1985. Authority to set 1983-1984 NOx standards must
therefore be found in section 202(a)(1), and section 202(a)(3)(A)
makes its exercise mandatory; in setting them the Administrator
will doubtless take the best-technology standard for 1979-1982 as his
guide for applying the cost criterion of section 202(a)(1).
B.

Revisions

Aware that the technology required for the 1983 and 1985 reductions might not be forthcoming, Congress provided ample leeway for
administrative adjustment to avoid undue hardship, in sensible
contrast to the narrow automotive relief provisions. Sections
202(a)(3)(B) and (C)2 ° authorize revision of the final percentagereduction requirements upon a finding "that compliance. . . cannot be achieved by technology. . . reasonably expected to be available . . . without increasing cost or decreasing fuel economy to an
2' 51
excessive and unreasonable degree.
This language is a fair paraphrase of the traditional variance
247See, e.g., Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
21 See H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 407 (1977).
211H.R. REP.No. 564, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 163-64 (1977), reprinted in [19771 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1502, 1543-45.
21 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(3)(B).(C) (Supp. I 1977).
23 Id. § 7521(a)(3)(C)(i).
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standard of unreasonable hardship, imposing a heavy burden of
proof on industry while providing the necessary flexibility that obviates the need for awkward congressional intervention. The provision differs from the corresponding automobile provision in certain
key ways: it applies to all pollutants for which statutory emission
levels are prescribed; it allows repeated revisions at three-year intervals for as long as they may be necessary; by its reference to
"excessive and unreasonable" costs it allows the hardship to be
weighed against the benefits of compliance; it explicitly provides for
revision by "regulations" rather than on application of individual
manufacturers; and the criteria for revision include none (such as
good faith) applicable to particular manufacturers. This last feature
should suffice to avoid the arguments over procedure that have so
confused litigation under the automobile provision; the required
"public hearing," which is expressly subjected to the lengthy additional requirements of section 307(d) ,252 should be held to be a legis253
lative one.
The refusal to focus upon individual circumstances, however,
makes the revision tool a crude one. If there are differences between
manufacturers in ability to comply or in good faith, the producers
must apparently all sink or swim together. Indeed, good faith may
not be relevant at all since the statute authorizes a revision if the
technology, for whatever reason, is not "reasonably expected to be
available." Arguably, good faith might enter in determining what
is "reasonably" expected, but the more likely reading concerns the
Administrator's confidence in the prediction that the technology
will be available. It is more promising to view the provision that the
Administrator "may" revise the standards as giving him some latitude to impose conditions beyond those listed in the statute, as the
legislative history makes clear with respect to another similar provi254
sion.
There are two additional conditions on revisions under sections
202(a)(3)(B) and (C). The first is that "the National Academy of
Sciences has not . . . issued a report substantially contrary to the
findings of the Administrator" with respect to technology. "3 This
time there is no question about it; the NAS is given a veto. i find
252Id.

§ 7607(d)(1)(J).
See text and notes at notes 173-186 supra.
21 See H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 67 (1977), reprintedin [19771 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 1077, 1145 (commenting on the provision for delayed-compliance orders
respecting implementation plans in what became 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d) (Supp. 1 1977)).
25 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(3)(C)(ii) (Supp. I 1977).
21
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this delegation of unreviewable legislative authority to a quasipublic organization quite disturbing, even if under the more recent
cases it is not unconstitutional.151
Second, while in revising a standard the Administrator is generally to follow the 1979-1982 formula of maximum reduction expected to be technologically feasible, 25 7 the revised standard must
in all circumstances "require a reduction of emissions from any
standard which applies in the previous model year."' s The motivation is obvious, but the requirement is hardly compatible with the
general criterion allowing relaxation on the basis of available technology. If technology has not advanced since the preceding year, one
cannot tighten a technological standard without requiring the use
of technology that is not reasonably available.
A further opportunity for revision of the percentage-reduction
standards, again by "regulations" after opportunity for "public
hearing" subject to the procedural requirements of section 307(d),'1
is provided by section 202(a) (3) (E), on the basis of a required study
of "the effects of each air pollutant emitted from heavy-duty vehicles . . . and from other sources of mobile source related pollutants
26 and of
on the public health and welfare""
"such other information
as is available. ' 2 ' No criteria whatever are provided to guide the
determination under this provision. Since its exercise is plainly discretionary, it is not clear that it adds anything to the power already
given to adopt more stringent standards under either section
202(a) (1),212 which allows the Administrator to set truck standards
to protect the public health, or section 202(a) (3) (A), which directs
the Administrator to achieve the "greatest degree of emission reduction. . . available. ' 263 The section is necessary, however, to permit
relaxation of the percentage standards on grounds other than the
unavailability of technology, provided for in section 202(a)(3)(B).
Yet there is a clear danger that the unconfined authority given by
subparagraph (E) may be so exercised as to undercut the evident
" Compare Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936) with United States v.
Rock Royal Coop., Inc., 307 U.S. 533, 574-76 (1939).
"1 § 202(a)(3)(A)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(3)(A)(i) (Supp. 11977). The wording of the two
provisions differs slightly; while the differences create a risk of divergent interpretation,
comparison fails to suggest any significant discrepancies.
Id. § 7521(a)(3)(B).
"" Id. § 7607(d)(i)(J).
2,,Id. § 7521(a)(3)(E)(i).
211 Id.
§ 7521(a)(3)(E)(ii).
282 Id.
§ 7521(a)(1). See H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 273 n.13 (1977),
reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 1077, 1352 n.13.
21 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(3)(A)(i) (Supp. I 1977).
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attempt in subparagraph (B) to circumscribe narrowly the power to
relax the standards. To reconcile the two, subparagraph (B) should
be held the exclusive means of relaxation on grounds of technology
or cost, while subparagraph (E) should be limited to revisions based
upon the specifically mentioned consideration of effects of the pollutants on health and welfare. This reading accords with the House
Report's statement that under this provision "the 1985 [and now
1983] targets could be revised to be more lenient or less lenient, as
'264
needed to protect health and welfare.
In addition to these provisions for formal revision of the standards, the 1977 amendments added an innovative provision for
"nonconformance penalties," permitting under certain conditions
the certification and sale of heavy-duty vehicles not meeting prescribed emission standards. The nonconformance penalty is dis"
265
cussed below in connection with enforcement of the standards.
C.

Particulate Standards

Section 202(a)(3)(A)(iii) directs the Administrator to
"prescribe regulations . . .applicable to emissions of particulate
matter from classes oi categories of vehicles manufactured during and after model year 1981 (or during any earlier model year,
if practicable). '"266 The criterion for these standards is best technology, expressed in the same words as the 1979-1982 heavy-duty HC,
CO,and NOX standards, with the additional and probably redundant requirement that they "take effect as expeditiously as practic2 7
able taking into account the period necessary for compliance.""
The Senate Committee had contemplated that ultimate particulate
standards would be set on the basis of "the extent to which particulates are likely to cause or contribute to air pollution endangering
public health or welfare, ' 6 but the Conference Committee was
2 9
unwilling to go so far. 1
The interesting feature of this otherwise straightforward requirement is that on its face it appears to apply, unlike all the other
paragraphs of section 202(a)(3), to all vehicles, not just to heavy264H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 277 (1977), reprinted in [19771 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 1356.
265 See text and notes at notes 384-403 infra.
42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(3)(A)(iii) (Supp. I 1977).
267Id.

2 S. REP. No. 127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 67 (1977).
2' H.R. REP. No. 564, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 163 (1977), reprinted in 119771 U.S. CODE
& AD. NEws 1502, 1543-44.
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duty ones. The EPA so interprets it, relying unnecessarily on section
202(a)(3)(A)(iii) as authority for its new particulate standards for
light-duty vehicles and light trucks; for reasons given earlier in this
article, I think the Agency is mistaken. 0
D.

Light-Duty Trucks and Recreational Vehicles

With the possible exception of the particulate provision, the
requirements of section 202(a)(3) apply only to "heavy-duty vehicles or engines" and, as discussed below, 27 '1 to motorcycles. Section
202(b)(3) (C), also added in 1977, defines "heavy-duty vehicle" as "a
truck, bus, or other vehicle manufactured primarily for use on the
public streets, roads, and highways (not including any vehicle operated exclusively on a rail or rails) which has a gross vehicle weight
'272
• . .in excess of six thousand pounds.
It will be remembered, perhaps, that originally the Administrator had subjected all vehicles under this weight, including trucks,

to the "light-duty" standards prescribed by section 202(b) .273

Itmay

also be remembered that the court of appeals in International
Harvesterhad held that he was wrong to do so, and that on remand,
following suggestions in that opinion, he had decided that "multipurpose passenger vehicles" (which the House Report later said
included "campers, minibuses, jeep-type vehicles, etc.m27 ), were not
"light-duty vehicles" either. 275 In consequence, he promulgated a
third set of standards, more lenient than those applicable to lightduty vehicles, 27 6 to govern "light-duty trucks," which he defined to
277
include multi-purpose vehicles.
See note 74 supra.
"I See text and notes at notes 285-297 infra.
2 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(3)(C) (Supp. 1 1977). One thing this definition does, as pointed
out by the House Committee, is exclude locomotives and farm equipment. H.R. REP. No. 294,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 277 (1977), reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1077, 1356.
See text and notes at notes 627-628 infra. For present purposes, the significant aspect of the
definition is the limitation to vehicles of over 6,000 pounds.
2 See text and note at note 91 supra.
"I H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 271 (1977), reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 1350.
21 See text and notes at notes 92-98 supra.
21'See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §§ 86.077-9, 86.078-9 (1978), respectively prescribing 1977 and
1978 standards of, inter alia, 2.0 grams per mile of HC, 20 of CO, 3.1 of NOx . Compare the
more stringent 1977 standards for "light-duty vehicles" (0.41, 3.4, and 2.0 grams, respectively) in id. § 86.077-8(a)(1), and for those of "manufacturers who have been granted a
suspension" (1.5, 15, 2.0 grams, respectively), in id. § 86.077-8(a)(2).
2 See id. § 86.077-2 (defining a "light-duty truck" as "any motor vehicle rated at 6000
pounds [gross vehicle weight] or less, which is designed primarily for purposes of transportation of property or is a derivative of such a vehicle, or is available with special features
enabling off-street or off-highway operation and use").
21
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Congress in 1977 was aware of this history. The House Report
noted it with evident regret, immediately following the statement
that "control of new truck emissions has . . . been slower and less
effective than for passenger cars. ' 278 So did the Senate Report,
which stated its disapproval in no uncertain terms: "These vehicles
should not be regulated any less stringently than automobiles. As
automobiles are required to achieve greater degrees of emission control in the future, light duty truck emission standards must be tightened accordingly."' Yet neither bill did anything to change the
definition of light-duty vehicles, which had been held to exclude
light-duty trucks and campers; and the new definition of heavyduty vehicles expressly excludes them as well. The result seems to
be that light-duty trucks and their relations are not subject to the
statutory requirements applicable either to light-duty or to heavyduty vehicles. The Administrator may regulate them under section
202(a)(1), but his standards need neither achieve the percentage
reductions ultimately applicable to both "light-duty" and "heavyduty" vehicles nor respect the strict interim heavy-duty criterion of
best-available technology.
One might argue that the clear intentions of the committees
should lead the courts in the future to depart from the InternationalHarvester holding that only passenger cars are light-duty
vehicles, or that by defining heavy-duty vehicles as those over
6,000 pounds Congress meant to indicate that all smaller vehicles
should be considered "light-duty" ones. But International
Harvester and the EPA regulations were not based on the position
that small trucks were "heavy-duty vehicles"; that the statute excludes them from that category therefore does not establish that
small trucks must by a process of elimination be "light-duty" vehicles. And for a committee to say it disagrees with the existing interpretation of statutory language that it chooses not to alter is hardly
the most effective means of overruling that interpretation. In any
event, the House Report expressly said that "[b]y its distinction
between heavy-duty and other vehicles in this bill, the Committee
does not intend to preclude the Administrator from redefining the
terms 'light-duty' or 'heavy-duty' or from creating new classes such
as multipurpose vehicles or intermediate-duty. ' 280
"I H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 271 (1977), reprinted in [19771 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1077, 1350.
2 S. REP. No. 127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 66-67 (1977).
21 H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 281 (1977), reprinted in [19771 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 1360.
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The Administrator responded to the statute by retaining his
pre-1977 definition of "light-duty trucks" as including all nonpassenger vehicles weighing less than 8,500 pounds.2 8" But since
vehicles between 6,000 and 8,500 pounds are "heavy-duty" vehicles
under the statute, the standards for them must conform to the
section 202(a)(3) criteria, and since "there is no justification for
requiring trucks of less than 6000 pounds. . . to meet less stringent
emission standards than heavier trucks," "the entire light-duty
truck class will be subject to the requirements of section
202(a) (3).' ' 282 Interim standards for light trucks have thus been
set,28 evidently on the basis of the best technology. This approach
28 4
is entirely consistent with the statute.
E.

Motorcycles

"Presently uncontrolled motorcycles," said the House Committee in 1977, "emit twice as much CO and six times as much HC as
a 1976 new car. 2 85 At that time the Administrator, under section
202(a)(1), had just adopted emission standards for motorcycles
manufactured after 1977.211 In addition to forbidding crankcase
emissions, the motorcycle standards impose limits on hydrocarbon
and carbon monoxide exhaust emissions.27 While these standards
become more stringent in 1980, they remain less demanding than
those applicable to light-duty vehicles, and they do not apply to
nitrogen oxides at all.2 88 Cycles of under 50 cc. engine displacement,
or unable to exceed 40 km./hr. or to start "using only the engine,"
are excluded from the regulations altogether.29
While these regulations answered Committee concern about
2' 43 Fed. Reg. 43,299 (1978).
2n Id.
m See id. at 37,973 (adding 40 C.F.R. § 86.081-9).
21 See § 202(a)(3)(A)(iv), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(3)(A)(iv) (Supp. I 1977) (authorizing
the EPA to establish classes of heavy-duty vehicles on the basis of"gross vehicle weight" and
other factors); 43 Fed. Reg. 43,299 (1978).
" H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 273 (1977), reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1077, 1352.
- 40 C.F.R. §§ 86.401-78 to 86.444-78 (1978). See H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 271 (1977), reprinted in [19771 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 1350.
21 But the regulations make no reference to fuel-evaporative emissions, as they do for
light-duty vehicles and light trucks pursuant to section 202(a)(1). See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §
86.078-8(b), -9(b) (1978).
- 40 C.F.R. § 86.410-80 (1978) (the 1980 requirements are 5 grams per kilometer HC,
12 grams per kilometer CO). The statutory requirements for 1978 cars are 1.5, 15, and 2.0
grams of HC, CO, and NOXper mile. § 202(b)(1)(A)-(B), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(1)(A)-(B)
(Supp. I 1977).
40 C.F.R. § 86.401-78(b), (c) (1978).
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"uncontrolled" motorcycles, the statute was nonetheless amended
to make special mention of motorcycles in response to "the prolonged delay in promulgation of adequate control measures" for
them in the past.9 0 The Senate bill would have required that motorcycle standards be governed by the criteria applicable to heavy-duty
vehicles: interim use of best technology for the three principal pollu22
29
tants and percentage reductions thereafter. ' The House bill,
which in this respect was approved, gave the Administrator a
choice: under section 202(a)(3)(F), motorcycles "shall be treated in
the same manner as heavy-duty vehicles. . . unless the Administrator promulgates a rule reclassifying motorcycles as light-duty
vehicles . . . or . . .standards applicable to . . .motorcycles as a
2 93
separate . . . category.
Since the Administrator already had prescribed standards for
motorcycles "as a separate category," arguably he needed to do
nothing under the new provision. On the other hand, since the separate standards were in force when the requirement was adopted, it
may be that Congress expected him to give the matter a fresh look
and make a new determination whether or not separate standards
are desirable. To be on the safe side, the Administrator reaffirmed
that motorcycles are "a separate class of vehicles" as established by
29 4
the existing regulations.
No criteria other than the general ones of section 202(a)(1)
govern the Administrator's formulation of regulations for motorcycles as "a separate class or category," except that he "shall consider
the need to achieve equivalency of emission reductions between
motorcycles and other motor vehicles to the maximum extent practicable. 21 5 Thus on the face of the statute, he seems free not only
to ignore the relatively demanding light-duty or heavy-duty provisions, but also to preserve the present exemption of small cycles and
the total omission of limits on nitrogen oxides. An argument can be
made that since all "motorcycles" are made subject to all statutory
heavy-duty standards unless separate provision is made, Congress
meant to give the Administrator power only to prescribe different
21

See H.R. REp. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 273 (1977), reprinted in [19771 U.S.

CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 1352.
291See S. REP. No. 127, 95th. Cong., 1st Sess. 193-94 (1977).
2'2 See H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 274 n.16 (1977), reprinted in

[1977]

U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1077, 1353 n.16.
29342 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(3)(F) (Supp. I 1977). There is an exception dealing with high
altitude that is not relevant here. See text and notes at notes 99-115 supra.
21 43 Fed. Reg. 43,299 (1978).
29542 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(3)(F) (Supp. I 1977).
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standards, not to exempt some vehicles or pollutants from the standards entirely. The more natural reading of the statutory language,
though it means the amendment accomplished little, is that Congress, while starting with the presumption that motorcycles should
be treated the same as heavy vehicles, left it to the EPA to determine the extent to which they should be treated differently.
This conclusion is confirmed by the Conference Report's explicit declaration that "EPA's promulgated approach is consistent
with the authority granted in this section, 21 and the District of
Columbia Circuit has relied on this passage in sustaining the
27
Agency's definition of "useful life" for motorcycles. 1
V.
A.

ENFORCEMENT AND PREEMPTION

Certification

The central machinery for enforcing the vehicle-emission standards is a certification procedure. With minor exceptions, 25 section
203(a) prohibits any manufacturer from selling, and anyone from
importing, new vehicles subject to the emission standards unless the
vehicles are "covered by a certificate of conformity. 2 99 Under section 206(a) the manufacturer submits prototypes for EPA testing;
the certificate is issued if the Administrator determines3 ® that the
prototype "conforms with the regulations prescribed under section
[202]. "301 The 1970 House Report explained that this meant the
prototype must meet "the applicable emission standards"3 02-an
"I H.R. REP. No. 564, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 164 (1977), reprinted in [19771 U.S.

CODE

& AD. NEWS 1502, 1544-45.
"7 Harley-Davidson Motor Co. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 228 (D.C. Cir. 1979). See text and note
at note 338 infra.
"I The Administrator may exempt "any new motor vehicle" or engine "for the purpose
of research, investigations, studies, demonstrations, or training, or for reasons of national
security." § 203(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7522(b)(1) (Supp. I 1977). No mention is made of the
procedure to be followed in making such exemptions. I see no reason to think Congress, by
speaking in the singular of "any. . .vehicle," meant to preclude making categorical exemptions by general regulation.
- 42 U.S.C. § 7522(a)(1) (Supp. I 1977).
Although the statute says nothing of a hearing at this stage, the regulations appropriately provide opportunity for an adjudicative hearing upon rejection of an application. 40
C.F.R. § 86.077-6, -22 (1978).
3'42 U.S.C. § 7525(a)(1) (Supp. I 1977). Vehicles for export are sensibly subjected to
the standards of the receiving country in determining whether or not to issue a certificate. §
203(b)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7522(b)(3) (Supp. 11977). See H.R. REP. No. 1783,91st Cong., 2d Sess.
200 (1970), reprintedin [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5374, 5382: "vehicles intended
solely for export must comply with Federal emission standards unless the importing nation
has differing requirements affecting motor vehicles emissions or has advised that no such
CONG.

requirements exist.

'

.. ."

H.R. REP. No. 1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1970), reprinted in [1970] U.S.

CODE
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interpretation which, as the following discussion will show,302 was
03
not as obvious as it may appear.
A certificate of conformity, as the court said in United States
v. Chrysler Corp.,3 '" "is, in effect, a license that allows an automobile manufacturer to sell vehicles to the public"; he may sell as
many vehicles as he wishes so long as they are "covered by" the
certificate. Just what "covered by" the certificate means, however,
has been the subject of considerable controversy. The regulations
prescribe that certificates authorize sale of vehicles "which conform,
in all material respects, to the design specifications . . . described
in the application for certification.1035 One dispute over this provision was resolved in Chrysler, where the court sensibly rejected the
contention that all vehicles putatively meeting applicable emission
standards were "covered" though equipped with parts different
from those in the tested prototypes. The differences were "material"
because the nonconforming parts could reasonably be expected to
affect emission controls, and to allow conformity to be shown by a
later emission test "would frustrate clear congressional intent...
'36
that vehicles pass emission tests before they may be sold.
The more serious issue is the converse: whether vehicles that do
not meet emission standards are "covered" so long as they are designed in accordance with the prototype. The regulation quoted
above appears to say they are, and the EPA has explained that
"'the purpose of the certification program was to give the manufacturer assurance that its production cars would conform to legal requirements : . . [though their construction] differed from that of
a prototype for reasons not practically. . . within the control of the
manufacturer.' "307
The House Report observed in 1970, however, that
"[e]xperience has shown that the testing and certification of prototypes does not of itself assure that automobiles coming off the as3 8
sembly line . . .comply with the Federal emission standards.""
One reason for that experience was described in the Nader Report:
"[P]rototypes are handmade, individually machined to greater
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5356, 5358. This language was identical to that on which the report was
commenting.
30 See text and notes at notes 307-360 infra.
3- 591 F.2d 958, 960 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
3- 40 C.F.R. § 86.077-30(a)(2) (1978).
31 591 F.2d at 961.
37 W. RODGERS, supra note 36, § 3.15, at 307 (quoting 1 EPA Collection of Legal Op. Dec.
1970-Dec. 1973, at 184) (emphasis in original).
31 H.R. REP. No. 1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1970), reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5356, 5358.
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than production-line tolerances, carefully serviced, and handadjusted." ' Thus, by 1970 Congress was aware that certification
was not serving what Professor Rodgers has persuasively described
as another of its central purposes: "to approve the sale of vehicles
in a production line only after an adequate showing that the cars
' 31 0
will meet emission requirements.
The original statute had expressly forbidden sale of vehicles not
meeting emission standards.31 ' The apparent objective of this injunction was, however, contradicted by a provision that vehicles "of
substantially the same construction as the prototype" were
"deemed" to meet emission standards.3 12 Against the background of
widespread failure of mass-produced cars to perform as well as the
prototypes, Congress repealed the "same construction" proviso in
1970.313 Standing alone, this action would suggest that design conformity should no longer be a defense to a charge of selling uncertified vehicles. But at the same time, Congress substituted the present term "covered by" the certificate for the pre-existing requirement that production vehicles meet the emission standards; it also
added new and distinct remedies for the gap between prototype and
production, which are discussed in the following subsections. This
history, reinforced by the phrasing of the House Report, 34 suggests
that vehicles not meeting the standards may nonetheless be
"covered by" the certificate and therefore may be sold so long as it
remains in force, but that production failures may subject the manufacturer to a variety of remedial actions including revocation of the
certificate.
B.

Production-Line Testing

Section 206(b), responsive to the failure of production vehicles
to measure up to the prototype,3 1 5 since 1970 has authorized the EPA
J. Esposrro, VANISHNG Am 54 (1970).
RODGE S, supra note 36, § 3.15, at 307.
"'
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. 89-272, § 101(8), 79 Stat. 993 (amending
Clean Air Act § 203(a)(1)) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7522(a)(1) (Supp. 11977)).
32 Id., 79 Stat. 994 (amending Clean Air Act § 206(b)) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §
7525(b) (Supp. I 1977)).
"I Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. 91-604, § 8(a), 84 Stat. 1694 (amending
Clean Air Act § 206(b)) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7525(b) (Supp. I 1977)).
31 "[A] manufacturer may not sell . . . any vehicle or engine to which an emission
standard applies, unless such vehicle or engine is covered by a certificate of conformity ...
[A] certificate may be suspended or revoked if the secretary's production-line testing shows
that vehicles or engines covered by it do not actually meet the applicable emissions standards." H.R. Rse. No. 1146, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1970), reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5356, 5368.
"I Id. at 3, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 5358.
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to conduct production-line tests to determine "whether . . .vehicles. . . being manufactured. . . do in fact conform with the regu3'
lations with respect to which the certificate . . . was issued. 11 It
also permits the EPA to revoke or suspend the certificate, with
opportunity for a subsequent record hearing,"t 7 upon a finding that
"all or part" of the vehicles or engines covered do not so conform.3 18
For a long time this production-testing authority was not exercised, and significant failures of production vehicles to meet the
standards were reported. 3 9 In 1976, the EPA finally adopted a
"selective enforcement audit" procedure (SEA) for testing a sample
of light-duty production vehicles.32 0 In devising the procedure, the
crucial issue was once again the basis on which conformity was to
be determined. One possible interpretation would have been that a
vehicle satisfied "the regulations with respect to which the certificate . . .was issued," and thus met the production-line requirement, whenever it was "covered by" the certificate; production testing might have been only a means of assuring conformity to the
original design. Since a major cause of inadequacy of emission controls on production vehicles was that a prototype was not representative of its design, such an interpretation would render production
testing insufficient to accomplish its purpose. Moreover, while the
language of compliance for production testing suggestively differs
from the requirement of section 206(a) that a prototype be tested
for conformity with "the emission regulations prescribed under section [202], ' 321 the House Report explaining the production-testing
*,642 U.S.C. § 7525(b)(1) (Supp. I 1977).
317Id. § 7525(b)(2)(B)(i). The importance of protecting public health should justify postponing the hearing until after suspension or revocation, so long as the hearing is promptly
held. Cf. Commissioner v. Shapiro, 424 U.S. 614 (1976) (dictum) (seizure of absconding
taxpayer's property before hearing); North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S.
306 (1908) (ordinance requiring destruction of contaminated food before opportunity for hear-

ing).

31 42 U.S.C. § 7525(b)(2)(A) (Supp. 1 1977). Vehicles may be certified on an individual
basis after suspension or revocation of the prototype certificate. Id.
'.
3" See S. REP. No. 127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 85 (1977). The 1977 Senate bill, id. at 201,
would have required a production-line test procedure to be established within six months.
The Conference Committee deleted this requirement, noting the EPA had just adopted the
selective auditing procedure described below. Calling this only "a first step," the report added
that "the conferees intend that the Administrator revise current test procedures expeditiously
to provide a short production line test. . . to assure reasonable statistical certainty that each
car produced will be able to pass" a comparable emissions inspection. H.R. REP. No. 564,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 171 (1977),reprintedin [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS 1502, 1552.
The EPA had given the 45-minute length of the existing test as one reason for testing only a
small sample of vehicles. 41 Fed. Reg. 31,472 (1976).
40 C.F.R. §§ 86.601-.613 (1978).
"' 42 U.S.C. § 7525(a) (Supp. 1 1977).
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provision explicitly stated that the criterion was conformity "to the
3 ' The SEA rules
emission standards.""
therefore quite properly provide for determining whether production vehicles meet applicable
3
emission standards. 2
Thus it appears that, while a certificate covers every vehicle
that conforms to the prototype, production-line testing is to determine whether the individual vehicle meets applicable emission
standards. There is no necessary. inconsistency here. By prescribing
different criteria, the statute seems to have attempted to promote
the twin goals of certification as described above. So long as the
certificate is in existence, the manufacturer is protected against
money penalties or a shutdown order; but the certificate may be
revoked, and the public interest protected, if the prototype turns out
to be better than its descendants.
The question remains whether each vehicle tested must meet
the standards or whether, as the manufacturers contended, compliance should be determined by averaging the emissions of all vehicles
in a certified class.3 24 Averaging may be quite compatible with the
rollback calculus by which the statutory standards were initially
determined, 32 but section 206(b) itself authorizes revocation of the
entire certificate when "all or part" of the vehicles tested fail to
conform; 321 a certificate may also be revoked "insofar as" it "applies
to" any individual vehicle that fails the test.32 7 Moreover, section
207(b) provides that each vehicle sold shall be warranted to
"conform . . . during its useful life . . . to the regulations prescribed under section [202]," as soon as there is technology for
determining compliance "with the emission standards of such regulations. ' ' 32 The Conference Report confirms that this is a warranty
for every car of actual compliance "with applicable emission standards. 3 19 The warranty provision thus demonstrates that Congress,
11 H.R. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12 (1970), reprinted in [19701 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5356, 5367.
= See 40 C.F.R. Part 86, Subpart G, App. IX (1978).
32 41 Fed. Reg. 31,472, 31,480 (1976). Averaging is condemned in Jorling, supra note.36,
at 1118-19.
3 See text and notes at notes 39-40 supra.
32, 42 U.S.C. § 7525(b)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. I 1977).
3v Id. § 7525(b)(2)(A)(ii).
32 Id. § 7541(b). See text and notes at notes 341-360 infra.
H.R. REP. No. 1783, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1970), reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5374,'5383. See also § 206(g)(4),.42. U.S.C. § 7525(g)(4) (Supp. I 1977)
(providing an exception to the general rule by prescribing a warranty based upon the emission
levels permitted by a certificate issued to nonconforming heavy-duty vehicles subject to
nonconformance penalties, "and not for the emission levels required under the applicable
standard").
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subject only to the development of testing technology, contemplated
legal sanctions to assure that each vehicle met the emission standards; to determine substantive compliance on an averaging basis
would be inconsistent with section 207(b), and the EPA explicitly
so decided.3
Nevertheless, the manufacturers had proceeded on the assumption that averaging was permissible; and to avoid imposing an
"unreasonably burdensome" requirement, 33' the EPA regulations
provide that only 60% of production-line vehicles must meet emission standards to avoid revocation of the certificate under section
206(b) . 332 Technically, this seems not to violate the statute, which
gives the Administrator apparently broad discretion in the use of
this sanction: he "may" revoke on failure by "all or part" of the
vehicles tested. Yet it is not easy to reconcile this free pass with the
substantive requirement of compliance by each vehicle. If the warranty provisions had been in force, revocation of the certificate of
conformity would have avoided the inefficiency and tardiness of
widespread warranty repairs by keeping nonconforming cars off the
market; in the absence of warranties, revocation is all the more
indispensable if the substantive emission standards are to be met
at all.m
C.

Compliance in Use: Warranties

The EPA's authority to adopt vehicle-emission standards is
limited to "new" vehicles and engines,34 which are defined by section 216 as those that have "never been transferred to an ultimate
purchaser, '335 who is "the first person who in good faith purchases
. . .for purposes other than resale."1 Yet Congress could no more
afford to ignore the gap between initial and later performance than
31 41 Fed. Reg. 31,472, 31,480 (1976).
-1 Id. at 31,474.
32 40 C.F.R. §§ 86.602(a)(1), .607(b) (1978).
1' In proposing to extend the SEA procedure to heavy-duty vehicles, the EPA has set
forth a 90% compliance requirement, and the new emission standards have been designed
with that requirement in mind. 44 Fed. Reg. 9464, 9468, 9490 (1979) (proposing, interalia, a
new 40 C.F.R. § 86.1010-83(a)). When the failure rate becomes as low as 10%, revocation of
the entire certificate may be an unreasonably harsh remedy for expectable variability in
production. Inspection and warranty, see notes 341-360 infra, may be a preferable enforcement scheme under those circumstances. An alternative without the advantage of testing for
later deterioration would be testing of every vehicle at the production line, which the EPA
has rejected as not cost justified. See 41 Fed. Reg. 31,472 (1976).
§ 202(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (Supp. 1 1977).
42 U.S.C. § 7550(3) (Supp. 1 1977).
33 Id. § 7550(5).
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it could ignore that between prototype and production. Emission
standards consequently "shall be applicable to such vehicles and
engines for their useful life." 7
Section 202(d)(1) defines the "useful life" of a light-duty
vehicle as "five years or fifty thousand miles . . . whichever first
occurs." 338 One observer cites this definition as an example of industry's success in weakening the-emission standards by manipulating
the relatively invisible provisions for their implementation: although the statute rhetorically trumpets "that cars must conform
'for their useful life,' elsewhere 'useful life' is defined as what, in
practice, is only half the useful life of the car. '339 It is impossible to
say that this sleight-of-hand really undermines the statutory policy,
however, without knowing whether or not the rollback model by
which the emission standards were determined envisioned that cars
would conform to emission requirements as long as they were on the
road.
The first consequence of the useful-life provision is that certification is dependent upon the test vehicle's compliance with standards not only when it is new but also until it has been driven for
50,000 miles "or such lesser distance as the Administrator may agree
to. '30 One cannot very well run every car 50,000 miles before it is
-7 § 202(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (Supp. I 1977).
= 42 U.S.C. § 7521(d)(1). In the case of motorcycles, "useful life" is to be "a period of

use the Administrator shall determine," § 202(d)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(d)(3) (Supp. I 1977).
The Senate Report said the EPA should have flexibility to determine a "reasonable mileage
standard" in view of the fact that motorcycles, while requiring "effective controls," "simply
do not last 50,000 miles." S. REP. No. 127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 77-78 (1977). The motorcycle
regulations define "useful life" as five years or from 7,456 to 18,641 miles according to the
size of the engine. 40 C.F.R. § 86.402-78 (1978). Manufacturers contended these definitions
were improper because they were based upon actual expected lifetime travel distance in
contrast to the statutory automobile standard, which they argued was only half the actual
expected life. Harley-Davidson Motor Co. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 228, 230 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The
court disagreed: as the Senate Report had said, flexibility was intended, and the Conference
Report had expressly approved the existing motorcycle standards. Id.
For other vehicles, the 5-year, 50,000-mile light-duty definition applies "unless the
Administrator determines that a period of use of greater duration or mileage is appropriate."
§ 202(d)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(d)(2) (Supp. I 1977). Deeming the 50,000-mile and 100,000mile definitions respectively set, 40 C.F.R. § 86.077-2 (1978), for gasoline-powered and dieselpowered heavy-duty vehicles "unrealistically short," 44 Fed. Reg. 9464, 9466 (1977), the EPA
has proposed to substitute "the average period of use up to engine retirement or rebuild, ...
as determined by the manufacturer based on survey information of in-service engines or, for
new engines, based on durability testing of prototype engines"-with a statutory floor of the
light-duty definition. Id. at 9474 (proposing a new 40 C.F.R. § 86.083-2). The aim is to "bring
the definition of useful life into clear agreement with the periods of use actually seen by
heavy-duty engines." Id. at 9466.
33 Margolis, The Politics of Auto Emissions, 49 PuB. INTEREST 3, 16 (1977).
34 40 C.F.R. § 86.077-26(a)(4) (1978). See W. RODGFS, supra note 36, § 3.14, at 295
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sold, so the useful-life provision is further backed up by the warranty provisions of section 207.
Two distinct warranties are provided. The first, in section
207(a), is a design and construction warranty: that the vehicle or
engine "is (A) designed, built, and equipped so as to conform at the
time of sale with applicable regulations . . . , and (B) free from
defects . . .which cause such vehicle . . .to fail to conform . . .
for its useful life. '341 The warranty runs to the "ultimate purchaser
and each subsequent purchaser. 34 2 Presumably the consequence of
a breach is an obligation to make the purchaser whole, but for what
loss the statute does not say.
The design warranty seems to cover only vehicles whose poor
313
performance is caused by an identifiable flaw. Section 207(b)
therefore supplements it with a warranty of actual performance, to
assure that each vehicle will "conform. . .during its useful life...
to the regulations prescribed under section [202]" 3 4-that is, as
the Conference Report said,345 that each vehicle will meet the applicable emission standards, rather than simply conform to prototype
design. In case of breach, the "manufacturer shall remedy such
3 46
nonconformity" at his own expense.
This warranty, however, is qualified. It applies, appropriately
enough, only if "the vehicle or engine is maintained and operated
in accordance with instructions"; 34 7 the manufacturer is not responsible if the owner mistreats his car. Moreover, in order to allay fears
of an anticompetitive effect on the market for replacement parts, 34 8
the 1977 amendments limited the performance warranty to two
(arguing that the Administrator's decision to allow one replacement of the catalyst at the
owner's expense is inconsistent with the useful-life requirement); Jorling, supra note 36, at
1119-21 (same).
u' 42 U.S.C. § 7541(a)(1) (Supp. I 1977).

Id.

342

3,3
Id. 7541(b).
3,,
Id. § 7541(b)(2)(B).
"I See text at note 329 supra.
3" 42 U.S.C. § 7541(b)(2) (Supp. 11977).
" Id. § 7541(b)(2)(A).
3,1 See H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 291-92 (1977), reprinted in [1977] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1077, 1370-71.
A bevy of provisions was added in 1977 to calm fears that the warranty provisions might
give the vehicle manufacturer a competitive advantage in the market for replacement parts.
Absent a showing of necessity, he may not condition the warranty on use of brand-name parts
or services provided by his affiliates; he must inform the buyer that there are no such limitations; the EPA is required to certify competing replacement parts if they "enable such vehicle
or engine to conform" to mandatory light-duty standards. § 206(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7525(a)(2)
(Supp. 1 1977). See also § 207(c)(3)(A)-(B), 42 U.S.C. § 7541(c)(3)(A)-(B) (Supp. I 1977).

19791

Clean Air Act Mobile-Source Provisions

years or 24,000 miles except for "a catalytic converter, thermal reactor, or other component installed . . for the sole or primary purpose of reducing vehicle emissions. ' '349 Further, and most importantly, the performance warranty does not take effect until the
Administrator determines that adequate inspection procedures
have been established and correlated with the tests that are performed as a condition of certification. By the time of the 1977
amendments the performance warranty was not yet in effect
"because no short, in-use test [was] available";3 50 the EPA has
since declared that test procedures will be approved in time to make
3 51
the warranty applicable to 1980 vehicles.
On its face the performance warranty, once in effect, is subject
to still another limitation; under section 207(b)(2)(C), it applies
only if the owner is required as a result of nonconformity "to bear
any penalty or other sanction (including the denial of the right to
use such vehicle or engine) under State or Federal law. 35 2 Unaccountably, the owner may not require the manufacturer to fix his
car unless the owner has been punished under some inspection
scheme.3 13 This limitation, however, seems to have been effectively
repealed by the addition of section 207(h) in 1977:
If at any time during the period for which the warranty applies
under subsection (b) of this section, a motor vehicle fails to
conform to . . . regulations under section [202] . . . as determined under subsection (b) of this section such nonconformity
shall be remedied by the manufacturer at the cost of the manufacturer pursuant to such warranty as provided in subsection
(b)(2) of this section (without regard to subparagraph (C)
thereof).311
It was subparagraph (C) that required the purchaser to incur penalties before seeking repair at the manufacturer's expense. Apparently
the new provision leaves unimpaired the other requirements of the

31, § 207(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7541(b) (Supp. 1 1977). This is achieved by an awkward definition of the warranted "emission control device or system," which has a broader meaning
during the two-year or 20,000-mile period. See H.R. REP. No. 564, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 168
(1977), reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1502, 1548-49. I should have
thought the additional antimonopoly provisions adopted, see text and note at note 348 supra,
would have made this retrenchment of the warranty unnecessary.
3" S. REP. No. 127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1977).
31 See 44 Fed. Reg. 23,784, 23,785, 23,788 (1979).
35 42 U.S.C. § 7541(b)(2)(C) (Supp. I 1977).
"' Oddly, in light of this requirement, the statute does not say the owner is entitled to
reimbursement for his penalties.
31 42 U.S.C. § 7541(h)(2) (Supp. I 1977).
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warranty section;3 5 needless to say, Congress could have accomplished the goal with much less risk of confusion by simply repealing
the penalty requirement in section 207(b) itself.35
The EPA, noting that "[p]arentheticals in one section of a law
do not generally void other subsections, ' 35 7 has interpreted the new
provision of section 207(h) as dispensing with the penalty prerequisite only if the vehicle fails an emission test within three months after
its initial sale.35 At the same time, however, the EPA considers the
penalty requirement of subparagraph (C) satisfied whenever the
owner is ordered to repair his car after failing an inspection, at the
risk of future penalties. 9 Needless to say, both these readings are
difficult to square with the statute.
Independent of the warranty provisions, however, and without
regard to the limitations in those sections, section 207(c) requires
the Administrator to order a recall on finding that "a substantial
number of any class or category of vehicles or engines, although
properly maintained and used, do not conform to the regulations
prescribed under section [202]." The manufacturer must then rem3
edy the "nonconformity" at his own expense.
"I The effect of this masterpiece of circumlocution is not wholly clear even after careful
parsing. It does not repeal the requirement of a finding that adequate inspection procedures
have been established, since it applies only "during the period for which the warranty applies
under subsection (b)." For the same reason, I think it does not affect the limitation of the
warranty after two years or 20,000 miles, though technically that limitation is phrased as a
definition of the devices covered rather than as a limit of the warranty's duration. I should
also conclude, since no one expressed dissatisfaction with it, that Congress did not mean to
eliminate the salutary requirement that the owner not have mistreated his vehicle, though
the reference to a failure to conform "as determined under subsection (b)" does not clearly
incorporate requirements that that subsection appears to state as additional to that of nonconformity. The Conference Report loosely says the manufacturer is responsible whenever "a
motor vehicle fails an in-use emissions test," without mentioning proper maintenance, but
the thrust of this remark seems to be an indication that no imposition of penalties is requisite.
H.R. REP. No. 564, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 170 (1977), reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. &

AD. NEws 1502, 1550-51.

3mIn addition, section 207(h)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7541(h)(1) (Supp. I 1977), requires the
dealer to certify that the vehicle "conforms to the applicable regulations under section
[202]," but no remedies against the dealer are provided in case of test failure. To avoid
making the certificate "a meaningless piece of paper," the EPA proposed to require the dealer
to certify that the vehicle is covered by certificate, that visual inspection shows emissioncontrol components to be installed and apparently functioning, and that he has performed
any necessary presale preparation. See 44 Fed. Reg. 23,793, 23,796 (1979) (proposing a new
40 C.F.R. § 85.2108(b)).
44 Fed. Reg. 23,793 (1979).
Id. at 23,793, 23,797 (proposing a new 40 C.F.R. § 85.2108(d)).
Id. at 23,791, 23,796 (proposing a new 40 C.F.R. § 85.2106(a)).
30 42 U.S.C. § 7541(c)(1) (Supp. 11977). See Jorling, supra note 36, at 1122 (arguing that
the requirement of a "substantial" number of violations "should be read to impose a reasonable man test on the likelihood that the cause of the malfunction in those vehicles found
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Tampering

The provisions we have so far considered apply only to manufacturers and importers; nothing is said of any duty on the part of
the owner to keep his vehicle in compliance with emission standards. Section 203(a), however, takes a small step in that direction
by limiting the owner's ability to get professional help in sabotaging
the emission-control system the manufacturer is required to install.
The pre-1977 provisions forbade any person prior to delivery to
the "ultimate purchaser," and "any manufacturer or dealer" thereafter, to "remove or render inoperative any device or element of
design installed on or in a motor vehicle . . . in compliance with
regulations under this subchapter"-"knowingly" in the case of
tampering after delivery."' The obvious deficiency was that the
statute left it open to "any person independent of a manufacturer"
to "disconnect a pollution control system without penalty"382 after
delivery. Thus the Senate Report in 1977 noted:
In the wake of the fuel crisis of 1974 and the resulting national
concern over fuel economy, many private service garages advertised extensively their emission control removal services, allegedly to produce increases in fuel economy. Emission control
removal manuals were marketed. Studies by the Environmental Protection Agency . . indicate that such practices assure
only that emissions will increase dramatically and usually
3
without any improvement in fuel economy.1
Accordingly, the 1977 amendments extend the prohibition of knowing post-delivery tampering to "any person engaged in the business
of repairing, servicing, selling, leasing, or trading motor vehicles or
motor vehicle engines, or who operates a fleet of motor vehicles." 36 4

actually not in compliance would indicate that other vehicles in a production class are not
in compliance"); 8 ENw. REP. (BNA) 1594 (1978) (decision of an administrative law judge
upholding an order to Chrysler to recall vehicles for nonconformity to carbon monoxide standards).
31, Air Quality Control Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, § 2, 81 Stat. 500 (amending Clean
Air Act § 203 (a)(3)), as amended by Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91604, § 7, 84 Stat. 1693 (amending Clean Air Act § 203(a)(3)) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §
7522(a)(3) (Supp. 1 1977)).
312S. REP. No. 127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 78 (1977).
30 Id. An EPA study reports that pollution controls on 48% of 1973-1978 cars had been
"altered." 9 ENWIR. REP. (BNA) 1508 (1978).
"I § 203(a)(3)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 7522(a)(3)(B) (Supp. 11977). The terms of the prohibition
are the same as those applicable to manufacturers and dealers in id. § 7522(a)(3)(A). The
penalties are higher for manufacturers and dealers, see § 205, 42 U.S.C. § 7524 (Supp. I
1977), but a less prolix way to express that distinction could have been found than the addition of an entire separate subparagraph.
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Significant gaps in coverage remain. As the House Report emphasized, the law still does not outlaw tampering by "individual
motorists";31 5 apparently Congress was unwilling to commit federal
resources to the unpromising task of policing individual tampering.
Moreover, the statute does nothing about the distribution of
"emission control removal manuals"; indeed, so long as owner
tampering is not forbidden, the first amendment probably protects
the right to incite and abet it."' "Fleet of motor vehicles" is not
defined; there may be line-drawing problems that could have been
avoided by inserting a number, but the Committee's reference to
"individual motorists" ought to protect the three-car suburban family's right to undermine important federal policy.
On its face the tampering provision seems in some respects too
broad, while in others too narrow. The mechanic who temporarily
disconnects a control device while repairing it has literally done
what the statute forbids, though both committees made clear that
he was not meant to be covered;367 qualifying language should have
been put in the statute itself. Conversely, while the Senate Committee stated flatly that "[tiampering . . .extends to the purposeful
setting of engine adjustments to other than manufacturers' recommended specifications,"' 381 it is not obvious that to reset the carburetor so as to impair emission control is to "render inoperative" any
"installed" "device or element of design." Fortunately, the legislative history is confirmed by section 215(a)(1), which, by sensibly
making the tampering ban inapplicable to adjustments made to
compensate for high-altitude problems without impairing emission
control, " implies that other adjustments constitute tampering.
This could have been placed beyond the vagaries of judicial inter3 0
pretation by the insertion of a few words. 1
3" H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th
CONG. & AD. NEws 1077, 1377.

Cong., 1st Sess. 298 (1977), reprinted in 11977J U.S.

CODE

3,,
See Virginia State Bd.of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748 (1976).
311H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 298 (1977), reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws at 1377 (quoting United States v. Haney Chevrolet, Inc., 371 F. Supp.
381, 384 (M.D. Fla. 1974) (dictum)); S. RaP. No. 127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 79 (1977).
I" S. REP. No. 127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 78 (1977) (giving as an example "the setting of
the idle fuel flow to result in excessively rich mixtures").
3" 42 U.S.C. § 7549(a)(1) (Supp. I 1977).
'0 The tampering provision was enforced in a 1974 district court decision against a
Florida dealer whose employee had removed the "idle speed solenoid" and "renderted]
inoperative the transmission control spark system" after sale to the ultimate purchaser.
United States v. Haney Chevrolet, Inc., 371 F. Supp. 381, 384 (M.D. Fla. 1974). The only
serious defense was that the action had been taken "only temporarily until a solution to the
Corvette's engine problems could be found." Id. The court held this no excuse:
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E. Remedies
In addition to certification, production-line testing, recall, and
warranties, two principal tools are provided to enforce the prohibitions of the vehicle-emission sections. Section 204 authorizes injunctive actions by the United 3 States 31 and section 205 the imposition
of "civil" money penalties.

1

The injunctive provision extends to all "violations of section
[203(a)]," which include not only the sale and importation of uncertified vehicles7 3 but also tampering,37 ' failure to supply requisite
information, '

5 failure

to follow labelling requirements, 36 and viola-

tion of various warranty and recall provisions. 7
The penalty provision applies to the same violations. For postdelivery tampering by one who is not a "manufacturer or dealer,"
the maximum penalty is $2,500; for all other violations it is
$10,000.378 Except for violations of the information provisions in section 203(a)(2), "[a]ny violation . . . shall constitute a separate

offense with respect to each motor vehicle or motor vehicle engine.

'379

Obviously, penalties of this magnitude could make non-

compliance unattractive. While nothing is said as to who may sue
for penalties, the tradition of government enforcement is so strong
that it would take explicit language to authorize penalties at the
suit of private parties.
There is no mention of injunctive or damage suits by affected
individuals, and the citizen-suit provision of section 304 authorizes
private enforcement only of specified requirements not including
[A]n act is done knowingly when it is done voluntarily and intentionally, and not by
mistake or accident. . . . [T]he prohibited act of "removal or rendering inoperative a
device or element of design" is complete . . . when the dealer voluntarily removes or
renders inoperative the emission control devices or elements. . . and voluntarily relinquishes custody and control of the vehicle

. . .

with the

. . .

devices or elements.

removed or rendered inoperative.
Id. The House Report explicitly endorsed this interpretation in both respects. H.R. REP. No.
294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 298 (1977), reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Naws 1077,
1377.
371 42 U.S.C. § 7523 (Supp. I 1977).
3 Id. § 7524. Exclusion from the country is an additional remedy provided for importa-

tion of uncertified vehicles. Id. § 7522(b)(2);
31342 U.S.C. § 7522(a)(1) (Supp. 1 1977).
17, Id. § 7522(a)(3)(A)-(B).
"I'Id. § 7522(a)(2).
17, Id. § 7522(a)(4)(A).
37 Id. § 7522(a)(4)(A)-(D).
-1 § 205, 42 U.S.C. § 7524 (Supp. 1 1977).
379 Id.
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those of section 203.380 Though a citizen may sue to compel the
Administrator himself to perform nondiscretionary acts required
by the vehicle-emission sections, 38 ' and private relief is implicit in
the warranty provisions, 32 the availability of other private relief is
383
left to general law.
F.

Nonconformance Penalties

Normally the EPA issues a "certificate of conformity" only if
the prototype "conforms with the regulations prescribed under section [202], ' '13 and normally the manufacturer is expected not to
sell production vehicles without such a certificate.3 85 An interesting
exception to this pattern was made in 1977 by the addition of section
206(g).381 In order to avoid either rewarding the "laggarrd's" behavior
by relaxing the standard or "ruling the 'laggard' out of the market"
by prohibiting his sales, 387 section 206(g) innovatively provides that
"a certificate of conformity shall be issued" for heavy-duty vehicles,
and "may be issued" for motorcycles,388 "notwithstanding the failure . . .to meet such standard if [the] manufacturer pays a norn3 9 This provision is,
conformance penalty.""
on its face, inapplicable
to light-duty vehicles.

0 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a),(f) (Supp. 1 1977). While section 304 applies to "violation" of any
"emission. . .limitation under this chapter," id. § 7604(a) (1), no provision forbids emissions
in excess of vehicle standards as such; what is prohibited is sale of uncertified vehicles.
1'Id. § 7604(a)(2) ("any act or duty under this chapter which is not discretionary").
" See text and notes at notes 341-360 supra.
"1 See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). The enforcement provisions of section 113, including administrative orders and criminal sanctions, do not apply to motor-vehicle violations.
42 U.S.C. § 7413 (Supp. 1 1977). The existence of two separate enforcement schemes under
the same statute seems the result of history rather than design.
I" § 206(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7525(a)(1) (Supp. 1 1977).
u5 § 203(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7522(a)(1) (Supp. 1 1977) (prohibiting such sales).
3 42 U.S.C. § 7525(g) (Supp. I 1977).
See H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 275 (1977), reprinted in [1977] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1077, 1354.
38 See H.R. REP. No. 564, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 164 (1977), reprinted in [19771 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS 1502, 1544 ("the provision. . . authorizes but does not require, the
Administrator to permit the sale of nonconforming motorcycles upon payment of a . . .
penalty") (emphasis added). The House bill had included motorcycles in the "shall" provision later limited to heavy-duty vehicles. See H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 420
(1977).
38 42 U.S.C. § 7525(g)(1) (Supp. 1 1977). Similarly, while later proof of nonconformity
normally is a ground for revocation or suspension of the certificate, id. § 7525(b)(2)(A)(i)(ii), section 206(g)(1) makes payment of the penalty proof against revocation or suspension
as well in the case of heavy-duty vehicles. The omission of any reference to suspension or
revocation in the case of motorcycles is consistent with the discretionary nature of nonconforming certification of motorcycles, since suspension and revocation in any case "may"
rather than "shall" be ordered.
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There is a limiting condition, however: "no certificate. . . may
be issued. . . if the degree by which the manufacturer fails to meet
any standard. . . exceeds the percentage determined under regulations. . . to be practicable.13 In what appears to accord with the
statutory term "practicable," the EPA has said it will set upper
limits that "correspond to the lowest emission level which the
Agency determines any technological laggard has the capability of
achieving," so that "no manufacturer would be forced to suspend
engine production when the new standards go into effect.""'
The amount of the penalty may vary by pollutant or vehicle
class but "shall take into account the extent" of nonconformity, '
"shall be increased periodically in order to create incentives, "" 33 and
"shall remove any competitive disadvantage" to complying manufacturers. 34 The Conference Committee explained that in order to
remove that disadvantage the penalty
would include such items as the actual cost of compliance for
complying vehicles, the capital costs foregone as a result of
non-compliance, the market value of any fuel economy gains
made by non-complying vehicles compared to complying vehicles and the competitive advantage that may arise because of
39 5
the lesser warranty and recall obligations.
Penalties so determined should reasonably well serve the twin purposes of creating an incentive to comply with the emission standards
and promoting equitable treatment of competitors.
Nothing is said of the procedure whereby the amount of the
individual manufacturer's penalty is determined.3 98 In the analogous
situation of a suspension or revocation of a manufacturer's certificate for failure to meet the applicable standard, the statute provides
the manufacturer a right to a "hearing" and a "determination on
the record"; 317 these provisions trigger the full adjudicatory proce3" Id. § 7525(g)(2).
31 44 Fed. Reg. 9464, 9470 (1979). The House Report spoke vaguely of "an allowable

range" on nonconformity. H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., lst Sess. 275 (1977), reprinted in

[1977] U.S.
312 §

CODE CONG.

& AD.

NEWS

1077, 1354.

206(g)(3)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 7525(g)(3)(C) (Supp. I 1977).*
3,3 42 U.S.C. § 7525(g)(3)(D) (Supp. 1 1977).
3" Id. § 7525(g)(3)(E).
31 H.R. REP. No. 564, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 163 (1977), reprinted in [19771 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1502, 1544.
31 A formula for assessing penalties is to be promulgated by "regulations" after "notice
and opportunity for a legislative [see t-4xt at notes 173-177 supra] public hearing," § 206(g)
(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7525(g)(1) (Supp. I 1977), but the formula must be applied to the facts of
the particular case.
3" § 206(b)(2)(B)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7525(b)(2)(B)(1) (Supp. I 1977).
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dures of the APA.395 For reasons given above, 399 I think due process
requires the same procedures for the penalty determination, to the
extent that adjudicative facts are in dispute.
The relationship between the nonconformance penalty provision of section 206(g) and the authority to revise the ultimate heavyduty standards under section 202(a)(3)(B)40 5 is somewhat hazy. The
basis of nonconforming certification is inability to meet the standard; yet the Administrator is authorized by section 202 to revise
the standard itself, on what appears to be the same basis, so as to
obviate the imposition of penalties. One way to accommodate the
two provisions is to emphasize the presumptively permissive word
"may" in the provision for revising the standard as giving the Administrator either a free choice between the alternatives, or power
to adopt additional conditions, such as good faith efforts, for exercise of the revision authority.
The House Report, however, seems to suggest a different interpretation. Not only does it speak of penalties in the context of the
gap between the "laggard" and the "technological leader," '0 but it
does so in connection with the possible unfairness of a last-minute
decision to revise the standards: revised standards are to be set on
the basis of the leader's capability, but within limits, "[a]ny vehicle or engine which fails to meet the revised standards" may be
certified, subject to penalty. 02 Thus, as the EPA has concluded, 03
it appears that nonconforming certification was viewed only as an
answer to discrepancies between the capabilities of various manufacturers; revision is the appropriate remedy whenever no one can
.meet the statutory standard, although the policy against giving a
free pass to sluggards, which underlies the penalty provision, is as
applicable to .the whole industry as to the individual maker.
3,1See 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1976). The regulations provide an adjudicative hearing on
denial of an application for certification as well. 40 C.F.R. § 86.077-6, -22(c) (1978).
" See text and notes at notes 208-218 supra.
40 See text and notes at notes 250-258 supra.
"' H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 275 (1977), reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1077, 1354. See also § 206(g)(3)(E), 42 U.S.C. § 7525(g)(3)(E) (Supp. I
1977). This section makes one factor in the setting of penalties the removal of "any competitive disadvantage to manufacturers whose engines or vehicles achieve the required degree of
emission reduction" but does not necessarily imply there will be such manufacturers in all
cases.
1!1 H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Seas. 275 (1977), reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD.NEws at 1354 (emphasis added). See also H.R. REP. No. 564, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 162-63 (1977), reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1502, 1543 ("[a]
vehicle or engine failing to meet the revised standards") (emphasis added).
1 44 Fed. Reg. 9464, 9470 (1979).
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G.

Government Purchasing
One interesting provision of the statute attempts to commit the
immense purchasing power of the federal government to create an
additional incentive for the development of better technology. Once
the EPA has certified "low-emission vehicles" emitting pollutants
"inamounts significantly below" applicable standards, 04 the government must buy them "in lieu of other vehicles" if their costs are
not more than 150% of those of the "least expensive" models "for
which they are certified substitutes."4 5 The Administrator has
adopted regulations to implement this authority.' Yet as late as
1977 one commentator, citing a government study, described it as
"a model of imaginative draftsmanship and a virtual administrative
40 7
dead letter, . . . a splendid idea which has not worked.
H.

Preemption
In 1967, largely to protect the manufacturer from having to
build engines to comply with a multiplicity of standards,"" Congress
made a significant exception0 9 to the general principle, now found
in section 116,10 that the Clean Air Act does not preempt any state
or local "requirement respecting control or abatement of air pollution." Under present section 209(a), "[n]o State or any political
subdivision thereof shall adopt or attempt to enforce any standard
relating to the control of emissions from new motor vehicles or new
motor vehicle engines subject to this part." '' The Administrator
was allowed to waive preemption only for California" 2 because of
that State's unique experience and need; such a waiver also creates
a testing ground for new regulations without subjecting industry to
more than two regulations.

13

The District of Columbia Circuit, however, has soundly concluded that the waiver of federal preemption for California does not
§ 212(a)(4)(A), (d), 42 U.S.C. § 7546(a)(4)(A), (d) (Supp. I 1977).
§ 212(e)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7546(e)(1) (Supp. 11977). The Certification Board established
by section 7546(b) may raise the figure to 200% under section 7546(e)(2) if the vehicle "is
powered by an inherently low-polluting propulsion system."
," 40 C.F.R. § 85.1601-.1610 (1978).
" W. RODGERS, supra note 36, § 3.2, at 219 (1977).
O See S. REP. No. 403, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1967).
'" Clean Air Act Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-184, § 2, 81 Stat. 501 (amending
Clean Air Act § 208(a)) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (Supp. 1 1977)).
" 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (Supp. 11977).
,' Id. § 7543(a).
41 Id. § 7543(b) (allowing waiver only for states that adopted emission standards prior
to March 30, 1966).
"' See S. REP. No. 403, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1967).
JM
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preclude the imposition of federal sanctions in the state: "The decision not to pre-empt simply allows both federal and state authorities
to regulate emission controls."4 '4
I have discussed the scope of preemption under section 209(a)
in detail in another article.41 5 Suffice it to note here that section
209(d) expressly provides that the statute does not preempt "the
right otherwise to control, regulate, or restrict the use, operation, or
movement of registered or licensed motor vehicles."4 6' Further, the
1977 amendments allow any state to adopt approved California
standards where necessary to achieve federally mandated levels of
air quality. 417
VI.

FUEL REGULATION

Recognizing that what comes out of an engine may be influenced by what goes into it,4"' Congress, as early as 1967, authorized
HEW to require registration of fuels as a condition to their introduction into commerce. 1 9 The 1970 amendments extended coverage to
fuel additives, authorized the EPA to require manufacturers to test
fuels and additives, and added real teeth by giving the Administrator power, "by regulation," to "control or prohibit the manufacture,
"' United States v. Chrysler Corp., 591 F.2d 958, 961 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Similarly, the
same court has unanswerably held that vehicles meeting California standards (which no
longer need to be as strict as the federal in every respect) may be sold nationwide only if they
meet federal standards as well, for the statute provides that "compliance with such State
standards shall be treated as compliance with applicable Federal standards" only "in the case
of any new motor vehicle . . . to which State standards apply pursuant to a waiver," §
209(b)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(3) (Supp. 1 1977), and state standards apply only to vehicles
"introduced for sale in California" or in other states referred to in the new provision cited in
note 417 infra. Ford Motor Co. v. EPA, 606 F.2d 1293, 1300 & n.54 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
More questionable was the holding in American Motors Corp. v. Blum, 603 F.2d 978
(D.C. Cir. 1979), that California may not impose an earlier NO x compliance date than the
federal on small manufacturers dependent upon others for the development of control technology: California may not "deny to a small manufacturer the lead time that Congress has
found to be necessary." Id. at 1415. One might as persuasively argue that Congress found
each statutory postponement of emission deadlines to be "necessary" to avoid an industry
shutdown, yet California was given explicit permission to adopt stricter standards.
For two other decisions construing the California waiver provision, see Motor & Equip.
Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 13 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1737, 1762 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
"5 Currie, Motor Vehicle Air Pollution: State Authority and Federal Pre-Emption, 68
MICH. L. Rav. 1083 (1970).
41, 42 U.S.C. § 7543(d) (Supp. 1 1977).
4'1 § 177, 42 U.S.C. § 7507 (Supp. 1 1977).
"I See H.R. REP. No. 728, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1967), reprinted in [1967] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1938, 1958-59.
41 Air Quality Control Act of 1967, Pub. L. 90-148, § 2, 81 Stat. 502 (amending Clean
Air Act § 211) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7545 (Supp. I 1977)).

1979]

Clean Air Act Mobile-Source Provisions

introduction into commerce, offering for sale, or sale of any fuel or
42
fuel additive for use in a motor vehicle or motor vehicle engine." '
These provisions, as further amended in 1977, appear in section
211.421

A.

Registration

Once the Administrator "by regulation"4 22 has "designate[d]"
a fuel or additive, under section 211(a), "no manufacturer or processor. . . may sell, offer for sale, or introduce into commerce such fuel
or additive" after the date prescribed by regulation, "unless the
Administrator has registered . . . it in accordance with subsection

(b) . '"2

Subsection (b), in turn, provides that the Administrator

"shall" require submission of information as to the "chemical composition" of any additive, the identity of its manufacturer, and its
"concentration" in fuel; 424 "may" require the manufacturer to con25
duct tests and provide a broad range of additional information;'
and "shall" register the fuel or additive upon compliance with the
above requirements, "including assurances that the Administrator
will receive changes in the information required. ' 428 Registration is
thus dependent solely upon submission of information, not upon
any demonstration that use of the fuel or additive is compatible
with public health and welfare. Registration serves only to call potential problems to the EPA's attention.
"Not until November 1975," lamented the 1977 House Report,
"did the Agency promulgate regulations to implement the registration program ....
12 But by January 1977, 1,920 fuel additives,
gasolines, and 250 vehicle diesel fuels had been
511 motor-vehicle
42 81
registered.
The regulations in force in 1977 designated for registration
I2 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 9, 84 Stat. 1698 (amending
Clean Air Act § 211(c)(1)) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 75 45(c)(1) (Supp. I 1977)).
421 42 U.S.C. § 7545 (Supp. I 1977).
'22Since 1977 "any regulation pertaining to any fuel or fuel additive under section
[211]" is subject to the procedural requirements of section 307(d). Id. § 7606(d)(1)(D).
'2 Id. § 7545(a).
424 Id. § 7545(b)(1)(A)-(B).
4- Id. § 7545(b)(2)(A)-(B).
'z, Id. § 7545(b)(3).
" H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 306-07 (1977), reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 1077, 1385-86. The regulations appear at 40 C.F.R. §§ 79.1-.33 (1978)
(originally 40 Fed. Reg. 42,011 (1975)).
1 H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 307 (1977), reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws at 1386 (quoting a letter from the Acting Administrator).
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' "motor vehicle diesel fuel,"430 and
"motor vehicle gasoline,"429

"[a]ll additives produced or sold for use in motor vehicle gasoline,
motor vehicle diesel fuel, and/or motor vehicle engine oil." '' Additives and gasolines "specifically manufactured and marketed for
motorcycles were excluded,"4312 and "any designated fuel" (or additive) employed for "research, development, or test" purposes (or, in
the case of fuel, for "factory fill"), was "exempt from registration." 3'
Several interesting questions are suggested by these provisions.
First, it is not surprising that all the substances designated by the
EPA are used in "motor vehicles" as defined by the Act, since the
regulatory action to which registration is a prelude is expressly limited to motor-vehicle fuel 4u and since motor vehicles are the focus
of the other sections in the same part of the statute. Nevertheless,
the limiting words "motor vehicle" do not appear in section 211(a),
which refers to "any fuel or fuel additive," and those terms are
nowhere defined in the statute. The original 1967 provision, indeed,
explicitly allowed designation of "fuels used for purposes other than
motor vehicles." 3 The only relevant statement I have found in the
legislative history suggests that the broad language of the 1967 provision was omitted as redundant rather than as undesirable. In
explaining the conference bill, Senator Muskie declared in a printed
appendix that section 211's authority to control or prohibit "motor
vehicle fuels or additives" was "combined with added informationgathering powers in the registration of all fuels and fuel additives." 39 Despite its apparent power to regulate all fuels, however,
the EPA has not attempted to expand registration to fuels used in
42 40 C.F.R. § 79.32 (1978).
430Id.

§ 79.33.

40 Fed. Reg. 52,013 (1975).
40 C.F.R. 44 79.31(a)-.32(a) (1978).
Id. § 79.4(a) (3) (fuel), (b) (2) (additive). The Act does not authorize the Administrator
in terms to "exempt" any "designated" substance from registration, so that once any fuel is
designated it technically must be registered. Yet he has by regulation exempted fuels or
additives used only for research. The difficulty here is purely semantic, however; if a court
should be so technical as to set the exemption aside, the defect could be remedied by rephrasing the research exemption as a limitation on the designated fuels or additives.
4U § 211(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(1) (Supp. 1 1977).
"I Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, § 2, 81 Stat. 502 (amending Clean Air
Act § 210(a)) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7525(a) (Supp. 11977)). See H.R. REP.No. 728,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1967), reprinted in [1967] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS 1938, 1958'3,

59.
" 116 CONG. REc. 42,383 (1970). The Senate Report spoke only of vehicle fuels, S. REP.
No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1970), but the Senate bill, unlike the final product, was
expressly limited to vehicle fuels, id. at 116.
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aircraft, in vessels, in farm or construction equipment, or in stationary sources, though obviously a case could be made that it is important that the EPA know of any risks such fuels may entail.
The most interesting question raised by the Administrator's
original designations is the inclusion of additives for use in "motor
vehicle engine oil." The EPA regulations had expansively defined
"fuel" as "any material which is capable of releasing energy or
power by combustion or other chemical or physical reaction,' ' 37 but
industry thought this excessive: "My shirt is capable of [meeting
the definition], but most people do not regard it as a 'fuel.' ,,438 The
EPA then fell back on the more reasonable argument that motor oil
reaching the combustion chambers can result in harmful emissions,
3
which it was the purpose of section 211 to prevent. 1
In Lubrizol Corp. v. EPA,410 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held the motor-oil provision invalid. First,
the argument that the EPA could regulate "any potential contributor to emissions. . . known to Congress in 1970. . . would allow it
to regulate the design of. . . engines. . . as well as methods of auto
maintenance and driving techniques," which obviously are not
"fuels.' 44 This passage is unconvincing: motor oil, unlike engine
design, is arguably a "fuel" since some of it actually is burned in
the engine. But the court was quite persuasive in its further argument: in light of the "marked tendency of the legislators debating
the provision to use 'fuel' and 'gasoline' interchangeably,' 4 2 there
was no reason to think Congress meant to depart from the "common
sense understanding of the word 'fuel' as the substances used to
'4 3
propel motor vehicles.
,3740 C.F.R. § 79.2(c) (1978).
lu Letter from Lewis Green to T.P. Sands (Apr. 16, 1974), quoted in Lubrizol Corp. v.
EPA, 562 F.2d 807, 811 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
See Lubrizol Corp. v. EPA, 562 F.2d 807, 816 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
562 F.2d 807 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
,' Id. at 818.
442

Id.

"'Id. at 816 (emphasis in original). Not cited by the court, however, was the Supreme
Court's contrary split decision, in the analogous case of United States v. Standard Oil Co.,
384 U.S. 224 (1966), that valuable gasoline spilled into the water was "refuse" within the
Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899. The Court observed that since gasoline,
"whether usable or not by industrial standards. . . has the same deleterious effect on waterways," id. at 226, "refuse" includes "'anything which has become waste'" by reaching
the water, id. at 229 (quoting United States v. Ballard Oil Co., 195 F.2d 369, 371 (2d Cir.
1952)). If gasoline unintentionally discarded is "refuse," the same reasoning may lead to the
conclusion that lubricating oil incidentally burned is "fuel."
Perhaps it is not inconsistent to read "refuse" from the viewpoint of its impact and "fuel"
from that of the actor's intention, but the analogy is a close one. A less subjective basis ibr
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The 1977 amendments did not address the problem of engine
oil; the Lubrizol opinion was delivered a few days after they were
enacted. The 1977 House Report expressed a clear opinion on how
the 1970 amendments should be interpreted:
[T]he Committee, in repeating the terms "fuel" and "fuel
additives" intended that these terms be construed broadly, as
with existing section 211, to include any substance that is intentionally put into a vehicle's motor, either directly or indirectly, and which is combusted in the engine. In terms of the
potential effect on pollution control devices or on public health,
it matters not whether any such substance makes its way from
the engine to the gas tank [sic] or is put directly into the
engine.44
The meaning a legislative committee attributes to words it has
drafted is entitled to considerable respect, but that which it attaches to pre-existing law is another story. If Lubrizol was right that
the 1970 reference to "fuel" excluded motor oil, the 1977 Committee's disagreement is only an opinion to the contrary.44 Nevertheless
the EPA, after repealing its existing reference to motor-oil additives
in response to the Lubrizol mandate,44 6 has announced its expectation to reinstate it in reliance on the Committee's opinion." 7
B. Testing
Since 1970, section 211(b) (2) (A) had authorized the EPA to
require manufacturers to test fuels or additives "to determine potential public health effects.""44 But in 1977 the House Committee
complained that "the Agency did not even begin to work on testing
requirements until January 25, 1977. ' ' 44 Even then the Agency's
possible distinction is the absence from the fuel provisions of exemplary terms such as
"ashes" and "acids," which the Court in Standard Oil seized on because they were included
as "refuse" "whether or not they had any remaining commercial or industrial value." 384 U.S.
at 228.
1 H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 309 (1977), reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1077, 1388.
" See Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 132 (1974) ("[Plostpassage remarks of legislators, however explicit, cannot serve to change the legislative intent
of Congress expressed before the Act's passage.").
"
See 43 Fed. Reg. 28,489-90 (1978). See also id. at 38,607.
See id. at 28,489-90.
,, 42 U.S.C. § 7545(b)(2)(A) (Supp. I 1977).
"
H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 307 (1977), reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 1077, 1386. The regulations stated only that "the Administrator may
establish procedures and protocols for the conduct of tests. . and may thereafter require a
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plan was to rely on its own research to identify potentially troublesome candidates for selective testing by the manufacturer. . 0 The
Committee found this "wholly unsatisfactory": the Agency's proposed approach "requires it to prove a fuel or fuel additive probably
harmful, before the manufacturer would be required to test it. ' " 5'
Impatient, Congress in 1977 enacted a new section 211(e),
which required the Administrator within one year, after "notice and
opportunity for public hearing,"45 2 to "promulgate regulations which
implement the authority under subsection (b) (2) (A) and (B) of this
section with respect to each fuel or fuel additive which is registered
. . . [or] for which an application for registration is filed" in the
future.45 3 In other words, with minor exceptions provided in section
211(e) (3),151 he must require manufacturers to test every designated
fuel or additive.45 5 Compliance promises to be a considerable burden, since over 2,600 fuels and additives had been registered by
1977.111
C.

Controls and Prohibitions

Congress had two reasons for concern about fuel composition:
that additives might pass through vehicles and directly endanger
the public, and that they might adversely affect devices to control
other automotive emissions.4 5 Accordingly the 1970 statute, in section 211(c), authorized the EPA to "control or prohibit" fuels or
additives on alternative grounds:
(A) if any emission products of such fuel or fuel additive will
endanger the public health or welfare, or (B) if emission products of such fuel or fuel additive will impair to a significant
degree the performance of any emission control device or sys* . . manufacturer.
. . to conduct tests." 40 C.F.R. § 79.6 (1978). This added nothing to the
statute.
IN H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 307 (quoting letter from Acting Administrator John R. Quarles to Rep. Paul G. Rogers (Feb. 28, 1977)), reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws at 1386.
" Id. at 307, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 1386.
52 42 U.S.C. § 7545(e) (Supp. I 1977). The hearing is subject to the procedures prescribed by section 307(d)(1)(D), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(1)(D) (Supp. I 1977).
" Id. § 7545(e)(1).
,' Id. § 7545(e)(3) (allowing the EPA to exempt "any small business," to "provide for
cost sharing" by common manufacturers, and to avoid "duplicative" testing).
' See H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 308 (1977), reprinted in [1977] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1077, 1387. He must also require manufacturers to provide additional
information, as the regulations already provided. E.g., 40 C.F.R. § 79.31(c)-(d) (1978).
'" H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 308 (1977), reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws at 1387.
, S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 33-34 (1970).
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tem which is in general use, or which the Administrator finds
has been developed to a point where in a reasonable time it
would be
in general use were such regulation to be promul8
gated.

45

Before promulgating a health standard under clause (A), the
Administrator is to consider "all relevant medical and scientific
evidence available," including that relating to "other technologically or economically feasible means of achieving emission standards under section [202] .'' 4 Before promulgating a standard to
protect emission-control technology under clause (B), he is to consider "available scientific and economic data, including a cost benefit analysis comparing emission control devices or systems which are
or will be in general use and require the proposed control or prohibition" with those not requiring it." Upon request by a manufacturer,
the EPA is to hold "a public hearing" and to "publish findings with
respect to any matter the Administrator is required to consider,"
apparently only in promulgating a standard under clause (B).411
Before acting under either clause, the Administrator must find in
writing "that in his judgment such prohibition will not cause the use
of any other fuel or fuel additive which will produce emissions which
will endanger the public health or welfare to the same or greater
degree than the use of the fuel or fuel additive proposed to be pro46 As in the case of all regulations "pertaining to any fuel
hibited.""
or fuel additive under section [211]," the rulemaking procedures
43
of section 307(d) must be followed. 1
1. Standardsto ProtectControl Devices. The Senate Committee had noted that lead "can reduce the effectiveness of. . .cataly-

tic mufflers by up to 90 percent."4 4 In January 1973, the EPA
adopted regulations under section 211(c)(1)(B) limiting the lead
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 9(a), 84 Stat. 1698 (amending Clean Air Act § 211(c)(1) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(1) (Supp. 11977)).
' 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(2)(A) (Supp. I 1977).
460 Id. § 7545(c)(2)(B).

4,Id. Section 211(c)(2)(B) also specifies a hearing and findings as to matters the EPA
"is required to consider under this subparagraph." Elsewhere section 211(c)(1), which authorizes both health and control-device standards, is described as a "paragraph," suggesting the
"subparagraph" referenede is to clause (B) of "paragraph" (2), and clause (B) requires consideration of "matters" only in connection with control-device standards. See Ethyl Corp.
v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 34 n.69 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (declaring the hearing requirement inapplicable to health regulations under section 211(c)(1)(A)), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
462 § 211(c)(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(2)(C) (Supp. I 1977).
4 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(1)(D) (Supp. I 1977).
46,S.REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1977).
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content of gasoline in order to prevent such damage."' It was made
illegal for any retailer or wholesale consumer466 to introduce
"leaded" gasoline (defined as including more than 0.05 grams of
lead or 0.005 grams of phosphorus per gallon)1 7 into cars marked or
designed for exclusive use of unleaded fuel.466 Manufacturers of new
cars whose emission controls would be damaged by lead were required to affix to them permanent labels reading "unleaded gasoline
only" and to provide them with gas tanks with small inlet holes." 9
Gasoline retailers and wholesale consumers were required to dispense leaded fuels from nozzles too big to fit into such cars,4 7 and
large retailers were required to offer unleaded gasoline after July 1,
1974.471
The inevitable judicial challenge was essentially rejected by the
District of Columbia Circuit in Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA. 7 2 The court
after considerable discussion held the statutorily required findings
adequate,4 73 and found ample support for the EPA's conclusions
that an 0.05 gram/gallon standard was both necessary and feasi474
ble.
The most interesting argument was that the requirement that

retailers offer unleaded gasoline was not authorized by the statutory
power to control or prohibit the manufacture or-sale of damaging
fuels. To this "narrow, linguistic argument" the court offered a
U

38 Fed. Reg. 1254 (1973) (codified in 40 C.F.R. § 80 (1978)).

" A wholesale consumer is numerically defined as one having a storage tank of at least

550 gallons, 40 C.F.R. § 80.2(o) (1978).
" Id. § 80.2(f).
JU Id.
§ 80.22(a).
Id. § 80.24. Enlargement of the inlet hole would appear to be covered by the antitampering provisions of section 203(a), see text at notes 361-370 supira. The provisions forbid
professionals (but not the owner himself) to "remove or render inoperative any device or
element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle in compliance with regulations under this
part," and the fuel provisions are found in the same Part A of Title II as is section 203(a).
47940 C.F.R. § 80.22(f) (1978).
471 Id.

§ 80.22(b).

4- 501 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
'7 Id.
at 731-41. The opinion contains a detailed and practical interpretation of the
findings provisions. In particular, section 211(c)(2)(B) was read to require only a finding "that
the [vehicle] emission standards . . . cannot be achieved in acceptable fashion by relying
on . . .devices in 'general use' which 'do not require the proposed control or prohibition.'"
Id. at 736.
'7' Id.
at 741-43. The statute does not require that compliance be "feasible" or economically reasonable, but it does not preclude adoption of regulations that consider these factors.
The court also found wanting a challenge based on the National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1976). 501 F.2d at 749-50. The Clean Air Act is now expressly
exempt from NEPA requirements. Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-319, § 7(c)(1), 88 Stat. 259 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 793(c)(1)
(Supp. I 1977)).
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"similarly narrow and linguistic answer": "The affirmative marketing requirement does in fact 'control' the sale of leaded gasoline, for
the regulation provides in effect that the specified retailers may sell
no leaded gasoline unless and until they also offer for sale one grade
'
of unleaded gasoline."47
The court underscored the necessity for the
requirement: "If unleaded gasoline is not conveniently available for
these vehicles, the new car market may well collapse, the phasingin of converter technology will be paralyzed, and the Clean Air Act's
47
schedule for reducing air pollution will be severely compromised.""
Not challenged were the restrictions on automobile manufacturers,
which one suspects the court would similarly have found necessary
to "control" the "sale" of leaded gasoline.
The EPA's regulations extended liability for introducing leaded
gasoline into the wrong car from a pump normally used for unleaded
fuel477 to distributors4 78 and sometimes to refiners,479 since it was
conceded that "lead contamination . . is typically caused in the
pre-retail stages" and that "it would be extremely difficult for the
Agency to locate the source of contamination in each instance."4' "
The court, however, accepted the objection that the distributor
must be allowed to escape liability by showing "that its employees
and agents did not cause the contamination," and the refiner by
showing that its "employees, agents, or lessees" were not responsible and "that the contamination could not have been prevented by
a reasonable program of contractual oversight." 81 Redrafted in
strict conformity to the opinion of the court of appeals,48 the vicarious liability provision was nevertheless struck down again: a blanket responsibility of refiners for negligent acts of their lessees went
"well beyond the bounds of traditional vicarious liability" and thus
exceeded the authority given by section 211.483 Judge Wright dissented on both obvious grounds: that common-law precedents do
not control the interpretation of the statute, and that the issue had
484
been determined in the earlier decision.
501 F.2d at 744.
Id. at 747.
"' See the qualifying language at 40 C.F.R. § 80.23(e)(1) (1978).
38 Fed. Reg. 1256 (1973) (adding 40 C.F.R. § 80.23(a)(2)).
"' 38 Fed. Reg. 1256 (1973) (adding 40 C.F.R. § 80.23(a)(1)).
501 F.2d at 748.
Id. at 749.
39 Fed. Reg. 43,284 (1974).
" Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 543 F.2d 270, 275 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
.' Id. at 279. See also 65 CALIF. L. Rav. 886, 890-93 (1977) (further arguing that the
refiner's duty would be held nondelegable at common law).
47
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885

2. Standards to Protect Health and Welfare. In December
1973, in order to reduce the health hazard from lead emissions, the
EPA under section 211(e)(1)(A) adopted a further regulation requiring a progressive reduction in the average lead content of all gasolines to 0.5 grams per gallon by January 1979.485 This regulation was
initially set aside by a divided panel of the District of Columbia
48 The opinion has considerable
Circuit in Ethyl Corp. v. EPA."
significance for the regulation of pollution risks generally in the absence of complete knowledge.
The 1970 amendments allowed regulation under the health provision only if emissions resulting from use of the fuel or additive
"will endanger the public health or welfare. 4187 The panel conceded
that Congress had not required a determination that airborne lead
would itself endanger health "without considering other sources of
' Moreover, while disparaging the dislead in the human body."488
sent's attempted distinction between "actual" and "potential"
harm," 9 the court may have left some room for prediction of health
effects by paraphrasing the statutory "endanger[ment]" require4 0
ment as one of "a significant health hazard.
The panel based its decision on alternative grounds. First, the
EPA had misconstrued the "will endanger" language, which "was
intended by Congress to 'turn crucially on factual issues' and not
upon 'choices of policy.' "4 Moreover, section 211(c)(1)(A) required
a more exacting showing that harm would result than the vehicleemission provision of section 202(a) 9 2 (any pollutant "which in his
judgment cause[s] or contributes to, or is likely to cause or
contribute to, air pollution which endangers the public health or
welfare") or the air-quality-standard provision of section 108413 (any

l' 38 Fed. Reg. 13,741 (1973). The determination is to be made on the basis of the total
amount of lead in all gasoline, whether leaded or not, produced by a refinery; leaded gasoline
may thus contain more lead if a greater proportion of the total product is unleaded. See 40
C.F.R. § 80.20(a)(2) (1978).
lu 7 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1353 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd on rehearingen banc, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
I" Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 9(a), 84 Stat. 1698 (amending Clean Air Act § 211(c)(1)(A)) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(1)(A) (Supp. I
1977)).
lu 7 Envir. Rep. Cas. at 1357.
" "[T]he best (and only convincing) proof of such potential harm is what has occurred
in the past . . . ." Id.

Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. at 1361 (quoting Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 722, 740-41 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
,, Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 6(a), 84 Stat. 1690 (amending Clean Air Act § 202(a)) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (Supp. 11977)).
"I Id. § 4(a), 84 Stat. 1678 (amending Clean Air Act § 108(a)(1)(A)) (current version at
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pollutant "which in his judgment has an adverse effect on public
health or welfare").494 In sum, the court said that section 211(c)
(1)(A) required a threshold determination "that an identifiable
measurable increment of lead in the human body is derived from
auto fuel additives and that this measurable increment of lead itself
(taking into consideration all other sources of lead) causes a signifi' Finally, the panel held, the Administrator
cant health hazard."495
had acted arbitrarily in finding that lead from vehicles made a
"'significant contribution to elevated blood lead levels' in either the
'46
general population or among children.
On rehearing en banc, the regulation was upheld.497 Most significant was the court's ringing rejection of the idea that actual harm
must precede regulation:
Case law and dictionary definition agree that endanger means
something less than actual harm. . . Regulatory action may
be taken before the threatened harm occurs; indeed, the very
existence of such precautionary legislation would seem to
demand that regulatory action precede, and, optimally, prevent, the perceived threat. . . . Ethyl is correct that we have
not had the opportunity to learn from the consequences of an
environmental overdose of lead emissions; Congress, however,
sought to spare us that communal experience by enacting §

211(c)(1)(A) .

4

1

Cited in support 9 was the Eighth Circuit's celebrated decision in
Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA. 500 In that case, the court upheld a
finding that asbestos discharges into Lake Superior "endanger[ed]
the health. . . of persons" under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act5"' on the basis of a similar "precautionary or preventive"
interpretation.
The air-quality-standard provision of section 108, which the
42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(A) (Supp. I 1977)).
", 7 Envir. Rep. Cas. at 1361-64.
'
Id. at 1357 (emphasis in original).
4" Id. at 1376.
" Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
4,3 Id. at 13 (emphasis in original).
" Id. at 13 n.18.
514 F.2d 492, 528 (8th Cir. 1975), modified sub noma.Reserve Mining Co. v. Lord, 529
F.2d 181 (8th Cir. 1976).
0' The court was construing what was then section 33 U.S.C. § 1160 (1970). That section was superseded by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972,
Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 2, 86 Stat. 816 (current version codified in scattered sections of Title

33).
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panel had thought showed that section 211, by contrast, imposed a
particularly exacting requirement, was shown to reinforce the conclusion that section 211 was preventive: in contrast to section 211's
"will endanger," section 108 "require[d] an actual 'adverse effect'
on health.151 2 While section 202's vehicle-emission provision appeared to give the EPA more leeway in that it employed the additional phrase "is likely to," "'[i]ikely' enters the equation only in
determining whether the emitted air pollutant . . contributes to
the air pollution that is found dangerous. . . . [I]n making the
threshold determination of danger both sections are the same: air
pollution must endanger the public health before regulation is justi-

fied." 503

One can only lament that such an extensive expatiation of the
obvious was necessary.
The remainder of the Ethyl opinion, faithful to Congress's clear
intention that the EPA anticipate and prevent future harm, reflects
a broad deference to the Agency. Disapproved was the panel's insistence that danger be determined on a purely "factual" basis: a requirement of "specific findings" on the issue had been dropped in
conference, and "how can [the Administrator] . . . assess risks if
he cannot make policy judgments?15 4 The panel's conclusion that
regulation was permissible if airborne and other sources created an
aggregate lead danger was reaffirmed. 05 The statute was once more
paraphrased:
[T]he Administrator may regulate lead additives under Section 211(c)(1) (A) when he determines, based on his assessment
of risks as developed by consideration of all the evidence available to him, and guided by the policy judgment inherent in the
statute, that lead automobile emissions significantly increase
the total human exposure to lead so as to cause a significant
risk of harm to the public health."'
50, 541 F.2d at 14.
56 Id.
at 16. I am not so confident as was the court that the word "likely" in section 202
had no relation to the dangerousness of the predicted pollution, but the point is immaterial;
that Congress may have chosen to be redundant in one provision of a most complicated
statute cannot destroy the clear cautionary import of the word "endanger" in an essentially
unrelated provision.
5', Id.
at 20-29.
"Id. at 29-31.
"' Id.
at 31-32. The decision not to regulate lead emissions under section 202 was found
sustainable because section 202 was limited to emissions from new vehicles. Id. at 32 n.66.
The court stressed the deletion of a requirement of a finding that section 202 regulation was
impracticable: "While Congress thus indicated its preference for regulation under section 202,
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The opinion then devoted detailed attention to the evidentiary
basis of the Agency's central conclusion that fuel lead endangered
public health. Basic once more was the deduction drawn from Congress's preventive intention: "the Administrator's decision may be
fully supportable if it is based, as it is, on the inconclusive but
suggested results of numerous studies."501 The essential message is
a justified repudiation of the premise of the panel opinion: to insist
upon certainty at any step of the Agency's reasoning is inconsistent
with Congress's choice to prevent "danger," that is, the risk or
threat of harm.
The court found little dispute that lead in sufficient quantities
was poisonous, that lead in the air "contribute[d] to body blood
lead levels," that ambient lead levels in some cities were "2,000
times greater" than those "over the mid-Pacific," and that 90% of
lead in the air was attributable to vehicle emissions." 8 The dispute,
reduced to essentials, was whether the amounts of lead that could
be expected to be added to the body by airborne lead created a risk
that was significant.
Agreeing that 40 micrograms per 100 grams of blood was a
reasonable "precautionary level" to be avoided," 9 the dissent
argued, as had the panel, that there was no basis for finding that
this level existed among "a significant portion of the general adult
population" or that high lead levels in children could be attributed
to airborne concentrations.5 1" The majority retorted that, among
other things, the existence of excessive lead levels in occupational
groups such as "policemen, mailmen, service station employees,
parking lot attendants," and the like, "whose only exposure to lead
is through the ambient air," was "indicative of high blood lead
it left the Administrator with full discretion to implement this preference or not." Id.
The finding that lead substitutes would not cause an equal danger was upheld because
hydrocarbon-emission standards would produce an enormous improvement in the emissions
from substitute fuels over the next few years. Id. at 33 n.68. The court also suggested, though
it did not decide, that since section 211(c)(2)(C) speaks only of a regulation that "prohibits"
a fuel or additive and the lead regulations only "control" lead additives, the findings requirement might not apply. The court conceded that the purpose of the requirement was fully
applicable; very likely, the omission was due to clerical oversight. Id. at 32 n.67. Moreover,
the line between "control" and "prohibition" is not distinct: the regulation at issue prohibited
the sale of fuel containing more than the specified lead concentration.
507 Id. at 37-38.
10 Id. at 38.
10 Id. at 101-02 (Wilkey, J., dissenting). For justification, see the majority opinion,
id. at 38-40.
510See, e.g., id. at 103: "A sample of 55 'Women Living Near Freeways' uncovered one
person at 40 ug [sic] or above"; another study of "1,935 persons" found "only three"; even
among Los Angeles cab drivers the average level was "a normal 24.6 ug [sic]."
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levels among a significant portion of the adult population"; 1 ' it
would have made sense to adopt regulations even if they were the
only ones threatened. 12 The majority may have had to rely on this
evidence to avoid a dilatory remand, for the Administrator had
expressly declared that airborne lead "when added to lead from
other sources . . . results in total exposure that is excessive, '"1' '3 and
under SEC v. Chenery Corp., 51 4 administrative action may not be
sustained on a basis other than that relied on by the agency.
More fundamental for future regulation, however, was the
court's clear declaration that future danger, rather than existing
harm, is decisive: "the occupational data . . .suggest the future
likelihood, absent controls, of increasing high blood levels among
even more widely dispersed portions of the public."' 51 5 In the confusing welter of facts, this observation seems most telling: the congressional insistence on prevention was not compatible with a requirement that vehicle emissions had already contributed to excessive
lead levels in people.5 16
Enthusiastically endorsing "the views expressed in the majority
5 , the House
opinion of the en banc panel on rehearing" in Ethyl,"
Committee in 1977 reported, 5 8 and Congress adopted, a new criterion to govern promulgation not only of fuel regulations 59 but also
of standards for air quality,5 0 new-source performance, 52' hazardous
emissions, 52 2 vehicle emissions,5 and aircraft emissions.5 24 The fuel
',,

Id. at 40-41.

Id. at 40 n.89.
id. at 114 (reprinting as appendix 38 Fed. Reg. 33,734-37 (1973)).
", 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943).
"' 541 F.2d at 41.
5, It may be argued that the regulations previously adopted to protect emission-control
devices will result in decreasing lead emissions and render any precaution against increasing
ambient concentrations unnecessary. This position presupposes continued reliance on catalytic converters, which cannot safely be assumed.
The dissent made much of a procedural issue, arguing that there had been no adequate
opportunity for comment on information on which the Administrator had significantly relied,
id. at 78-94, and the majority attempted to respond, id. at 48-53. The principle invoked by
the dissent was firmly established, see text and notes at notes 171-172, 227 supra; whether
it was correctly applied in this case is not important to the substantive analysis in Ethyl,
and I express no view on that question.
5"7 H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 49 (1977), reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
5,2

5,3 See

& AD.NEWS 1077, 1127.
311See id. at 50, reprinted in [1977] U.S.

CONG.

s" §
"' §
s §
', §
5:3§
5", §

CODE CONG.

& AD. NEws at 1128.

211(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(1) (Supp. I 1977).
108(a)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(A) (Supp. I 1977).
111(b)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(A) (Supp. I 1977).
112(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(1) (Supp. I 1977).
202(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (Supp. I (1977).
231(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7571(a)(2) (Supp. I 1977).
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provision in section 211(c) (1) (A) now authorizes regulation "if in the
judgment of the Administrator any emission product of such fuel or
fuel additive causes . . . or contributes . . . to air pollution which
may reasonably be anticipated to endanger the public health or
welfare." '2 5 The three-judge panel in Ethyl had come close to saying
that catastrophe must precede regulation. The en banc decision and
the congressional response resoundingly interred that unacceptable
notion.
The Ethyl litigation focused exclusively on the question
whether health considerations justified any regulation of fuel lead
at all; nothing was said about the justification for the particular
ceiling on lead content the regulation imposed. Since the statute
happily does not provide otherwise, the Administrator quite properly considered both the benefits and the costs of achieving the
prescribed reduction, whih he said was "designed to accomplish a
60-65 percent decrease in lead usage from base 1971"528 and which
was predicted to "increase the cost of producing gasoline by less
than .1¢ per gallon." 5
This cost, even multiplied by the huge number of gallons consumed, hardly seems excessive if it gives us reasonable insurance
against widespread poisoning. What is less clear from the Administrator's explanation is why he concluded that a 60 to 65% reduction
in 1971 emissions would do the job. Initially the EPA had proceeded
on the assumption that an ambient lead level of 2 micrograms per
cubic meter should be avoided in the interest of public health; an
emission level could have been derived from such a goal by mathematical modeling. The Agency later determined, however, "that it
was difficult, if not impossible, to establish a precise level of air'
borne lead as an acceptable basis for a control strategy."528
This
being so, one might have expected the enunciation of some alternative basis for the figures chosen, such as the limits of technology
without prohibitive cost.5 9 Instead the explanation makes the figure
appear to have been plucked at random. Unfortunately, a random
standard is not the best safeguard against either lead poisoning or
judicial review. 510
42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(1)(A) (Supp. I 1977).
526 38 Fed. Reg. 33,740 (1973).
52

Id. at 33,739.

- Id. at 33,734.
"2 The EPA has since concluded that the fuel standard should suffice in the foreseeable
future to assure compliance with the subsequently adopted ambient lead standard of 1.5
,'g/ml except where there are significant stationary sources. See 43 Fed. Reg. 46,246, 46,247
(1978).
"0 The statute now prescribes more lenient lead standards for small refineries until
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Preemption

Section 211(c)(4), adopted in 1977, contains a preemption provision concerning fuel regulation significantly less onerous than that
preventing states from implementing new-vehicle emission standards:
(A) Except as otherwise provided in subparagraph (B) or (C),
no State (or political subdivision thereof) may prescribe or attempt to enforce, for purposes of motor vehicle emission control, any control or prohibition respecting use of a fuel or fuel
additive in a motor vehicle or motor vehicle engine(i) if the Administrator has found that no control or prohibition under paragraph (1) is necessary and has published
his finding in the Federal Register, or (ii) if the administrator has prescribed under paragraph (1) a control or prohibition applicable to such fuel or fuel additive, unless
State prohibition or control is identical to the prohibition
53
or control prescribed by the Administrator. '
The exceptions in subparagraphs (B) and (C) allow fuel regulation
by California "at any time" 532 and by any other State in an implementation plan if "necessary to achieve" national ambient airquality standards. 533
After the EPA had adopted fuel-lead standards to protect catalytic converters,su but before it had adopted standards to protect
against direct health effects of lead emissions, a federal trial court
in Exxon Corp. v. City of New York 5 upheld a New York City
October 1, 1982. § 211(g)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7545(g)(2) (Supp. I 1977).
=I 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(4)(A) (Supp. I 1977). The Administrator may refuse to regulate a

fuel or additive not only on the ground that control is not "necessary" but on the ground that
he lacks authority to do so. Since the limits on the EPA's authority reflect congressional
policy that regulation under the specified circumstances (for example, no endangerment of

health or welfare, worse emissions from substitute technology) is undesirable, "necessary"
was an unfortunate word to choose. It should be construed as broadly as possible to reflect
the policy against regulation that the federal government determines undesirable.
u2 The exceptions reach "any State for which application of section [209(a)] . . .has
at any time been waived." Id. § 7545(c)(4)(B). Such waiver is authorized only for California,
and it has been granted. The statute does not require a current waiver under section 209; once
a waiver has been granted "at any time," California may regulate fuels "at any time." See
H.R. REP. No. 1783, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1970), reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. &

AD. NEws 5374, 5385: "These restrictions will not apply to California."
m 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(4)(C) (Supp. I 1977). The EPA construes this proviso to allow
state fuel regulation only if "no other reasonable measures are available" for achieving the
ambient standard. 43 Fed. Reg. 46,264, 46,266 (1978).
5m 43 Fed. Reg. 1254 (1978).
s35 356 F. Supp. 660 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd, 548 F.2d 1088 (2d Cir. 1977).
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ordinance limiting lead for the latter purpose against a claim of
preemption: "The Federal Administrator has acted with regard for
[protection of control devices] but has not as yet acted with regard
to the health standard. Until he does, the City of New York is free
to enact and enforce its own regulations." 511
The Second Circuit, reviewing this decision after the EPA had
adopted health standards for lead"7 but before the date those standards became applicable, reversed: reporting and monitoring provisions of the new health regulation, integral parts of the "phase-down
timetable," were already in force. 518 The court of appeals also struck
down a local limit on the volatility of gasoline, though the federal
regulations referred only to lead and phosphorus: "The City has
added a control or prohibition applicable to the fuel of motor vehicles which is more onerous than that provided by the Administrator." 539
Comparison of section 211(c) (4) with the preemption provision
respecting vehicle emissions in section 209(a)540 suggests that the
district court better captured the spirit of section 211(c)(4) than did
the court of appeals. Section 209, by outlawing state standards
"relating to the control of emissions from new motor vehicles...
subject to this part," 541 encourages the conclusion that state emission regulations are forbidden whether or not the EPA has acted,
creating the real possibility of a regulatory void. The fuel provision
is sensibly drafted to avoid this risk: the states may act unless the
EPA has either regulated or found regulation unnecessary. At the
time the district court decided Exxon, the EPA had done neither
with respect to the health effects of lead or to volatility. That the
EPA had addressed itself to another aspect of the lead problem-protection of control devices-did not satisfy the policy of
avoiding a regulatory gap underlying 211(c)(4).
Unfortunately, the drafting is such as to make full effectuation
of that policy impossible. Even before the district court decision, the
EPA had "prescribed . . . a control or prohibition applicable to
such fuel or fuel additive": it had prescribed a limit on lead in
gasoline. Thus the literal terms of the statute required preemption.
It was not for the district court to rewrite the statute so as better to

5' Id. at 663.
38 Fed. Reg. 33,734 (1973); 41 Fed. Reg. 13,984 (1976); id. at 28,352; id. at 42,675.
Exxon Corp. v. City of New York, 548 F.2d 1088, 1092-93 (2d Cir. 1977).
9 Id. at 1095. The fuel limitations had not been submitted as part of the implementation
plan under section 211(c)(4)(C). Id.
u" 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (Supp. 1 1977). See text and notes at notes 408-417 supra.
42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (Supp: I 1977).

1979]

Clean Air Act Mobile-Source Provisions

achieve its purpose. No such inescapable language, however, compelled the result reached by the court of appeals with respect to the
volatility-of-gasoline regulation. It was true that the EPA had already promulgated standards regulating the content of gasoline, but
those standards dealt with only two additives, lead and phosphorus.
To treat the lead standards as controlling "fuel" rather than "fuel
additive[s]," as the court did, is to resolve an ambiguity in a way
that frustrates congressional purpose. Given the ubiquitousness of
gasoline, Congress, in its effort to avoid a regulatory gap, could
hardly have meant that federal regulation of a single additive in
42
gasoline would preclude state regulation of all others. 1
The court of appeals's decision that preemption occurs before
the effective date of the federal regulation, however, was right. The
statute plainly requires only that the federal standard be
"prescribed," not that it already be enforceable. A lead time for
compliance is often an integral part of a regulatory decision. Once
the Administrator has set a date for limitation of a fuel or additive,
the congressional policy requiring a federal decision on the need for
regulation is satisfied. Just as plainly, the mere proposal of a federal
standard is insufficient for preemption; no control has at that stage
been "prescribed" as required by the statute, and no federal deci543
sion made as demanded by its policy.
Another interesting question concerning the meaning of the
preemption provision was raised but not decided in another case in
the Southern District of New York.54 4 The city had imposed a tax
on leaded fuel; the plaintiff argued the tax was a preempted
"control" on the sale of a fuel or additive already regulated by the
EPA. The well-known deterrent effect of special taxation and the
52 Cf. Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Usery, 539 F.2d 386 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 874 (1977) (holding that regulation of safety aspects of certain railroad operations
by another federal agency did not give the railroad industry a blanket exemption from the
Occupational Safety and Health Act under a provision making that statute inapplicable to
"working conditions. . . with respect to which other Federal agencies. . . exercise statutory
authority to prescribe or enforce standards or regulations affecting occupational safety or
health," 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(1) (1976)); Southern Ry. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm'n, 539 F.2d 335 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 999 (1976).
51 The reasoning of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission in Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 3 O.S.H.C. 1760 (1973), was similar. The Commission concluded that
the proposal of a safety regulation by another federal agency did not constitute an "exercise"
of "authority to prescribe . . . standards" sufficient to oust OSHA jurisdiction under the
provision quoted in note 542 supra. 3 O.S.H.C. at 1760 n.1. See Currie, OSHA, 1976 A.B.F.
REsEARCH J. 1107, 1113: "The Commission's view seems right, as otherwise the proposal of a
regulation by another agency would create precisely the sort of gap in coverage that it was
the evident purpose of the 'exercise' requirement to prevent."
5, 57th St. Management Corp. v. City of New York, 456 F. Supp. 286 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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unlikelihood that Congress meant to deprive states of ordinary
sources of revenue suggest that those taxes that bear disproportionately upon leaded fuels, but not those that are nondiscriminatory, should be struck down as preempted "control [s]." 1 5
E.

Manganese and the Ban on New Fuels and Additives

The Senate Committee in 1977 was disturbed by reports that
an organo-manganese additive called MMT "was impairing the performance of emission control systems and' increasing hydrocarbon
emissions in test vehicles.""54 The Committee feared that, because
of delays produced by the informational and hearing requirements
of section 211(c), "emission systems currently in use could not be
adequately protected" from the dangers of MMT and of potential
new additives under the existing control provisions.5 7 The result
was a new section 211(f), which not only banned "any gasoline
which contains a concentration of manganese in excess of .0625
grams per gallon" 548 but outlawed as well all other new fuels or
additives for 1975 and later vehicles as a precautionary measure,
unless the fuels were "substantially similar to" those "utilized in
the certification" of such vehicles. 49
5'5iCf. Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276 (1976) (construing the Constitution's ban on state "Duties" on "Imports," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10). Placement of the
preemption provision in subsection (c), which deals only with "control[s]" and
"prohibit[ions]," reinforces the inference from the language itself that it does not apply to
registration or testing requirements, which are treated separately in subsections (a) and (b)
of section 211, 42 U.S.C. § 7545(a), (b) (Supp. 1 1977). Conflicting state requirements as.to
actual content of fuels under section 211(c) could certainly be the more burdensome. A strong
precedential argument to the contrary is based upon Lubrizol Corp. v. Train, 547 F.2d 310
(6th Cir. 1976), and Lubrizol Corp. v. EPA, 562 F.2d 807 (D.C. Cir. 1977), both holding that
a registration requirement was a "control or prohibition under section 211" for purposes of
judicial review under section 307(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (Supp. 1 1977). The court's reliance
on section 307's reference to "all of section [211]" and on the disruptive impact of bifurcated
review, see 562 F.2d at 813-14, arguably provides bases for distinguishing preemption.
14 S. REP. No. 127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1977).
" Id. at 90.

5" 42 U.S.C. § 7545(f)(2) (Supp. I 1977). Unlike the administrative standards for lead
and phosphorus, the manganese limit is not restricted to gasoline for vehicles with sensitive
control equipment. It thus imposes burdens upon users of leaded fuel that can be warranted
only if deemed necessary to avoid the temptation to put manganese in the wrong car. Such a
philosophy was rejected in the case of lead, and the Senate Committee, which had not
proposed to limit manganese specifically, said its purpose was to keep harmful additives away
from catalysts, "but not to limit the use of such additives in the leaded grades of gasoline."
S. REP. No. 127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 90 (1977).
u' 42 U.S.C. § 7545(f)(1) (Supp. I 1977). Also covered was the "increase" in
"concentration" of existing additives. Fuels and additives already introduced since the testing of 1975 vehicles were similarly banned after a grace period of just over one year. Id. §
7545(f)(3).
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These provisions are not as draconian as they seem, since section 211(f)(4) allows the Administrator to "waive" either the manganese ban or the general one "upon application of any manufacturer" who "establishe[s] that such fuel or fuel additive or a specified concentration thereof . . . will not cause or contribute to a
failure of any emission control device or system . . . to achieve
compliance" with applicable standards.5 Nevertheless, they impose a significant delaying obstacle to technological innovation;
they effectively create a permit system that reverses the burden of
proof in order to protect the important vehicle-emission program.
There is no requirement that the manufacturer show that the new
additives will not endanger public health directly.
The Agency has denied applications for waiver with regard to
MMT, finding insufficient proof that its use would not impair required control devices. 51 In setting those applications for public
hearings the EPA had announced that there were "no adversary
parties as such"; that its decision "will be applicable to all manufacturers"; that there would be no cross-examination;5 52 and that it
would not necessarily base its decision on the record 5 3 In short, it
seems to have conducted a general rulemaking proceeding where the
statutory terms "waive," "application," and "establish" appear to
have contemplated an individual variance proceeding. 54 Fortunately, since the pertinent issue is whether an additive will damage
control equipment-a general "legislative" one-due process probably does not require a trial-type hearing.55
The EPA also received applications to waive the ban on new
fuels for mixtures of gasoline and alcohol ("gasohol"), which hold
promise of reducing dependence on foreign petroleum supplies. In
order not to interfere with the immediate use of such fuels, the
5- Id. § 7545(f)(4). If the Administrator fails to act on an application within 180 days,
the waiver "shall be treated as granted." Id. Finally, "no action . . . under this section may
be stayed by any court pending judicial review." Id. § 7545(f)(5). The reference to "this
section" seems a clerical error; the Conference Committee said no stay should be granted in
judicial review of "such action," meaning action under the waiver provision to which the stay
ban is attached. H.R. REP. No. 564, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 161 (1977), reprinted in [19771
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1502, 1542.
"' 43 Fed. Reg. 41,424 (1978).
M2 Id. at 24,742.
Id. at 24,743.
m' For similar analysis, see the discussion of section 202(b)(5) at text and notes at notes
189-205 supra.
" See text at notes 208-218 supra. Moreover, the statute arguably does not create an
entitlement to a waiver on proof of the prescribed fact, since it uses the commonly discretionary word "may."
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Agency suspended enforcement of section 211(f) against them,
pending decision on the waiver applications. "5 Such authority
seems a highly desirable analog of the judicial power of interlocutory
relief, but it appears irreconcilable with the requirement of section
211(f)(4) that a waiver be granted only after "the applicant has
established" that the new fuel is harmless to control devices. 5 7 Although the Administrator may have some discretion not to enforce
the statute despite the apparently mandatory words of section
211(d), a "suspension" seems to go beyond discretion by precluding
private enforcement under section 304555 as well. I see no authority
for doing so.
After the prescribed hearing, the gasohol waiver was extended
indefinitely," 9 but a subsequent EPA interpretation of section 211(f)
appears to have circumvented the waiver procedure for gasohol and
comparable new fuels in the future. The ban on new fuels does not
apply to fuels that are "substantially similar" to those used in certification testing, and the Agency has issued an interpretive ruling
defining as "substantially similar" to test fuels, among other things,
any fuel containing nothing more than carbon, hydrogen, and oxygen 8 0 Gasohol thus no longer requires a waiver, since the ethanol
with which it is made meets that definition. 6 ' Unquestionably,
ethanol is substantially dissimilarto gasoline in many of its physical
and chemical properties, but the EPA thought it "similar" in the
respect most central to the statutory purpose: it does not impair the
performance of emission controls. Yet the existence of the statutory
waiver provision casts considerable doubt on the propriety of this
interpretation; Congress expressly contemplated that the determination whether a new fuel would impair controls would be made
after hearing, and that in the meantime the new fuel would not be
marketed. While the EPA purported to limit its ruling to fuels of
specified composition, its reasoning is equally applicable to any new
fuel. The interpretation invites the manufacturer to make his own
decision whether a new fuel will impair controls and to market it
2
without the presale clearance required by the statute.11
43 Fed. Reg. 44,565 (1978).
Cf. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. EPA, 1 Ill. Pollution Control Bd. Op. 585 (1971)
(Board lacked power to issue a temporary restraining order before the resolution of enforcement proceeding).
s 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (Supp. I 1977).
s' See 9 ENviR. REP. (BNA) 1513 (1978).
"
44 Fed. Reg. 16,033 (1979).
',

'5'

"' CHSOH.
582

Cf. United States v. Chrysler Corp., 591 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (manufacturer's
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F. Enforcement
Civil penalties of $10,000 per day, which the Administrator may
without statutory guidance "remit or mitigate," may be recovered
by the United States in federal district court under section 211(d)
for any violation of the fuel or additive requirements of section
211.563 Oddly, nothing is said of EPA actions to enjoin violations of

any of the requirements of section 211, which are not included either
in the general injunctive authority of section 113111 or in that pertaining to vehicle requirements in section 204.55 "A control or prohi-

bition respecting a motor vehicle fuel or fuel additive,

'"

however,

56 7
is expressly declared to be an "emission standard or limitation

that "any person" may sue to enforce under section 304; this, combined with precedent permitting the inference of injunctive remedies when necessary to effectuate the statutory purpose,56 should
suffice to permit the United States to seek an injunction as well.
On its face, section 304, which permits suits to enforce a
"control or prohibition," would seem to exclude actions to enforce
the registration and information requirements of section 211(a) and
(b). Nonetheless, the decisions of two courts of appeals giving a
broader construction to a nearly identical provision respecting judicial review,"' and especially the ruling by one of those courts that
section 211(a) and its implementing regulations "act as a
'prohibition' on the sale of unregistered products,"' 570 give promise
of a contrary interpretation, especially since no reason appears why
Congress might have wanted to exclude citizen enforcement of registration or testing requirements.
own testing of vehicles not equivalent of statutory certification process). See text at notes
304-306 supra.
51 42 U.S.C. § 7545(d) (Supp. I 1977). The references in the section to violations of
"subsection (a) or (f)," "the regulations prescribed under subsection (c)," and "any information required . . . under subsection (b)" seem to be all-inclusive.
'" Id. § 7413.
"' Id. § 7523.
', Id. § 7604(f)(2).
Id. § 7604(a)(1)(A).
5,8E.g., United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 491-92 (1960) (Rivers and

Harbors Act, § 10, 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1976)).
5,'
Lubrizol Corp. v. EPA, 562 F.2d 807 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (construing what is now 42
U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (Supp. I 1977)); Lubrizol Corp. v. Train, 547 F.2d 310 (6th Cir. 1976)
(same).

110
Lubrizol Corp. v. EPA, 562 F.2d at 814.
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VII. AIRCRAFt EMISSIONS
Section 231(a), enacted in 1970, 571 now provides that the Administrator, after "public hearings," 5712 "shall, from time to time"
adopt "emission standards applicable to the emission of any air
pollutant from any class or classes of aircraft engines which in his
judgment causes, or contributes to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare. ' 573 The
criteria for setting such standards are implicit in the congressional
blueprint for an introductory study of "the extent to which such
emissions affect air quality" 574 and "the technological feasibility of
controlling such emissions." ' They are made explicit in part by the
command that such regulations take effect, like vehicle-emission
standards under section 202(a),57 6 "after such period a the Administrator finds necessary. . . to permit the development and application of the requisite technology, giving appropriate consideration to
the cost of compliance within such period." 577 This formulation permits regulations that go beyond existing technology.
Except for the hearing requirement, which was made redundant by the 1977 adoption of section 307(d)'s additional procedures
applicable to both vehicles and aircraft, 578 these aircraft provisions
closely track the general motor-vehicle provision of section 202(a).
But there are differences. The most important is that, in contrast
to the vehicle provisions, section 231 is not limited to new aircraft.
Nevertheless, the statute authorizes only "emission standards. ' 5 '
And just as the Supreme Court has held that the term "emission
standards," as used in section 112,580 does not comprehend the pre' Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 11(a), 84 Stat. 1703
(amending Clean Air Act § 231(a)) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7571(a) (Supp. 1 1977)).
572 These hearings should be "legislative." See text and notes at notes 173-186 supra.
Since 1977, aircraft-emission standards are subject to the additional procedures of section
307(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d) (Supp. I 1977).
373 42 U.S.C. § 7571(a)(2)-(3) (Supp. I 1977). The 1970 language was similar, except
that it required promulgation of standards within a year. Clean Air Amendments of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-604, § li(a)(1), 84 Stat. 1703 (amending Clean Air Act § 231(a)). The present
language, identical to that applicable to fuel regulation under section 211(c)(1), 42 U.S.C.
§ 7545(c)(1) (Supp. I 1977), was designed to reflect the cautionary approach established in
the Ethyl case, discussed in text and notes 485-525 supra.
$74 42 U.S.C. § 7571(a)(1)(A) (Supp. I 1977).
"7 Id. § 7571(a)(1)(B).
"' See text at notes 84-88 supra.
57 42 U.S.C. § 7571(b) (Supp. I 1977).
' Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 305(a), 91 Stat. 772 (amending Clean Air Act § 307(d)) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d) (Supp. I 1977)).
42 U.S.C. § 7571(a)(2) (Supp. I 1977).
Id. § 7412(c)(1)(A).
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scription of work practices designed to avoid asbestos emissions
during building demolition,"' so regulation of aircraft use aimed at
reducing emissions may not constitute "emission standards" under
section 231. I consider such distinctions artificial, and I think the
authority to regulate aircraft use should be conferred explicitly.
A different aspect of federal aircraft regulation prompted another provision foreign to the vehicle sections. The 1970 Act required
that before promulgating regulations applicable to aircraft, the
Administrator consult "with the Secretary of Transportation in
order to assure appropriate consideration for aircraft safety"; 52 the
1977 amendments substitute a discretionary presidential veto of
both existing and future standards after opportunity for another
"public hearing," if the Secretary of Transportation finds "that any'
such regulation would create 'a hazard to aircraft safety. ' 'z The
House Committee, which would have vested the veto authority in
the Secretary himself, explained that the pre-existing consultation
requirement was not considered "an adequate mechanism" to effec''
tuate "the paramount concern of aircraft safety. Ss
The Agency
itself has promised that its regulations "will be revised if at any time
the Secretary. . .determines that an emission standard cannot be
met . . .without creating a safety hazard."' 5
A complex set of emission regulations with differential application to new and to existing aircraft engines was adopted in 1973.586
The EPA found that aircraft were "significant sources of emissions
of carbon monoxide, hydrocarbons, and nitrogen oxides in some...
regions in which the . . . air quality standards are being violated,
as well as being significant sources of smoke. 58 7 The emission standards, however, were "not quantitatively derived from. . . air qualms Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275 (1978).
5" Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 11(a)(1), 84 Stat. 1704 (amending Clean Air Act § 231(c)) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7571(c) (Supp. I 1977)).
59 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 225, 91 Stat. 769 (amending
Clean Air Act § 231(c)) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7571(c) (Supp. I 1977)).
I" H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 277 (1977), reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1077, 1356.
- 40 C.F.R. § 87.6 (1978).
588 38 Fed. Reg. 19,088 (1973) (current version at 40 C.F.R. § 87 (1978)). The regulations
"shall apply" to "aircraft of foreign registry. . .in a manner consistent with any obligation
assumed by the United States in any treaty, convention or agreement." 40 C.F.R. § 87.3(c)
(1978). I take this to mean foreign planes are covered unless exempted by such an agreement,
though it is not clear to me whether this is an ideal means of reconciling competing American
and foreign interests. The proposed revised regulations would apply to foreign carriers, in
order to minimize emissions and be fair to domestic competitors, until standards at least as
stringent are adopted by an international organization. See 43 Fed. Reg. 12,621 (1978).
N7 38 Fed. Reg. 19,089 (1973).
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ity considerations . . .but, instead, reflect EPA's judgment as to
what reduced emission levels are or will be practicable to
achieve." 5' It was expected that the achievement of the standards
would "contribute to the maintenance of the quality of the air in
and around major air terminals throughout the post-1975 era,""''
and would cost $141,000,000 over a ten-year period, representing for
new engines a cost increase of no more than 3%.110 A major revision
of the regulations is pending, 51 and the date for compliance has
592
meanwhile been extended.
One interesting feature of the regulations is the provision for a
temporary exemption from certain requirements upon a showing of
good-faith inability to comply " 3 and a plan for achieving compliance "in the shortest time which is feasible." 594 The statute makes
no mention of variances, but the statutory criteria are general
enough to permit them as reasonable accommodations of costs and
benefits in individual cases. Indeed, they constitute a case-by-case
application of the statutory direction to make standards applicable
"after such period as . . .necessary to permit . . application of
the requisite technology."5 15 Further, since that determination is to
be made "giving appropriate consideration to the cost of compliance," the term "feasible" in the regulations should be construed
to mean "practicable.5 9
Section 232(a) directs the Secretary of Transportation to adopt
regulations that will enforce the aircraft emission standards developed by the Administrator. "7 Those regulations "shall include provisions making such standards applicable in the issuance, amendment, modification, suspension, or revocation of any certificate au58

Id.

58 Id.

Id. at 19,090.
5, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,615 (1978).
892 Id.
at 12,614.
5,3
40 C.F.R. § 87.101(a) (1978).
"I Id. § 87.101(a)(3).
5 § 231, 42 U.S.C. § 7571(b) (Supp. I 1977). These provisions may distinguish section
231 from the new-source performance standard provision in section 306 of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1316 (1976), whose sole temporal reference is the flat
requirement that all sources comply "after the effective date," and which was held in the light
of rather persuasive legislative history not to require or permit the EPA to allow variances.
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977).
5,,Cf. Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (word
"feasible" in section 6(b)(5) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, now codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976), includes "economic feasibility"); Currie, OSHA,, supra note
543, at 1136-38 (same).
59 42 U.S.C. § 7572(a) (Supp. I 1977).
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thorized by the Federal Aviation Act or the Department of Transportation Act." 98 Nothing is said of actions for penalties or for injunctions. The effect is to extend the existing permit system,
through which the Department of Transportation regulates aircraft
use, to cover emission standards, avoiding duplication at the expense of dividing responsibility for pollution control between the
EPA and the Department of Transportation.
What the Secretary may do to punish noncompliance, short of
refusing or revoking the certificate, is not clear. I would not read the
statute's general language as taking the highly unusual step of authorizing administrative creation of a schedule of money penalties,
though such penalties are an important tool in the enforcement of
the standards. On the other hand, a government power to sue for
an injunction can probably be inferred despite the statutory specification of enforcement through the permit process of the Department
of Transportation. " ' Moreover, since a duty to comply with the
standards seems implicit in the provision for their adoption, 00° it
appears that "any person" 01 may sue to enforce them as "an emission standard

. . .

under this chapter" pursuant to section 304.602

Section 233 contains a preemption provision that differs from
those applicable either to vehicle emissions0 3 or to fuels,"' forbidding state and local standards "respecting emissions of any air pollutant from any aircraft or engine thereof" unless "identical" to the
federal standards. 0 5 In contrast to the fuel section, preemption is
not expressly made dependent upon prior federal adoption or rejection of a standard; the language invites the unpalatable conclusion
that state action is precluded if the EPA does nothing at all.0'
In contrast to the automotive provision, there is no explicit
reservation of state authority to regulate aircraft "use, operation, or
movement." That the need for uniform regulation is greatest with
respect to construction of the aircraft itself might conceivably jus' !d.
" See text and notes at notes 564-568 supra.

0 In contrast, the vehicle-emission standards apply basically through the prohibition on
sale of uncertified vehicles rather than through direct prohibitions on the user. See text and
notes at notes 298-300 supra.
'
42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1) (Supp. 1 1977).
U2 Id. § 7604(f)(1).
"' See text and notes at notes 408-417 supra.
' See text and notes at notes 531-545 supra.
" 42 U.S.C. § 7573 (Supp. I 1977).
" See Jorling, supra note 36, at 1131 (also noting that the preemption provision "was
generated by a California law which was to regulate emission controls on aircraft effective 1
January 1971").
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tify construing the preempted "standard[s] respecting emissions"
not to include use regulations. More significant, perhaps, is that
what the state may not do is expressed in substantially the same
words that define the federal authority to adopt regulations: the
EPA may, and the states may not, regulate "emission[s]." Thus
the states seem to be preempted from adopting use regulations if
and only if the EPA has authority to adopt them. The reservation
of state authority to regulate vehicle use was redundant on either
theory, and its omission from the aircraft provision is therefore
immaterial; for Congress to oust state regulation from an area it has
not authorized the federal agency to enter would be unconscionable
and ought not to be inferred.
The question may still be important, as the modification of
ground operations, such as taxiing and idling, would probably lead
to a substantial reduction in airport emissions of hydrocarbons and
carbon monoxide. Under present law, I think the states may regulate such operations because precedent suggests the EPA may not. 07
I think Congress should give the EPA authority to do so. At the
same time though, Congress should modify the preemption section
to make explicit that state use regulations not requiring alteration
of aircraft equipment are permissible, at the very least when necessary to achieve an acceptable level of air quality, as is provided
with respect to fuel standards by section 211.08
VIII.
A.

THE MOBILE-SOURCE PROVISIONS: AN APPRAISAL

Technology Forcing

1. Reasons for Optimism. The central motivating idea of the
mobile-source program, at least since 1970, has been the daring
principle that invention can be stimulated by setting future requirements that cannot be met by existing technology. If the threat has
worked at all, there is reason for some surprise. One commentator
has invoked the analogy of the tale of Rumpelstiltskin, in which an
evil king locked a maiden in a room full of straw with orders to spin
See text at notes 579-581 supra; Jorling, supra note 36, at 1124-25 (agreeing with that
conclusion).
'" See text and note at note 533 supra. The one reported decision to date on aircraft
standards struck down a prohibition on the discharge of jet fuel after engine shutdown because it arbitrarily ignored the danger of engine damage and injury to persons by fire.
Citronelle-Mobile Gathering, Inc. v. McLucas, 432 F. Supp. 821 (S.D. Ala. 1977). The problem of fuel discharge warrants further study; one report has estimated that "110 tons of
castoff jet fuel were dumped into the air surrounding Washington's National Airport in 1970,"
and according to the court the catch tanks installed to ameliorate the problem still discharged
the fuel into the atmosphere. Id. at 825 & n.6.

1979]

Clean Air Act Mobile-Source Provisions

it into gold by morning."' Another has observed that "there is a
certain comfort in being asked for the impossible: you know you will
not actually have to do it." ' A third argues that a "retreat" from
strict standards "is apparently inevitable" when policymakers "are
confronted with specific instances of economic and social disruption."'1' One article cites the vehicle program ' '6as
living proof of the
12
inherent futility of "aspirational commands.
Indeed, there has been slippage in attaining the noble goals of
the 1970 statute. The unrealistically brief definition of an automobile's "useful life" may have damaged the program before it even
began. The industry's tardiness in meeting the standards has resulted not only in several postponements of the compliance dates
themselves but also in an EPA policy that allows massive numbers
of vehicles to be sold that do not meet even the watered-down interim standards. Solicitude for the manufacturer's need for assurance that he may market his product and the need to develop quick
testing procedures have exacerbated the difficulty of reducing the
gap between prototype testing and compliance of production vehicles in actual use. Further, as Professor Rodgers has pointed out,
conventional recall campaigns that depend upon voluntary action
by the owner "have not been wholly successful" even when the
owner stands to benefit directly by the repair; and the absence of
widespread inspection requirements makes the owner "a lukewarm
candidate for citizen enforcer" of the warranties.61 3 Moreover, both
the warranty and recall provisions necessarily exempt performance
failures attributable to improper maintenance, and even the prohibition of deliberate tampering is inapplicable to the owner himself.
Despite all the postponements of the substantive compliance standards, the General Accounting Office estimated in early 1979 that
a whopping 80% of vehicles in use failed to meet even the applicable
revised standards." 4 Finally, as Howard Margolis has noted, the
much-touted "technology-forcing" standards required the industry
to do nothing more than it acknowledged in 1970 it could do within
15
the next ten years.

I" Batchelder, Land Use TransportationControls for Air Quality, 6 URB. LAW. 235, 235
(1974).
" Margolis, supra note 339, at 13.
"' La Pierre, Technology-Forcing and Federal Environmental Protection Statutes, 62
IOWA L. REv. 771, 837 (1977).

,"2 Henderson & Pearson, Implementing FederalEnvironmentalPolicies: The Limits of
Aspirational Commands, 78 CoLum. L. Rav. 1429 (1978).
"I W. RODGERS, supra note 36, § 3.15, at 301-10.
91, See 9 Evi.
I's

REP. (BNA) 1827 (1979).

Margolis, supra note 339, at 6, 14-15.
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The lesson to be drawn from Rumpelstiltskin, however, is the
opposite of that implied by our pessimistic observer. For the maiden
received unexpected help, and in the morning the room was full of
gold. Similarly, though for reasons no doubt more prosaic, we have
come a long way in reducing motor-vehicle emissions since the federal program began in 1965. By 1970, as Margolis acknowledges,
emissions of hydrocarbons and carbon monoxide had already been
reduced, at least from prototypes, by 60%.' By 1977 the remaining
HC and CO prototype emissions had been trimmed by over 50%,
and there seems to be general expectation that only minor kinks
remain to be ironed out in time to reduce them by a full 90% from
the 1970 levels. This seems to be no mean accomplishment, and it
does not seem probable that industry would have come so far without the pressure of the law. Perhaps, despite "the absence of any
real threat" that the deadlines would be strictly enforced," 7 the
cosmetic efforts industry felt compelled to make in order to establish its good faith could not, given the resourcefulness
of its engi18
neers, but have produced some improvement.

Indeed, although I have argued that Congress's insistence on
prescribing technical minutiae risks unnecessary error in the handling of complex technical matters and necessitates repeated and
inefficient congressional tinkering,1 9 the incentive effect of the
technology-forcing requirements may well have been significantly
enhanced by the need to persuade Congress itself, rather than a
mere agency, that the industry had done all it could.
Moreover, this improvement has been achieved despite a serious and entirely unnecessary deficiency in the statutory incentive
scheme. Postponements have repeatedly been granted, and an enormous discrepancy between prototype and production tolerated, on
the explicit basis that to enforce the standards would be unreasonably burdensome. No doubt an industry shutdown would have been
unreasonable, but that does not mean the best expedient was to give
the manufacturers a free pass. Implicit in these decisions is the
Its Id. at 5.
"I La Pierre, supra note 611, at 796.
118The House Report gave evidence that strict statutory standards had actually stimulated research, citing an EPA conclusion that "developmental efforts to meet the 0.4 NOx
standard have slowed to a near stop, because of the possibility that Congress may act to relax
or abolish the NO:Xstandard." H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 240 (1977), reprinted
in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1077, 1319.
"I For a similar conclusion as to the Clean Air Act generally, even before the 1977
revisions, see Stewart, The Development of Administrativeand Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw in
JudicialReview of EnvironmentalDecisionmaking:Lessons from the Clean Air Act, 62 IOWA
L. Ray. 713, 764-65 (1977).
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assumption that shutdown is the expected sanction for sale of uncertified vehicles, and this otherwise less than obvious assumption was
reinforced by Congress's 1977 decision to provide for certification of
inadequate heavy-duty vehicles upon payment of nonconformance
penalties-an antidote to what the Committee viewed as the rule
that uncertified vehicles might not be sold.
Nonconformance penalties should be extended to all vehicles,
and they should apply when it is the whole industry, not just a
"laggard" or two, that is unable to meet the standards. So extended, penalties could help considerably against both prototype
and production-line failures, and they should make it possible to
provide a rational system of administrative relief procedures without jeopardizing the statutory incentive.
The gap between production and performance in actual use,
however, is another story. Conceivably, technology might be pushed
to deal with this problem by requiring, subject to appropriate penalties, the development of technology less prone to deterioration in
use, such as engines with more complete combustion. Yet Congress
has shown no signs of an intention to force technology in that direction.
2. Reasons for Pessimism. Despite substantial progress, however, the most striking aspect of the 1977 mobile-source amendments is not the relatively unimportant extension of the deadlines
for 90% reductions, but Congress's decision not to press harder for
the development of still better technology in the face of strong evidence that what section 202(b) requires will not do the job. The
nitrogen oxide picture, as painted by the House Committee,"'0 is far
from promising. Even more disturbing, perhaps, is the oxidant situation. In February 1978 the EPA reported that 103 of the 105 urban
areas with over 200,000 population "consistently experience photochemical oxidant levels above the NAAQS [National Ambient Air
Quality Standards]." ' In 1977 it had told the House Committee
that from 15 to 48 regions would continue in violation beyond the
year 2000 even if the statutory hydrocarbon-emission standards
were met.12 In relaxing the oxidant standard on the basis of new
health information in February 1979, the EPA observed that
"[e]ven with aggressive control programs . . . it will be very diffi'
£21

See text and notes at notes 56-58 supra.
43 Fed. Reg. 8962-63 (1978).

" H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 255 (1977) (quoting an EPA report entitled
"Air Quality and Health Effects of Alternate Exhaust Emission Standards for Light Duty
Vehicles" (Mar. 21, 1977 draft)), reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1077,
1334.
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cult for some urban areas to achieve the standard within the next
6
10 years" "-the
outside date set by the 1977 amendments. These
predictions appear to support the Agency's recommendation,
quoted by the Committee, that "'all hydrocarbon controls reasonably possible are needed for light duty vehicles.' ")624
While the House Report quite properly noted that its 1977
amendments balance a variety of legitimate concerns, "including
protection of public health, economic and technical feasibility,"' '2
a proper concern for cost and feasibility is not incompatible, as the
House Report implies, with the technology-forcing philosophy of
section 202(b). That section contemplated relief for manufacturers,
though largely through the cumbersome amendment process, if
good-faith efforts were unavailing. It is true that section 202(a) appears to provide authority for the EPA to continue to force technology beyond the section 202(b) requirements in order to protect
health and welfare. The enactment of section 202(b), however,
shows that Congress in 1970 was unwilling to leave it to the Agency
to determine how far technology should be forced. It is surprising
that it left that decision to the Agency in 1977 in the face of strong
evidence that section 202(b) alone would not do the job.
In short, given the bleak predictions as to the adequacy of the
present statutory requirements, the decision not to tighten them
and actually to relax the ultimate NOx standard seems to represent
a significant departure from the principle of forcing technology. The
key to satisfactory air quality in the absence of additional amendments thus appears to lie largely outside the mobile-source provisions, and that brings me to my next set of concluding observations
about this part of the statute.
B. The Interstitial Nature of the Mobile-Source Provisions
The mobile-source provisions of Title II of the Clean Air Act are
representative in one respect of the entire federal program. Unlike
most state laws, they do not provide a comprehensive framework for
complete regulation of their subject. Instead they are the aggregate
of a cautious series of piecemeal, incremental steps designed to limit
direct federal regulation to those aspects of the problem most in
need of and most amenable to federal solution.
Thus the initial step, and even today the central theme of Title
11344 Fed. Reg. 8202, 8219 (1979).
624 H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 255 (1977), reprinted in [19771 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS, 1077, 1334.
5 Id. at 234, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 1334.

19791

Clean Air Act Mobile-Source Provisions

II, was federal regulation of emissions from new vehicles, with federal enforcement principally brought to bear on the manufacturer.
The 1970 amendments added authority over aircraft emissions and
fuel composition, both also areas in which there was great potential
for progress through uniform regulation of a relatively small number
of persons.
The absence of a general authorization to adopt regulations to
control pollution from mobile sources can create interpretive difficulties. Thus the EPA can require that lead-free gasoline be offered
for sale only if the requirement is a "control or prohibit[ion]" on
"the sale of any fuel or fuel additive" under section 211, and it can
limit idling time only if the limitation is a "standard applicable to
the emission of any air pollutant from

. . .

aircraft engines" under

section 231(a). It also has meant that the dilatory process of new
legislation must be invoked to deal with newly perceived problems.
Fuel composition, for example, could not be regulated under the
original authority to adopt standards for "emission[s]" from "new
motor vehicles," and a special provision had to be added in 1977 to
assure that the EPA could prescribe specifications for fill pipes in
2
order to reduce evaporative emissions during fueling of vehicles.'

1

There still are conspicuous gaps in Title II even as to the regulation of new mobile sources, a subject that cries aloud for a high
degree of uniformity. While section 202(a) allows regulation of emissions from all "new motor vehicles," section 216(2) defines "motor
vehicle" as "any self-propelled vehicle designed for transporting
persons or property on a street or highway.

' 2

Excluded are trains,

ships, and agricultural or construction
equipment, though obviously
62 8
their emissions can be significant.

Congress has been cognizant that Title II in itself will not suffice to solve pollution problems generated by mobile sources. In part
I" Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 215, 91 Stat. 760 (amending
Clean Air Act § 202(a)(5)) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(5) (Supp. I 1977)).
I 42 U.S.C. § 7550(2) (Supp. I 1977).
'' In 1970 the Senate Committee proposed to extend section 202 to aircraft, vessels,
locomotives, and agricultural equipment, as well as to existing commercial vehicles, arguing
that "[sitandards for vessels and locomotives are appropriate because of [sic] their use
characteristically involves interstate travel, with large numbers of them congregating in ports
and yards in or near areas of high population and air pollution concentration." S. REP. No.
1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1970). Except with respect to aircraft, this proposal remains
unimplemented. The 1977 amendments require a study of railroad emissions. Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 404, 91 Stat. 793, reprintedin 42 U.S.C. § 7401 at
1258 (Supp. 1 1977). See H.R. REP. No. 564, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 186-87 (1977), reprintedin
[1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1502, 1566-68; S. REP. No. 127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
93 (1977).
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its answer has been to leave the residual task to the states, for
section 116 emphasizes that, with specified exceptions, "nothing in
this chapter shall preclude or deny the right of any State or political
subdivision thereof to adopt or enforce . . . any requirement re-

specting control or abatement of air pollution."6 2 Even such a subject as what equipment is required on new locomotives or vessels has
been left to the states, though federal regulation would be manifestly preferable. 3 '
Another striking feature of the mobile-source provisions, however, is their tendency to oust the states from regulation of specific
areas as they are subjected to federal scrutiny. First employed as to
new-vehicle emissions in 1965, preemption was extended to fuel
regulation and to aircraft in 1970. Opposed as I am to depriving the
states of authority to protect their people, I nevertheless think mobile sources are one category in which the arguments for preemption
are at their strongest, especially when regulation is to be directed
at the manufacturer.
State measures respecting the use of vehicles, in any event, are
not preempted, and Congress in other sections of the Act has attempted to ensure that measures in addition to those authorized by
Title II are taken to limit mobile-source emissions where such action
is necessary to achieve satisfactory air quality. State plans for im621

42 U.S.C. § 7416 (Supp. I 1977).

110That such state regulation is not generally forbidden by the commerce clause was
established by the Supreme Court in Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S.
440 (1960). The Court upheld application of a municipal smoke ordinance to a vessel in
interstate trade although compliance would require "structural alterations":
State regulation, based on the police power, which does not discriminate against interstate commerce or operate to disrupt its required uniformity, may constitutionally
stand.
. . . [T]he local ordinance . . . is a regulation of general application, designed to
better the health and welfare of the community. And while the appellant argues that
other local governments might impose differing requirements. . . ,the record contains
nothing to suggest the existence of any such competing or conflicting local regulations.
Id. at 448. Moreover, the Court held, the smoke ordinance did not invalidly impinge upon
the authority granted by a federal license to operate in navigable waters: while "[a] state
may not exclude from its waters a ship operating under a federal license," "[t]he mere
possession of a federal license. . . does not immunize a ship from the operation of the normal
incidents of local police power." Id. at 447.
A limit may be found in People v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 268 Cal. App. 2d 501, 74 Cal.
Rptr. 222 (1968), invalidating a state prohibition on smoke emissions from diesel locomotives
as a burden on commerce: "there is no known way to prevent discharge of black smoke when
the engine starts from a standstill." Id. at 502, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 223.
The Court in Huron further noted that the federal statute itself, in what has since become
section 116, 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (Supp. 11977), expressly provided against statutory preemption.
362 U.S. at 445-46.
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plementing ambient air-quality standards under section 110 are to
contain necessary "transportation control" measures to that end,
specifically including the inspection and maintenance programs
1
that appear essential to assuring compliance by vehicles in use.'
The EPA may prescribe and enforce most such measures itself in
default of state action. 32
Title II therefore is difficult to evaluate in isolation. Although
broader powers of direct regulation might well be desirable, the
most serious deficiencies can in theory be remedied by alternative
federal action. In the case of nitrogen oxides, as the Senate Report
argued, it may be desirable to achieve further progress by pushing
technology to control significant sources such as power plants under
section 110; but a recent study has concluded that stationary
sources actually make only a small contribution to long-term am33
bient levels.
In any case, hydrocarbons and the oxidants that result from
them are essentially an automotive problem, and the alternatives
to better control of vehicle hydrocarbon emissions have themselves
proved most burdensome and unpalatable, as the House Committee
itself suggested when it argued that "[r]apid clean up of automobiles is necessary to avoid placing undue reliance on transportation
controls. ' '1 34 The prospects for curing automotive pollution, in short,
do not appear particularly bright; yet Congress seems largely to
have abandoned one of the most promising means toward that end.

"142 U.S.C.

§ 7410 (Supp. I 1977).

$32Id.
'm See 9 ENvm. REP. (BNA) 2028, 2029 (1979).

,m H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 268 (1977), reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 1077, 1347.

